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PATENT LAW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT DURING 1991
Alex Chartove*
I. NOVELTY - 35 U.S.C. § 102
A. Extrinsic Evidence may be Considered to Explain the
Meaning of a Reference under 35 U.S.C. § 102
The subject patent in the case of Scripps Clinic & Research
Foundation v. Genentech, Inc.I was a reissue patent entitled "Ul-
trapurification of Factor VIII Using Monoclonal Antibodies." 2
Before the district court, the accused infringer had argued that sev-
eral claims of the patent were invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)
based upon subject matter described in a 1979 publication by a Dr.
Harris The parties had filed three successive declarations of Dr.
Harris with the district court, each declaration explaining the
meaning of the 1979 publication.
The district court, citing the third Harris declaration, held that
the claims were invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) in view of the
1979 Harris publication and granted the accused infringer's motion
for summary judgment on this issue.' The patentee appealed.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit observed that it is sometimes
appropriate to consider extrinsic evidence to explain the meaning of
a reference under 35 U.S.C. § 102.5 It is appropriate to use the ex-
trinsic evidence to educate the decision-maker to what the reference
meant to persons of ordinary skill in the field of the invention, but it
is not appropriate to use the extrinsic evidence to fill gaps in the
reference.6
In Scripps, the record showed apparent inconsistencies among
Copyright @ 1993 by Alex Chartove.
* B.A. Brandeis University; J.D. Duke University. Mr. Chartove is a partner in the
law firm of Spensley Horn Jubas & Lubitz, Washington, D.C.
1. 927 F.2d 1565, 18 USPQ2D 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
2. Id. at 1003.
3. Id. at 1010.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See Studiengesellschaft Kohle, mbH v. Dart Industries, Inc., 726 F.2d 724, 727, 220
USPQ 841, 842 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
38 COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAWJOURN4lL
the three Harris declarations.7 To the extent that these apparent
inconsistencies raised questions of credibility and weight, whether
of the witness or of the interpretation of the publication, such fac-
tual questions were not properly resolved on summary judgment.
The Federal Circuit therefore reversed the grant of partial summary
judgment of invalidity for anticipation by the Harris publication.'
B. Invalidity Under 35 U.S. C. § 102(b) Requires Proof by
Clear and Convincing Evidence
The respondent in the case of Intel Corporation v. U S. Inter-
national Trade Commission 9 had argued that the subject patent was
invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) because devices which embodied
the patented invention had been placed on sale more than one year
before the patent application's filing date. °
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that the respondent had
not offered any direct or circumstantial evidence showing that the
patentee had sold the patented invention before the critical date.
Instead, the respondent had merely offered evidence showing that
such a sale had been "likely", and had argued that the fact of such
sale could be reasonably inferred from the evidence."
The Federal Circuit found that the reasonable inferences which
the respondent suggested be drawn from the evidence did not meet
the "clear and convincing" standard of proof required for showing
patent invalidity under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). 12 Thus, the respondent
had failed to carry its burden of proof that a sale or offer to sell had
been made prior to the critical date. Accordingly, the Federal Cir-
cuit affirmed the Commission's determination that the patent was
not proven invalid.' 3
C. Post-Critical Date Events May Be Used to Establish That
An Invention Was "On Sale" Under 35 US. C.
§ 102(b)
The application for the subject patent in the case of Sonoscan,
Inc. v. Sonotek, Inc. 4 had been filed on September 15, 1988. On
7. Scripps Clinic & Research Foundation v. Genentech, Inc.; 18 USPQ2D 1001, 1004
(Fed. Cir. 1991).
8. Id. at 1016.
9. 946 F.2d 821, 20 USPQ2D 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1991).




14. 936 F.2d 1261, 19 USPQ2D 1156 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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September 10, 1987 (more than one year prior to the application
filing date) the patentee had quoted a price on a system including
the claimed invention to a first customer.15 On September 18, 1987
(less than one year prior to the application filing date) the patentee
had quoted the same price on the same system to a second
customer. 16
After the patent issued, the patentee filed suit against an al-
leged infringer. As an affirmative defense, the alleged infringer as-
serted that the patent was invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) on the
basis that the claimed invention had been on sale more than one
year prior to the patent application filing date.
The patentee conceded that the September 18 quotation to the
second customer had been for the claimed invention, but argued
that on the September 15 "critical date" the invention had not been
sufficiently developed to be "on sale."' 7
The district court heard testimony concerning the state of de-
velopment of the invention both before and after the September 15
"critical date." The district court found that no serious change in
the invention had taken place between September 10 and September
18.18
On the basis of these findings, the district court concluded that
the claimed invention had been sufficiently developed so that the
September 10 quotation was a genuine offer to sell the claimed in-
vention. 9 The district court therefore held the patent invalid under
§ 102(b) and entered final judgment in favor of the alleged in-
fringer.2 ° The patentee appealed.
On appeal, the patentee argued that the September 18 quota-
tion was irrelevant because it had occurred after the critical date,
and that the district court had therefore erred by taking the Septem-
ber 18 quotation into consideration. 2
The Federal Circuit found, however, that the district court had
properly inquired as to what was offered in the September 18 quota-
tion, what development activities occurred between September 10
and September 18, and had properly inferred from the evidence that
what was adequately developed on September 18 was also ade-
quately developed on September 10. The Federal Circuit therefore
15. Id. at 1157.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1158.
18. Id. at 1159.
19. Sonoscan, 19 USPQ2D at 1158.
20. Sonoscan, Inc. v. Sonotek, Inc., 17 USPQ2D 1247 (E.D. Va. 1990).
21. Sonoscan, 19 USPQ2D at 1159.
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affirmed the judgment of the district court.2 2
D. "Inherency" Represents An Exception to The Rule That
Anticipation Requires Every Element of the Claims to
Appear in A Single Reference
The subject patent in' the case of Continental Can Company
USA, Inc. v. Monsanto Company23 was directed to a plastic bottle
whose ribbed bottom structure had sufficient flexibility to impart
improved impact resistance, combined with sufficient rigidity to re-
sist ddformation under internal pressure. All of the claims recited
that the patented plastic bottle was "characterized by the feature
that the ribs are hollow." 24
The alleged infringer had moved for summary judgment of in-
validity under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) based upon a prior art reference
to Marcus.25 The Marcus reference did not state that the ribs dis-
closed therein were "hollow., 2 6 The alleged infringer had argued,
however, that the Marcus ribs were formed by injection blow mold-
ing, which was the same process described for the patented ribs.
Therefore, according to the alleged infringer, the ribs of the Marcus
reference were "inherently" hollow, regardless of how the ribs were
shown in the Marcus reference. 27
The district court agreed with the alleged infringer, found that
all of the claims of the patent were anticipated by the Marcus refer-
ence, and granted summary judgment of patent invalidity. The pat-
entee appealed.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit observed that the concept of
"inherency" represents a modest flexibility in the rule that anticipa-
tion under § 102 requires every element of the claims to appear in a
single reference. "Inherency" is not a substitute for determination
of patentability under § 103.28 Instead, "inherency" is intended to
accommodate those situations in which the common knowledge of
the skilled artisan is not expressly stated in the reference.29
To serve as an anticipation under § 102 when a reference is
silent about the asserted inherent characteristic, the missing de-
scription in the reference may be filled by extrinsic evidence. How-
22. Id.
23. 948 F.2d 1264, 20 USPQ2D 1746 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
24. Id. at 1747.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1748.
27. Id.




ever, such evidence must make clear that the missing descriptive
matter is necessarily present in the thing described in the reference,
and that it would be so recognized by persons of ordinary skill. In-
herency may not be established by mere probabilities or
possibilities.30
In Continental Can, there was no dispute that the Marcus ref-
erence disclosed an injection blow molding process.31 However,
there was a dispute regarding whether a skilled artisan would recog-
nize this process as necessarily producing "hollow" ribs, as the term
"hollow" was used in the patent. The Federal Circuit concluded
that this was a genuine dispute of a material fact which required a
trial for its resolution. Resolution of this disputed fact adversely to
the patentee was improper on summary judgment. The Federal
Circuit therefore vacated the grant of summary judgment of antici-
pation under § 102(a) and remanded the case.32
E. Conception of a Genetic Invention Under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(g) Requires That the Inventor Be Able to Define
the Gene So As to Distinguish It From Other
Materials
The subject patent in the case of Amgen, Inc., v. Chugai Phar-
maceutical Co., Ltd.33 was entitled "DNA Sequences Encoding Er-
ythropoietin. '' 34 The patent claims were directed to a "purified and
isolated DNA sequence" encoding human EPO. The structure of
this DNA sequence had not been known until September of 1983,
when the inventor had reduced the claimed invention to practice by
cloning the gene.35
The district court had found that the successful identification
and isolation of the EPO gene resulted from a probing strategy
which used two sets of fully-degenerate cDNA probes of two differ-
ent regions of the EPO gene to screen a cDNA library.36 The ac-
cused infringer had asserted that this successful strategy had first
been conceived by a Dr. Fritsch in 1981, and that Fritschhad been
diligent until he reduced the claimed invention to practice in May of
30. In re Oelrich, 666 F.2d 578, 581, 212 USPQ 323, 326 (CCPA 1981); Hansgirg v.
Kemmer, 26 C.C.P.A. 937, 102 F.2d 212, 214, 40 USPQ 665, 667 (CCPA 1939).
31. Continental Can, 20 USPQ2D at 1750.
32. Id.
33. 927 F.2d 1200, 18 USPQ2D 1016 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
34. Erythropoietin (EPO) is a protein consisting of 165 amino acids which stimulates
the production of red blood cells.
35. Amgen, 18 USPQ2D at 1018.
36. Id. at 1019.
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1984. The accused infringer therefore had argued that the patent
claims were invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) due to Fritsch's prior
invention.37
The district court disagreed with the accused infringer and
held that the patent claims were valid and had been infringed.38
The accused infringer appealed.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that a gene is a chemical
compound.39 Conception of a chemical compound requires that the
inventor be able to define the compound so as to distinguish the
compound from other materials, and to describe how to obtain the
compound.' If an inventor is unable to envision the detailed con-
stitution of a gene so as to distinguish it from other materials, as
well as a method for obtaining it, then conception is not established
until the gene has been isolated and thereby successfully reduced to
practice.41
Therefore, to act as prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g),
Fritsch's conception of a process had to be sufficiently specific that
one skilled in the relevant art would succeed in cloning the EPO
gene. However, the record showed that prior to September of 1983,
Fritsch did not have a complete mental conception of a purified and
isolated DNA sequence encoding EPO and a method for its prepa-
ration, in which the precise identity of the sequence is envisioned.
All Fritsch had at that time was an objective to make an invention
which he could not then adequately describe or define sufficiently to
distinguish it from other genes. Fritsch had a goal of obtaining the
isolated EPO gene and an idea of a possible method of obtaining it,
but he did not conceive a purified and isolated DNA sequence en-
coding EPO and a viable method for obtaining it until after the
inventor.42
The record indicated that neither party had an adequate con-
ception of the DNA sequence until reduction to practice had been
achieved, and the inventor had been the first to accomplish that
goal.
The Federal Circuit concluded that the district court had not
erred in finding that the claims directed to a purified and isolated
DNA sequence encoding human EPO were not invalidated under
37. Id.
38. Amgen Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 13 USPQ2D 1737 (1990).
39. Amgen, 18 USPQ2D at 1021.
40. Oka v. Youssefyeh, 849 F.2d 581, 583, 7 USPQ 1169, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
41. Amgen, 18 USPQ2D at 1021.
42. Id.
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35 U.S.C. § 102(g) by the work of Fritsch.43
II. OBVIOUSNiESS - 35 U.S.C. § 103
A. Obviousness Is Not Negated by the Quantity of
References Cited
The claimed invention in the case of In re Gorman4 was di-
rected to a composite candy sucker on a stick, molded in an elasto-
meric mold in the shape of a human thumb. All of the claims had
been rejected as obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103 in view of thirteen
references.45
On appeal, the applicant argued that when it is necessary to
combine the teachings of a large number of references in order to
support a rejection for obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103, this in
and of itself weighs against a holding of obviousness.46
The Federal Circuit noted, however, that the criterion for obvi-
ousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is not the number of references, but
what the references would have meant to a person of ordinary skill
in the field of the invention. 47
The Federal Circuit found that each element of the claimed
invention was present in the prior art, and that the prior art used
the various elements for the same purposes as in the claimed inven-
tion. These facts made the claimed invention, as a whole, obvious
in terms of 35 U.S.C. § 103, and the obviousness of the claimed
invention was not negated by the large number of references cited.
The rejection of the claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103 was therefore
affirmed.48
B. Obviousness Rejection Requires Consideration of the
Degree to Which One Reference Might Discredit
Another Reference
The subject application in the case of In re Young 9 was di-
rected to a method and apparatus for generating an acoustic pulse
43. Id. at 1022.
44. 933 F.2d 982, 18 USPQ2D 1885 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
45. Id. at 1887.
46. Id. at 1888.
47. See, Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1383, 231
USPQ 81, 93 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 947, 94 L. Ed. 2d 792, 107 S. Ct. 1606
(1987); Kansas Jack, Inc. v. Kuhn, 719 F.2d 1144, 1149, 219 USPQ 857, 860 (Fed. Cir.
1983); In re Troiel, 47 C.C.P.A. 795, 274 F.2d 944, 947, 124 USPQ 502, 504 (CCPA 1960);
In re Miller, 34 C.C.P.A. 910, 159 F.2d 756, 758-59, 72 USPQ 512, 514-15 (CCPA 1947).
48. Gorman, 18 USPQ2D at 1889.
49. 927 F.2d 588, 18 USPQ2D 1089 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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in water. All of the claims had been rejected as obvious under 35
U.S.C. § 103 in view of a prior art patent to Carlisle. The Carlisle
reference taught both the method and the advantages of the appli-
cant's claimed invention."
The applicant had argued that the teachings of Carlisle had
been expressly discredited by a prior art article written by Knudsen.
The Knudsen article described a series of tests which evaluated the
Carlisle technique. The Knudsen article stated that the Carlisle
technique yielded no appreciable improvement in bubble oscillation
suppression.51
The applicant had argued that the effective teaching of the
Knudsen/Carlisle combination suggested avoidance of the Carlisle
technique, and that a person of ordinary skill in the art would there-
fore not have considered Carlisle when developing a method and
apparatus for generating an acoustic pulse in water. The Board had
rejected the applicant's arguments, holding that Carlisle was appro-
priately applied notwithstanding the teachings of Knudsen.52
On appeal, the issue was whether the Board had properly af-
firmed the rejection over Carlisle in light of Knudsen's allegedly
contrary teachings.
The Federal Circuit stated that when the prior art contains ap-
parently conflicting references, each reference must be weighed for
its power to suggest solutions to the skilled artisan. In weighing the
suggestive power of each reference, consideration must be given to
the degree to which one reference might accurately discredit
another.53
In Young, the record showed that Knudsen did not test the
Carlisle technique under conditions which were directly comparable
to the conditions disclosed in Carlisle. Moreover, Knudsen's con-
clusion that the Carlisle technique was ineffective appeared to di-
rectly contradict at least some of the data contained in Knudsen. 4
The Federal Circuit concluded that, considering the discrepan-
cies between the Knudsen test and the Carlisle disclosure, as well as
the tendency of some of Knudsen's data to confirm the Carlisle
technique, the Board had correctly determined that Knudsen did
not convincingly discredit Carlisle and would not have deterred the
skilled artisan from using the teachings of Carlisle. The use of Car-
50. Id. at 1091.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1092.
53. Id. at 1091.
54. Young, 18 USPQ2D at 1092.
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lisle in the rejection of the claims was therefore not clearly errone-
ous and the Board's decision affirming the examiner's rejection was
therefore affirmed.55
C. Obviousness Rejection Requires Consideration of Whether
the Prior Art Discloses That the Skilled Artisan Would
Have a Reasonable Expectation of Success in
Making the Claimed Invention
The claimed invention in the case of In re Vaeck 56 was di-
rected to the use of genetic engineering techniques for the produc-
tion of insecticidal Bacillus proteins within transformed
cyanobacterial hosts. 7 The subject matter of the application in-
cluded a chimeric (i.e., hybrid) gene comprising (1) a gene derived
from a bacterium of the Bacillus genus whose product is an insecti-
cidal protein, united with (2) a DNA promoter effective for expres-
sing the Bacillus gene in a host cyanobacterium, so as to produce
the desired insecticidal protein.5
The claims had been rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103. The ex-
aminer stated that the primary reference disclosed a chimeric gene
capable of being highly expressed in a cyanobacterium, the gene
comprising a promoter region effective for expression in a cya-
nobacterium operably linked to a structural gene encoding the en-
zyme chloramphenicol acetyl transferase (CAT). The chimeric
gene and the transformed host of the primary reference differed
from the claimed invention in that, in the primary reference, the
structural gene encoded CAT rather than insecticidally active pro-
tein.59 The secondary references taught genes encoding insecti~i-
dally active proteins produced by Bacillus, and the advantages of
expressing such genes in heterologous hosts to obtain larger quanti-
ties of the protein. The examiner contended that it would have been
obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to substitute the Bacillus
55. Id.
56. 947 F.2d 488, 20 USPQ2D 1438 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
57. Id. at 1439.
58. Claim 1 recited:
A chimeric gene capable of being expressed in Cyanobacteria cells comprising:
(a) a DNA fragment comprising a promoter region which is effective for ex-
pression of a DNA fragment in a Cyanobacterium; and (b) at least one DNA
fragment coding for an insecticidally active protein produced by a Bacillus
strain, or coding for an insecticidally active truncated form of the above pro-
tein or coding for a protein having substantial sequence homology to the active
protein, the DNA fragments being linked so that the gene is expressed.
Id. at 1440.
59. Id. at 1441.
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genes taught by the secondary references for the CAT gene in the
vectors of the primary reference in order to obtain high level expres-
sion of the Bacillus genes in the transformed cyanobacteria. The
examiner further contended that it would have been obvious to use
cyanobacteria as heterologous hosts for expression of the claimed
genes due to the ability of cyanobacteria to serve as transformed
hosts for the expression of heterologous genes. The examiner's re-
jection had been affirmed by the Board, and the applicant appealed
to the Federal Circuit.'
On appeal, the Federal Circuit observed that where a claimed
composition has been rejected as obvious in view of a combination
of prior art references, a proper analysis under § 103 requires, inter
alia, consideration of two factors: (1) whether the prior art would
have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art that they should
make the claimed composition; and (2) whether the prior art would
also have revealed that in making the claimed composition, those of
ordinary skill would have a reasonable expectation of success. Both
the suggestion and the reasonable expectation of success must be
found in the prior art, not in the applicant's disclosure. 1
In Vaeck, the Federal Circuit found that there was no sugges-
tion in the primary reference of substituting in the disclosed plasmid
a structural gene encoding Bacillus insecticidal proteins for the
CAT gene utilized for selection purposes. Nor did the Federal Cir-
cuit find a suggestion in the secondary references of the substitution
of insecticidal Bacillus genes for CAT marker genes in cya-
nobacteria. While the secondary references disclosed expression of
Bacillus genes encoding insecticidal proteins in certain transformed
bacterial hosts, the secondary references did not disclose or suggest
expression of such genes in transformed cyanobacterial hosts.62
The similarity between bacteria and cyanobacteria alone was
not sufficient to motivate the skilled artisan to substitute cya-
nobacteria for bacteria as a host for expression of the claimed gene.
Evidence of recent uncertainty regarding the biology of cya-
nobacteria tended to rebut the position that the skilled artisan
would have considered the cyanobacteria effectively interchangeable
with bacteria as hosts for expression of the claimed gene.63
The Federal Circuit therefore concluded that the prior art of-
60. Id. at 1442.
61. In re Dow Chemical Co., 837 F.2d 469, 473, 5 USPQ2D 1529, 1531 (Fed. Cir.
1988).
62. Vaeck, 20 USPQ2D at 1443.
63. Id.
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fered no explicit or implicit suggestion of the substitution that was
the difference between the claimed invention and the prior art.
Moreover, the prior art did not convey to those of ordinary skill a
reasonable expectation of success in making the claimed composi-
tion." Accordingly, the Federal Circuit reversed the rejection of
the claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
D. Obviousness Rejection Can Not Be Overcome by a
Terminal Disclaimer
In In re Bartfeld6 the claims of a pending application had
been rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious in view of two U.S.
patent references. One of the two U.S. patent references was owned
by the owner of the pending application. Nevertheless, the co-
owned patent reference was available as prior art because the co-
owned patent reference had an earlier filing date than the pending
application and named different inventive entities than the pending
application.66 The PTO Board affirmed the § 103 rejection.67
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, the applicant argued that, in
view of the co-ownership of the reference and the pending applica-
tion, the obviousness rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103 was compara-
ble to an obviousness-type double patenting rejection. Conse-
quently, the § 103 rejection (like an obviousness-type double
patenting rejection) could be overcome by an appropriate terminal
disclaimer.68
The Federal Circuit noted, however, that there is a basic differ-
ence between an obviousness-type double patenting rejection and an
obviousness rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103. An obviousness-type
double patenting rejection depends entirely upon subject matter
that is claimed in an issued U.S. patent. An obviousness rejection
under 35 U.S.C. § 103 depends upon subject matter that is disclosed
(regardless of whether the subject matter is claimed) in a prior art
reference (regardless of whether the reference is an issued U.S. pat-
ent). Consequently, a prior art reference that renders claimed sub-
ject matter obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103 does not necessarily
create an obviousness-type double patenting situation.69
64. See In re O'Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 7 USPQ2D 1673 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
65. 925 F.2d 1450, 17 USPQ2D 1885 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
66. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(e).
67. Ex Parte Bartfield, 16 USPQ2D 1714 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interferences 1990).
68. Bartfeld, 17 USPQ2d at 1886. In support of this position, the applicant cited the
legislative history underlying the 1984 amendment to 35 U.S.C. § 103 and the Federal Cir-
cuit's holding in In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 225 USPQ 645 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
69. Bartfeld, 17 USPQ2D at 1888.
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The purpose of a terminal disclaimer is to limit the term of a
patent, not to remove a reference as prior art. If claimed subject
matter is obvious in view of the prior art, then a terminal disclaimer
can not convert that obvious subject matter into unobvious (and
therefore patentable) subject matter.70 Given these fundamental
differences between an obviousness-type double patenting rejection
and an obviousness rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103, the Federal
Circuit coneluded that a terminal disclaimer is neither an appropri-
ate nor available means for overcoming a rejection under § 103 and
affirmed the decision of the Board.7
E. Evidence of "Secondary Considerations" May Not Be
Sufficient to Defeat a Motion for Summary Judgment
of Invalidity Under 35 US.c.§ 103
The subject patent in the case of Ryko Manufacturing Co. v.
Nu-Star, Inc. 72 was directed to an automatic car wash system elec-
tronically activated by an electrical numerical keypad device.
The district court determined that the difference between the
claimed invention and the prior art was the claimed invention's sub-
stitution of an electrical numerical keypad device for a coin box or
other common input device. The district court found that utiliza-
tion of a numerical keypad device to electronically activate an auto-
matic car wash system was a combination that was clearly
suggested by the prior art. The district court determined that the
patentee had shown evidence of so-called "secondary considera-
tions" (such as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs,
and the failure of others to invent), but this evidence did not carry
sufficient weight to override a determination of obviousness. Ac-
cordingly, the district court granted the alleged infringer's motion
for summary judgment of patent invalidity under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
The patentee then appealed.73
On appeal, the patentee argued that the district court had com-
mitted legal error by improperly focusing its obviousness analysis
on only one element of the claimed invention (the electrical numeri-
cal keypad device), rather than focusing upon the claimed invention
as a whole. 74
70. See In re Braithwaite, 54 C.C.P.A. 1589, 379 F.2d 594, 603, 154 USPQ 29, 36
(CCPA 1967).
71. Bartfield, 17 USPQ2D at 1889.
72. 950 F.2d 714, 21 USPQ2D 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
73. Id. at 1055.
74. Id. at 1056.
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The Federal Circuit acknowledged that, when analyzing the
question of obviousness, the district court must evaluate the claimed
invention as a whole and not unduly focus on one facet of the
claimed invention." However, the district court must also deter-
mine the principal differences between the claimed invention and
the prior art to place the obviousness analysis into proper perspec-
tive.7 6 The Federal Circuit concluded that, in evaluating the
claimed invention as a whole, the district court in Ryko had cor-
rectly compared the claimed invention to the prior art and had cor-
rectly found only one difference recited in the claims that was not
taught by the prior art.7
Regarding the "secondary considerations", the Federal Circuit
found that the district court had, on the alleged infringer's motion
for summary judgment, appropriately accepted the patentee's evi-
dence of commercial success as being true. The alleged infringer
had argued that the patentee had failed to produce evidence of the
required "nexus" between the commercial success and the merits of
the claimed invention. However, the Federal Circuit noted that
prima facie evidence of the required nexus is established if there is
commercial success and if the invention disclosed in the patent is
that which was commercially successful.78 In Ryko the Federal
Circuit found sufficient prima facie evidence in the record to with-
stand summary judgment on the nexus issue.7 9 Consequently, the
district court had appropriately assumed that a nexus existed be-
tween the commercial success and the merits of the claimed
invention.
However, even though the district court found that the secon-
dary considerations weighed in favor of the patentee, the district
court concluded that the secondary consideration did not carry suf-
ficient weight to override a determination of obviousness. The Fed-
eral Circuit concluded that, as long as the secondary considerations
are contemplated by the district court, it is appropriate for the dis-
trict court to reach such a conclusion on summary judgment. The
holding of the district court was therefore affirmed.80
75. W.L. Gore & Associates v. Garlock, Inc. 721 F.2d 1540, 1548, 220 USPQ 303, 309
(Fed. Cir. 1983), cert denied, 469 U.S. 851 (1984).
76. Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
77. Ryko, 21 USPQ2D at 1056.
78. Demaco Corp. v. F. Von Langsdorff Licensing, Ltd., 851 F.2d 1387, 1392, 7 USPQ
2d 1222, 1226 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 956 (1988).
79. Ryko, 21 USPQ2D at 1058.
80. Id.
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F. Obviousness-type Double Patenting Rejection Does Not
Mean That the First-filed Patent is a Prior Art
Reference Against the Later-filed Application
The patentee in the case of Quad Environmental Technologies
Corporation v. Union Sanitary District81 was the owner of two pat-
ents. The earlier issued '589 patent described and claimed a method
of removing odors from wet waste gas streams. The later issued
'461 patent described and claimed a method of removing odors
from dry waste gas streams. Both patents had been filed within a
year of one another, and both patents named the same inventor.8 2
The patentee had requested, and the PTO had granted, reex-
amination of the '461 patent. The Reexamination Order stated that
the '589 patent raised a new question of patentability under the ju-
dicially-created doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting.83
To "obviate" the issue of obviousness-type double patenting,
the patentee had filed a terminal disclaimer, disclaiming that por-
tion of the term of the '461 patent which extended beyond the expi-
ration date of the '589 patent. The examiner held that the terminal
disclaimer resolved the issue of obviousness-type double patenting,
and a Reexamination Certificate was issued.84
The patentee had then sued the alleged infringer for infringe-
ment of the reexamined '461 patent. The district court had granted
the alleged infringer's motion for summary judgment of invalidity
for obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)/§ 103. The motion had
been based on the patentee's pre-trial stipulation that the invention
disclosed in the '589 patent had been in commercial use more than
one year before the filing of the '461 patent.8 5
The district court had not made an independent finding that
the '461 patent claims were obvious in view of the '589 patent dis-
closure. Instead, the district court held that the patentee's filing of
the terminal disclaimer to obviate the double patenting issue was an
admission that the '461 patent claims were obvious in view of the
'589 patent disclosure. The district court thus held that the paten-
tee was estopped from arguing that the '461 claims were unobvious
in view of the process disclosed in the '589 patent.8 6
The patentee appealed the summary judgment of the district
81. 946 F.2d 870, 20 USPQ2D 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1991).




86. Quad Environmental Technologies, 20 USPQ2D at 1394.
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court holding all the claims of the '461 patent invalid on the basis of
obviousness.8 7
On appeal, the Federal Circuit observed that a rejection for
obviousness-type double patenting means that the claims of a later
patent application are deemed obvious from the claims of an earlier
patent.88 A rejection for obviousness-type double patenting does
not mean that the first-filed patent is a prior art reference under
§ 102/§ 103 against the later-fied application. 9 Thus, the "obvia-
tion" of an obviousness-type double patenting by filing a terminal
disclaimer has no effect on a rejection under § 103 based on the
first-filed patent. A rejection under § 103 based on the first-filed
patent can not be overcome by a terminal disclaimer.90 Thus, a ter-
minal disclaimer is not an admission of obviousness of the later-filed
claimed invention in light of the earlier-filed disclosure, for that is
not the basis of the disclaimer.
The Federal Circuit therefore concluded that the district court
had incorrectly granted summary judgment based on an error of
law. The Federal Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment
and remanded for trial.91
G. Obviousness-type Double Patenting Rejection of
Commonly Owned Applications Claiming Separate and
Independent "Subcombination" Inventions Requires
A "Two-way" Patentability Determination
The case of In re Braat involved a pending application to Braat
and an issued patent to Dil.9 2 Both the Dil patent and the Braat
application were assigned to the same assignee. The Dil patent had
issued in June 1980 based upon an application filed in January 1979.
The pending Braat application had been filed in July 1978. 9'
Both the Braat application and the Dil patent were directed to
compact discs. The Braat application was directed to a technique
for controlling the phase depth of information areas on compact
discs by varying the physical depth of the information areas. The
Dil patent was also concerned with controlling the phase depth of
87. Id. at 1392.
88. In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 893, 225 USPQ 645, 648 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re
Braithwaite, 54 C.C.P.A. 1589, 379 F.2d 594, 600, 154 USPQ 29, 34 (CCPA 1967).
89. In re Bowers, 53 C.C.P.A. 1590, 359 F.2d 886, 887, 149 USPQ 570, 572 (CCPA
1966).
90. Bowers, 359 F.2d at 891 n. 7, 149 USPQ at 575 n. 7.
91. Quad, 20 USPQ2D at 1396.
92. In re Braat, 937 F.2d 589, 19 USPQ2D 1289 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
93. Id. at 1290.
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information areas on compact discs, but was primarily concerned
with the effect that the angle of the side walls of the information
areas had on the phase depth.94
The Dil patent expressly acknowledged the Braat invention,
and stated that a compact disc having angled side walls (as taught
by Dil) was particularly useful when combined with an alternating
phase depth structure (as taught by Braat). Claim 1 of the Dil pat-
ent was directed to a compact disc having angled side walls. Claims
5 and 6 of the Dil patent, which depended from claim 1, were di-
rected to a compact disc having angled side walls (as taught by Dil)
in combination with an alternating phase depth structure (as taught
by Braat).
The PTO Board affirmed the rejection of the claims of the
Braat application on grounds of obviousness-type double patenting
in view of dependent claims 5 and 6 of the Dil patent.95
On appeal, the Federal Circuit agreed with the Board that the
rejected claims of the Braat application were obvious in view of
claims 5 and 6 of the Dil patent. However, the Federal Circuit
found that the Board had erred in sustaining the obviousness-type
double patenting rejection without making a corresponding deter-
mination that claims 5 and 6 of the Dil patent were obvious in view
of the rejected claims of the Braat application. In the terminology
used by the Federal Circuit, the Board had erred in applying a
"one-way" patentability determination instead of a "two-way"
determination.9 6
Such a "two-way" patentability determination applies where,
for example, an applicant files a first application for a "basic" inven-
tion and then subsequently fies a second, separate application for
an "improvement" invention. As a matter of policy, such an appli-
cant should not be penalized by the different rates of progress of the
two applications through the PTO. 97 Therefore, if the later filed
improvement patent issues before the earlier filed basic patent, a
double patenting rejection is only proper against the claims of the
basic patent if the improvement invention is not patentably distinct
94. Id. at 1291.
95. Obviousness-type double patenting is a judicially created doctrine intended to pre-
vent improper extension of the patent term by prohibiting claims in a second patent which
define an obvious variation of an invention claimed in a first patent. In re Longi, 759 F.2d
887, 892, 225 USPQ 645, 648 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Vogel, 57 C.C.P.A. 920, 422 F.2d 438,
441, 164 USPQ 619, 622 (CCPA 1970).
96. Braat, 19 USPQ2D at 1292.
97. Id. at 1293.
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from the basic invention.98 In such a situation, the order in which
the two applications issue is irrelevant. The relevant determination
is whether the improvement invention is patentably distinct from
the basic invention.99
The Federal Circuit determined that the same policy should
apply to the claims of the Braat application, even though the Fed-
eral Circuit did not consider the Dil invention to be an "improve-
ment" of the Braat invention. Instead, the Federal Circuit viewed
the Dil patent and the Braat application as disclosing separate and
independent "subcombination" inventions. Dil had simply com-
bined these two separate subcombination inventions to form a third
invention, which third invention was defined in dependent claims 5
and 6 of the Dil patent."°
The Federal Circuit reasoned that the common assignee of the
Dill and Braat applications should not be penalized merely because
the Dil patent happened to have issued first. Therefore, a double
patenting rejection would be sustainable only if the rejected claims
of the Braat application were obvious in view of claims 5 and 6 of
the Dil patent, and claims 5 and 6 of the Dil patent were obvious in
view of the rejected claims of the Braat application (thereby estab-
lishing the absence of a patentable distinction between claims 5 and
6 of Dil and the rejected claims of Braat).'1
The Federal Circuit found that claims 5 and 6 of the Dil patent
were not obvious in view of the rejected claims of the Braat applica-
tion. The Federal Circuit therefore concluded that the obviousness-
type double patenting rejection was in error, and reversed the deci-
sion of the Board.102
III. THE PATENT SPECIFICATION - 35 U.S.C. § 112
A. The Written Description Requirement is Separate and
Distinct from the Enablement Requirement
The patentee in the case of Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar had filed
a U.S. design patent application directed to a double lumen cathe-
ter.103 The patentee had also filed a Canadian design patent appli-
cation comprising the same drawings as the U.S. design patent
application. The Canadian design patent application ultimately is-
98. In re Borah, 53 C.C.P.A. 800, 354 F.2d 1009, 148 USPQ 213 (CCPA 1966).
99. Id.
100. Braat, 19 USPQ2D at 1292.
101. Id. at 1293.
102. Id. at 1294.
103. Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 19 USPQ2D 1111 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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sued as a Canadian design patent.1°
More than one year after the issuance of the Canadian design
patent, the patentee filed two utility patent applications in the U.S.
The U.S. utility patent applications included the same drawings as
the U.S. design patent application and claimed the benefit of the
filing date of the U.S. design patent application. The U.S. utility
patent applications issued as U.S. utility patents.10 5
After issuance, the patentee was sued by an alleged infringer
seeking a declaratory judgment of patent invalidity and non-in-
fringement. The alleged infringer argued that the U.S. utility pat-
ents were not entitled to the filing date of the U.S. design patent
application under 35 U.S.C. § 120, because the drawings of the U.S.
design patent application did not provide an adequate "written de-
scription" of the invention claimed in the U.S. utility patents, as
required by 35 U.S.C. § 112, 11.106 The alleged infringer asserted
that, as a consequence, the U.S. utility patents were anticipated by
the Canadian design patent under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). 107
The alleged infringer moved for summary judgment on the va-
lidity issue. For purposes of the summary judgment motion, the
patentee conceded that if the U.S. utility patents were not entitled
to the filing date of the U.S. design patent application under 35
U.S.C. § 120, then the Canadian design patent would represent an
anticipating § 102(b) reference against the claims of the U.S. utility
patents.108
The district court agreed with the alleged infringer and held
the U.S. utility patents invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).109 The
patentee appealed.
The issue on appeal was whether the district court erred in
concluding, on summary judgment, that the disclosure of the U.S.
design patent application did not provide a § 112, 1 "written de-
scription" adequate to support the claims of the U.S. utility
patents. 110
104. Id. at 1112.
105. Id. at 1113.
106. The first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 requires that:
the specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or
with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set
forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
107. Vas-cath, 19 USPQ2D at 1116.
108. Id. at 1117.
109. Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 745 F. Supp. 517, 17 USPQ2D 1353.
110. Vas-Cath, 19 USPQ2D at 1117.
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The Federal Circuit initially noted that, under proper circum-
stances, drawings alone may be sufficient to provide the "written
description of the invention" required by § 112, 1.111
The Federal Circuit then explained the extent to which the
"written description" requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1, is sepa-
rate and distinct from the enablement ("make and use") require-
ment of 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1.112 As interpreted by the Federal
Circuit, the "written description" requirement requires more than a
mere explanation of how to "make and use" the invention.' 13 The
written description requirement also requires the applicant to con-
vey, with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the
fMling date, the applicant was in possession of the invention
claimed. 14
Thus, in Vas-Cath, the proper test under the "written descrip-
tion" requirement was whether the drawings of the U.S. design pat-
ent application conveyed with reasonable clarity to the skilled
artisan that the patentee had in fact invented the catheter recited in
the claims of the U.S. utility patents. The proper test was not
whether the drawings of the U.S. design patent application neces-
sarily excluded all diameters other than those within the range
claimed in the U.S. utility patents, as the district court had errone-
ously assumed. 115
In Vas-Cath the patentee had submitted the declaration of an
expert explaining why a skilled artisan, studying the drawings of the
U.S. design patent application, would have understood from the
drawings that the catheter must have a diameter within the range
recited by the claims of the U.S. utility patents. The district court
had relied upon later patents issued to the patentee which disclosed
diameter ratios that differed from those in the U.S. utility patents.
However, since application sufficiency under § 112, 1, must be
111. Id. at 1114.
112. In In re Wilder, 736 F.2d 1516, 1520, 222 USPQ 369, 372 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1209, 84 L. Ed. 2d 323, 105 S. Ct. 1173 (1985), the Federal Circuit stated:
"The description requirement is found in 35 U.S.C. § 112 and is separate from the enable-
ment requirement of that provision." However, in Kennecott Corp. v. Kyocera Int'l, Inc.,835
F.2d 1419, 1421, 5 USPQ2D 1194, 1197 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1008, 100 L.
Ed. 2d 198, 108 S. Ct. 1735 (1988), the Federal Circuit had stated: "The purpose of the
[written] description requirement [of section 112, first paragraph] is to state what is needed to
fulfill the enablement criteria. Those requirements may be viewed separately, but they are
intertwined... . The written description must communicate that which is needed to enable
the skilled artisan to make and use the claimed invention."
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judged as of the filing date, 116 the Federal Circuit viewed these later
patents involving different range limitations as being irrelevant." 7
The Federal Circuit held that the patentee's unrefuted declara-
tion evidence gave rise to a genuine issue of material fact inappro-
priate for summary disposition. The district court's grant of
summary judgment holding the U.S. utility patents invalid under 35
U.S.C. § 102(b) was reversed and the case remanded for further
proceedings. 118
B. The First Paragraph of § 112 Requires That the Scope of
the Claims Must Bear a "Reasonable Correlation" to
the Scope of Enablement Provided by the
Specification
The claimed invention in the case of In re Vaeck "9 was di-
rected to the use of genetic engineering techniques for the produc-
tion of insecticidal Bacillus proteins within transformed
cyanobacterial hosts.' 0 The subject matter of the application in-
cluded a chimeric (i.e., hybrid) gene comprising (1) a gene derived
from a bacterium of the Bacillus genus whose product is an insecti-
cidal protein, united with (2) a DNA promoter effective for expres-
sing the Bacillus gene in a host cyanobacterium, so as to produce
the desired insecticidal protein.' 2 1
In addition to describing the claimed invention in generic
terms, the patent application disclosed two particular species of Ba-
cillus as sources of insecticidal protein and nine genera of cya-
nobacteria as useful hosts. The relevant working examples
described in the application detailed the transformation of a single
strain of cyanobacteria.122
The examiner had rejected the claims under 35 U.S.C. § 112,
116. United States Steel Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 865 F.2d 1247, 1251, 9
USPQ2D 1461, 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
117. Vas-Cath, 19 USPQ2D at 1119.
118. Id. at 1120.
119. 947 F.2d 488, 20 USPQ2D 1438 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
120. Id. at 1439.
121. Claim 1 recited:
A chimeric gene capable of being expressed in Cyanobacteria cells comprising:
(a) a DNA fragment comprising a promoter region which is effective for ex-
pression of a DNA fragment in a Cyanobacterium; and (b) at least one DNA
fragment coding for an insecticidally active protein produced by a Bacillus
strain, or coding for an insecticidally active truncated form of the above pro-
tein or coding for a protein having substantial sequence homology to the active
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first paragraph, on the ground that the disclosure was enabling only
for claims limited in accordance with the specification as filed. The
examiner took the position that undue experimentation would be
required of the skilled artisan to practice the claimed invention, in
view of the unpredictability in the art, the breadth of the claims, the
limited number of working examples and the limited guidance pro-
vided in the specification. The examiner's rejection had been af-
firmed by the Board, and the applicant appealed to the Federal
Circuit. 123
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that, although the first
paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 does not so state, enablement requires
that the specification teach the skilled artisan to make and use the
invention without "undue experimentation." Some degree of exper-
imentation is permissible. The issue is whether the amount of ex-
perimentation required to make and use the invention is
"undue.", 124
Moreover, the first paragraph of § 112 requires that the scope
of the claims must bear a "reasonable correlation" to the scope of
enablement provided by the specification. 12' The first paragraph of
35 U.S.C. § 112 requires sufficient disclosure, either through illus-
trative examples or terminology, to teach the skilled artisan how to
make and use the invention as broadly as it is claimed. This means
that the disclosure must adequately guide the skilled artisan to de-
termine, without undue experimentation, which species among all
those encompassed by the claimed genus possess the disclosed util-
ity. Where a claimed genus represents a diverse and relatively
poorly understood group of microorganisms, the required level of
disclosure will be greater than the disclosure of an invention involv-
ing a "predictable" factor (such as a mechanical or electrical
element). 126
In Vaeck, the Federal Circuit observed that the rejected claims
were not limited to any particular genus or species of cyanobacteria.
Cyanobacteria are a diverse and relatively poorly studied group of
organisms, comprising 150 different genera, and heterologous gene
expression in cyanobacteria is "unpredictable." Only one particular
species of cyanobacteria was employed in the working examples of
the specification, and only nine genera of cyanobacteria were men-
123. Id. at 1442.
124. In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 736-37, 8 USPQ2D 1400, 1404 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
125. In re Fisher, 57 C.C.P.A. 1099, 427 F.2d 833, 839, 166 USPQ 18, 24 (CCPA 1970).
126. Id.
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tioned in the entire patent application.127
Consequently, there was no reasonable correlation between the
narrow disclosure in the application and the broad scope of protec-
tion sought in the claims encompassing gene expression in any and
all cyanobacteria. Taking into account the relatively incomplete
understanding of the biology of cyanobacteria as of the application's
filing date, as well as the limited disclosure of particular cya-
nobacterial genera operative in the claimed invention, the Federal
Circuit found that the Board had not erred in rejecting the claims
under § 112, first paragraph. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit af-
firmed the rejection of the claims under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first
paragraph.128
C. The First Paragraph of 35 USC. § 112 Requires a
Description of All Claim Elements That Are Integral
to the Invention and Not Well Known in the Art
In the case of In re Buchner 129 the claimed invention was di-
rected to a digital transmission system which included a compara-
tor and a divider. Although the specification adequately disclosed
the functions performed by the comparator and the divider, the ex-
aminer found that neither the comparator nor the divider were stan-
dard elements, and that the specification failed to disclose the
structure of these two elements. The examiner therefore rejected
the application under 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1, for failing to describe
how to make and use the comparator and the divider without undue
experimentation. 130
In response, the applicant offered a declaration of an expert
stating that the divider and the comparator were well-known to the
skilled artisan as of the application filing date and that these two
elements were "routinely built." The expert's declaration provided
details concerning the structure and the function of the comparator
and the divider. 131
The Board found that the expert's declaration failed to over-
come the § 112 rejection. The Board characterized the declaration
as a mere conclusory statement unsupported by any factual docu-
mentation showing that the technology concerning the comparator
127. Vaeck, 20 USPQ2D at 1444.
128. Id. at 1445.
129. 929 F.2d 660, 18 USPQ2D 1331 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1332.
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and the divider was, in fact, well-known.132
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that the elements at issue
were integral to the practice of the claimed invention, and that
neither the specification nor the prior art appeared to describe the
structure of these elements. Consequently, it was reasonable for the
examiner in this case to doubt that the claimed invention could
have been carried out based upon the specification.
The Federal Circuit further held that if information is not well
known in the art, then § 112 requires the specification itself to con-
tain such information. It is not sufficient to provide such informa-
tion only through an expert's declaration. 3 3 Consequently, even
though the expert's declaration in Buchner provided significant de-
tail concerning the structure and function of the elements in ques-
tion, the declaration was insufficient to overcome the rejection
under 35 U.S.C. § 112, 11.
Moreover, the Federal Circuit found that the expert's declara-
tion was inadequate because the expert's opinion on the ultimate
legal issue was a conclusory statement unsupported by any addi-
tional evidence.134 The declaration failed to provide adequate evi-
dentiary support showing that the divider and the comparator were
well known to the skilled artisan as of the filing date and that they
were routinely built. Although the declaration described how to
construct the divider and the comparator, it did not demonstrate
that such construction was well-known to the skilled artisan. The
Federal Circuit reasoned that if the comparator and the divider
were so well-known and routinely built as of the effective filing date,
then the expert should have had no trouble documenting this fact.
The declaration did not, however, provide such supporting
documentation. 135
The Federal Circuit therefore concluded that the Board had
not erred in affirming the examiner's rejection of the claims for fail-
ure to comply with 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1, and affirmed the Board's
decision. 136
132. Id.
133. In re Smyth, 38 C.C.P.A. 1130, 189 F.2d 982, 990, 90 USPQ 106, 112 (1951).
134. In re Brandstadter, 484 F.2d 1395, 1405, 179 USPQ 286, 294 (CCPA 1973).
135. Buchner, 18 USPQ2D at 1332.
136. Id.
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D. For Claims Directed to DNA Sequences, the First
Paragraph of 35 U.S. C. § 112 Requires Disclosing
How to Make and Use Enough Sequences to Justify
the Grant of the Claims
The subject patent in the case of Amgen, Inc., v. Chugai Phar-
maceutical Co., Ltd. 137 was entitled "DNA Sequences Encoding Er-
ythropoietin."13 The patent claims were directed to a "purified
and isolated DNA sequence" encoding human EPO. Claim 7 en-
compassed all possible DNA sequences that will encode any poly-
peptide having an amino acid sequence "sufficiently duplicative" of
EPO to possess the property of increasing production of red blood
cells.
The district court found that over 3,600 different EPO analogs
could be made by substituting only a single amino acid position,
and over a million different analogs could be made by substituting
three amino acids. Thus, the number of claimed DNA encoding se-
quences that could produce an EPO-like product was potentially
enormous. 1
39
The district court concluded that the patent specification was
insufficient to enable one of ordinary skill in the art to make and use
the invention defined by claim 7 without undue experimentation,
and held claim 7 invalid for lack of enablement under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112.4 The patentee appealed.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, an inventor must provide a disclosure sufficient to enable a
skilled artisan to carry out the invention commensurate with the
scope of the claims. For claims directed to DNA sequences, 35
U.S.C. § 112 requires disclosing how to make and use enough se-
quences to justify the grant of the claims sought. 4 '
Claim 7 encompassed every possible analog of a gene contain-
ing about 4,000 nucleotides. The patent specification disclosed only
how to make EPO and a few analogs. Considering the structural
complexity of the EPO gene, the many possibilities for change in its
structure, the uncertainty as to what utility might be possessed by
these analogs, the Federal Circuit found that the disclosure was
137. 927 F.2d 1200, 18 USPQ2D 1016 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
138. Erythropoietin (EPO) is a protein consisting of 165 amino acids which stimulates
the production of red blood cells. Id. at 1018.
139. Id. at 1027.
140. Amgen Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 13 USPQ2D 1737 (1990).
141. See Utter v. Hiraga, 845 F.2d 993, 998, 6 USPQ2D 1709, 1714 (Fed. Cir. 1988); In
re Robins, 57 C.C.P.A. 1321, 429 F.2d 452, 456-57, 166 USPQ 552, 555 (CCPA 1970).
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inadequate in terms of identifying the various analogs that are
within the scope of the claim, the methods for making them, and
the structural requirements for producing compounds with EPO-
like activity. 142
The record showed that there may be many other genetic se-
quences that code for EPO-type products. The patent disclosed
how to make and use only a few of them. The Federal Circuit
therefore concluded that the patent disclosure was inadequate to
support a patent claim covering all possible genetic sequences that
have EPO-like activity. The Federal Circuit found no error in the
district court's conclusion that claim 7 was invalid under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112.143
E. The Particulars of Making a Commercial Embodiment of
the Invention Do Not Necessarily Equate With the
"Best Mode" of Carrying Out the Invention
The subject patent in the case of Wahl Instruments, Inc. v. Ac-
vious, Inc. 144 was directed to a reversible temperature indicating de-
vice useful in timing the cooking of eggs. A commercial
embodiment of the claimed invention had been mass produced us-
ing a technique known as "embedment molding." 145
The inventor had testified that, at the time the patent applica-
tion had been filed, the best technique for manufacturing the com-
mercial version of the claimed invention had been the embedment
molding technique. The alleged infringer asserted that because the
patent specification did not describe the embedment molding tech-
nique, the patent specification failed to disclose the best mode con-
templated by the inventor of carrying out the invention as required
by 35 U.S.C. § 112. The district court granted the alleged in-
fringer's motion for summary judgment on this ground, ruling that
the claims were invalid for failure to disclose the best mode. The
patentee appealed the district court's grant of summary
judgment. 146
On appeal, the Federal Circuit observed that a description of a
particular manufacturing technique may or may not be required as
142. Amgen, 18 USPQ2D at 1027-28.
143. Id. at 1028.
144. 950 F.2d 1575, 21 USPQ2D 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
145. The embedment molding technique consists of layering plastic into a mold, followed
by an adhesive pouring, onto which a thermochromic layer is placed, followed by a third
pouring to complete the device. Id. at 1125.
146. Id. at 1126.
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part of a best mode disclosure respecting a device. 147 There is no
mechanical rule that a best mode violation occurs because the in-
ventor failed to disclose a particular manufacturing technique. One
must look at the scope of the invention, the skill in the art, the
evidence as to the inventor's belief, and all of the circumstances in
order to evaluate whether the inventor's failure to disclose a partic-
ular manufacturing technique gives rise to an inference that the in-
ventor concealed information which one of ordinary skill in the art
would not know. 148
The Federal Circuit further observed that any manufacturing
technique requires the selection of specific steps and materials over
others. The best mode does not necessarily cover each of these se-
lections. A technique considered "best" in a manufacturing sense
may have been selected for a non-"best mode" reason, such as the
manufacturing equipment was on hand, certain materials were
available, a prior relationship with a supplier was satisfactory, or
other reasons having nothing to do with the development of the
invention. Thus, the particulars of making a commercial embodi-
ment of the invention do not necessarily equate with the "best
mode" of "carrying out" an invention.' 49
In Wahl Instruments the record indicated that the embed-
ment molding technique had been well known at the time the appli-
cation had been filed, and that the embedment molding technique
would have been utilized if one in the business of fabricating solid
plastic articles had been asked to make the claimed invention.
There was no proof that the embedment molding technique was
"best" for any reason related to the claimed invention, other than
the commercial manufacture of a particular embodiment of the in-
vention. The record indicated that the embedment molding tech-
nique had been selected as the commercial manufacturing technique
solely for reasons of cost and volume.
The Federal Circuit observed that the claimed invention was
directed to a device and a method of. using the device, not to a
method of manufacturing the device. How to mass produce the
claimed invention was not part of the claimed invention or a best
mode of the claimed invention. The embedment molding technique
was therefore not a "mode" of "carrying out" the invention within
147. Christianson v. Colt Indust. Operating Corp., 822 F.2d 1544, 1562, 3 USPQ2d
1254-55 (Fed. Cir. 1987), vacated on other grounds, 486 U.S. 800 (1988).
148. Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 946 F.2d 1528, 1531-32, 20 USPQ2d 1300,
1302-03 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Randomex, Inc. v. Scopus Corp., 849 F.2d 585, 587, 7 USPQ2d
1050, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
149. Wahl, 21 USPQ2D at 1127.
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the meaning of the statute, and the inventor had concealed nothing
respecting the claimed invention by failing to disclose the embed-
ment molding technique.15
The Federal Circuit concluded that the patent was not invalid
for failure to disclose the best mode, and reversed the decision of the
district court. 51
F. Invalidity for Failure to Disclose the Best Mode Requires
Both Knowledge and Concealment of a Better Mode
The case of Engel Industries, Inc., v. The Lockformer Com-
pany'51 involved an appeal by a patentee from a district court deci-
sion holding the patent in suit invalid due to the patentee's failure to
disclose the best mode as required by 35 U.S.C. § 112.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that invalidity for failure
to set forth the best mode requires that (1) the inventor knew of a
better mode of carrying out the claimed invention than the mode
disclosed in the specification, and (2) the inventor concealed that
better mode. 5 3 The element of concealment of the inventor's pre-
ferred mode must be established before claims may be invalidated
on best mode grounds. 5'
The Federal Circuit concluded that the district court had not
found such concealment, nor did the evidence support such a find-
ing. Since neither knowledge that there, was a better mode nor con-
cealment of that better mode had been established, the Federal
Circuit reversed the holding of invalidity for failure to comply with
the best mode requirement.155
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. 946 F.2d 1528, 20 USPQ2D 1300 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
153. Chemcast Corp. v. Arco Indus. Corp., 913 F.2d 923, 927-28, 16 USPQ2D 1033,
1036-37 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
154. Randomex, Inc. v. Sopus Corp., 849 F.2d 585, 588, 7 USPQ2D 1050, 1053 (Fed.
Cir. 1988); In re Gay, 50 CCPA 725, 309 F.2d 769, 774, 135 USPQ 311, 316 (1962); W.L.
Gore & Assoc., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1556-57, 220 USPQ 303, 316 (Fed. Cir.
1983), cert denied, 469 U.S. 851, 83 L. Ed. 2d 107, 105 S. Ct. 172 (1984); Hybritech, Inc. v.
Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1384-85, 231 USPQ 81, 94 (Fed. Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 480 U.S. 947, 94 L. Ed. 2d 792, 107 S.Ct. 1606 (1987); In re Sherwood, 613 F.2d
809, 816-17, 204 USPQ 537, 544 (CCPA 1980), cert denied, 450 U.S. 994, 210 USPQ 776, 68
L.Ed.2d 193, 101 S.Ct. 1694 (1981); In re Karnofsky, 55 CCPA 940, 390 F.2d 994, 997, 156
USPQ 682, 685 (1968).
155. Engel, 20 USPQ2D at 1304.
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G. No Cell Deposit May Be Required If the Specification
Enables the Skilled Artisan to Prepare the Best Mode
Cells from Known Materials
The subject patent in the case of Amgen, Inc., v. Chugai Phar-
maceutical Co., Ltd. 156 was entitled "DNA Sequences Encoding Er-
ythropoietin."' 15 7 The patent claims were directed to a "purified
and isolated DNA sequence" encoding human EPO.158
The accused infringer argued that the subject patent was inva-
lid under the best mode requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112 due to the
failure of the patentee to deposit the best mode host cells. The ac-
cused infringer contended that the "best mode" requirement for
patents involving novel genetically-engineered biological subject
matter requires a biological deposit, so that the public has access to
exactly the best mode contemplated by the inventor.
The district court disagreed with the accused infringer and
held that the patent was valid and had been infringed."5 9 The ac-
cused infringer appealed.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that analysis of the best
mode requirement has two components."6 The first is a subjective
inquiry, asking whether, at the time the patent application was filed,
the inventor contemplated a best mode of practicing the claimed
invention. If so, then the second inquiry is whether the disclosure is
adequate to enable one skilled in the art to practice the contem-
plated best mode.1 61
The Federal Circuit then observed that there is a basic distinc-
tion between novel genetically-engineered biological materials and
biological cells obtained from nature. When a biological sample re-
quired for the practice of an invention is obtained from nature, the
invention may be incapable of being practiced without access to that
specific biological sample. Consequently, the best mode require-
ment of 35 U.S.C. § 112 requires a deposit of that specific biological
sample.1 62
However, when an organism is created by the insertion of ge-
netic material into a cell obtained from generally available sources,
156. 927 F.2d 1200, 18 USPQ2D 1016 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
157. Erythropoietin (EPO) is a protein consisting of 165 amino acids which stimulates
the production of red blood cells.
158. Amgen, 18 USPQ2D at 1018.
159. Amgen Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 13 USPQ2D 1737 (1990).
160. Chemeast Corp. v. Arco Indus. Corp., 913 F.2d 923, 927, 16 USPQ2D 1033, 1036
(Fed. Cir. 1990).




then all that is required by 35 U.S.C. § 112 is a description of the
best mode and an adequate description of the means of carrying out
the invention. If the cells can be prepared without undue experi-
mentation from known materials, based on the description in the
patent specification, then a deposit is not required. 163
In Amgen, the record showed that the invention as it related to
the best mode host cells, could be practiced by one skilled in the art
following a specific example in the patent specification. The Federal
Circuit therefore held that there was no failure to comply with the
best mode requirement for lack of a deposit of the cells. The district
court finding that the accused infringers had not met their burden
of proving a best mode violation was affirmed. 1
H. Claims Are Properly Declared Invalid Under the Second
Paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 If the Meaning of the
Claims Is In Doubt
The subject patent in the case of Amgen, Inc., v. Chugai Phar-
maceutical Co., Ltd. 165 was entitled "Method for the Purification of
Erythropoietin and Erythropoietin Compositions."' 166
Claims 4 and 6 of the patent recited a specific activity limita-
tion of "at least about 160,000." The district court found that the
term "at least about 160,000" gave no hint as to which specific ac-
tivity level constituted infringement. The district court therefore
held claims 4 and 6 to be invalid for indefiniteness under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112.167 The patentee appealed.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit observed that if the meaning of
claims is in doubt, then the claims are properly declared invalid
under 35 U.S.C. § 112 (especially when there is close prior art).168
The Federal Circuit found the district court's invalidity hold-
ing to be supported by the fact that nothing in the patent specifica-
tion, prosecution history, or prior art provided any indication as to
what range of specific activity was covered by the term "at least
about," and by the fact that no expert testified as to a definite mean-
ing for the term "at least about" in the context of the prior art.169
163. Id. at 1025.
164. Id.
165. 927 F.2d 1200, 18 USPQ2D 1016 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
166. Erythropoietin (EPO) is a protein consisting of 165 amino acids which stimulates
the production of red blood cells. Id at 1018.
167. Amgen Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 13 USPQ2D 1737 (1990).
168. Standard Oil Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 453, 227 USPQ 293,
297 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
169. Amgen, 18 USPQ2D at 1031.
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The Federal Circuit cautioned that its holding in Amgen that
the term "at least about" renders claims 4 and 6 indefinite should
not be interpreted as ruling out any and all uses of this term in
patent claims. The term "at least about" may be acceptable claim
language in appropriate fact situations. 170
I. The Second Paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 Does Not
Require Claims to Recite Each and Every Element
Needed for the Practical Utilization of the Claimed
Subject Matter
The subject patent in the case of Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Ren-
ishaw PLC 171 was directed to a "touch-trigger" probe used in ma-
chines for measuring the dimensions of objects to extremely fine
precision. Claim 3 of the patent recited a device for performing the
function of moving a stylus in a position-determining apparatus so
as to provide for repeatable displacement and return of the stylus to
a rest position.1 72
In the opinion of the district court, the touch-trigger probe in-
vention disclosed in the patent consisted of more than merely mov-
ing a stylus back and forth between a rest position and an unseated
position. Focusing on the fact that claim 3 did not recite any elec-
trical circuitry or other signalling means, the district court con-
cluded that claim 3 arbitrarily presented only a part of the
invention. The district court held that claim 3 was therefore invalid
as lacking claim definiteness under 35 U.S.C. § 112, 12. The paten-
tee appealed the judgment of the district court. 173
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that a claim must recite a
structure that is capable of performing its purported function.1 7
4
The Federal Circuit found that the device defined by claim 3 was
capable of performing the purpose recited in claim 3 of "mounting a
stylus in position-determining apparatus" so as to provide for re-
peatable displacement and return to a rest position.' 75
The Federal Circuit further observed that it is not necessary
that a claim recite each and every element needed for the practical
utilization of the claimed subject matter. A single piece of appara-
170. See, W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1557, 220 USPQ
303, 316 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
171. 945 F.2d 1173, 20 USPQ2D 1094 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
172. Id. at 1099.
173. Id. at 1100.
174. General Elec. Co. v. United States, 215 Ct. CI. 636, 572 F.2d 745, 198 USPQ 65
(1978).
175. Carl Zeiss, 20 USPQ2D at 1101.
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tus disclosed in the specification as an embodiment of an invention
may include several separate subcombination inventions. It is
therefore entirely consistent with the claim definiteness requirement
of 35 U.S.C. § 112, 2 to present "subcombination" claims, drawn
to only one aspect or combination of elements of an invention that
has utility separate and apart from other aspects of the invention.'7 6
Consequently, the district court's holding of invalidity based
upon a conclusion of lack of claim definiteness was legally incorrect.
The Federal Circuit therefore reversed the holding and remanded
the case.
J. The Doctrine of Claim Differentiation Cannot Override
the Requirements of the Sixth Paragraph of 35 U.S.C.
§ 112
The subject patent in the case of The Laitram Corporation v.
Rexnord, Inc. 177 was directed to a conveyor belt. Claim 21 of the
patent included the following limitation:
means for joining said pluralities [of link ends] to one another so
that the axes of said holes of said first plurality are arranged
coaxially, the axes of said holes of said second plurality are ar-
ranged coaxially and the axes of respective holes of both plurali-
ties of link ends are substantially parallel; .... 178
Before the district court, the accused infringer argued that the
above-quoted means plus function limitation must be interpreted in
accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 112, 6.179 Therefore, a proper finding
of literal infringement of claim 21 requires that the means in the
accused device must be structurally equivalent to the cross member
element described in the patent specification which performs the re-
cited function of joining the link ends to one another.'80
The patentee argued that an interpretation which reads the
structural limitation of a cross member into claim 21 is impermissi-
176. Bendix Corp. v. United States, 600 F.2d 1364, 1369, 220 Ct. Cl. 507, 514, 204
USPQ 617, 621 (1979).
177. 939 F.2d 1533, 19 USPQ2D 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
178. Id.
179. 35 U.S.C. § 112, 6 provides:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step
for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or
acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corre-
sponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and
equivalents thereof.
180. Johnston v. IVAC Corp., 885 F.2d 1574, 1580, 12 USPQ2D 1382, 1386-87 (Fed.
Cir. 1989).
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ble despite § 112, 6, because claim 24 of the patent (a claim which
depended from claim 21, but which was not in suit) specifically re-
cited a cross member. The patentee asserted that claim 21 cannot
also require a cross member because to do so would violate the doc-
trine of claim differentiation."' 1
The district court held that § 112, 6 was inapplicable to the
above-quoted limitation, because the means plus function language
already included a recital of structure. The district court therefore
did not compare the accused device to the cross member structure
disclosed in the patent specification. Instead, the district court held
that the above-quoted claim limitation was literally met by the ac-
cused device because the accused device included a means for per-
forming the recited function of joining. The district court therefore
ruled that claim 21 was literally infringed by the accused device.1" 2
The accused infringer appealed the judgment of the district court.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit found that the applicability of
§ 112, 6 was not precluded merely because the means plus func-
tion language included a recital of structure. 1 3 The Federal Circuit
found that the recital of structure in the means plus function lan-
guage merely served to further specify the function performed by
the means. In other words, the recital of structure merely told what
the "means-for-joining" did, but did not tell what the "means-for-
joining" was structurally. The district court had therefore erred, as
a matter of law, by not interpreting the above-quoted subparagraph
in accordance with § 112, 6.
Regarding the patentee's argument that claim 24 prevented
claim 21 from being interpreted as statutorily mandated by 35
U.S.C. § 112, 6, the Federal Circuit noted that claim differentia-
tion is a judicially created guide to claim interpretation. This judi-
cially created guide cannot override the express statutory
requirements of § 112, 6. Therefore, a means-plus-function limita-
tion can not be made open-ended by merely adding a dependent
claim which specifically recites the structure disclosed in the specifi-
cation. Otherwise, the express requirement of § 112, 6 could easily
be avoided. 1 4
Moreover, the Federal Circuit found that even under a proper
§ 112, 6 claim interpretation, claims 21 and 24 did not have ex-
181. See, SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of America, 775 F.2d 1107, 1121, 227
USPQ 577, 586-87 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc).
182. See, Laitram Corp. v. Rexnord, Inc., 15 USPQ2D 1161 (E.D. Wis. 1990).




actly the same scope, and consequently there was no violation of the
doctrine of claim differentiation. As properly interpreted under
§ 112, 6, claim 21 literally covered the cross member structure de-
scribed in the patent specification and equivalents thereof."8 5 In
contrast, dependent claim 24 literally covered the cross member
structure only, and did not literally cover equivalents of the cross
member structure. Claim 21 was therefore broader than dependent
claim 24.
The Federal Circuit therefore concluded that the district
court's finding of infringement had been based upon a legally erro-
neous claim interpretation, and that under the correct interpreta-
tion there was no proof of infringement, either literally or under the
doctrine of equivalents. The Federal Circuit therefore reversed the
judgment of the district court.18 6
K. Consideration of the Prior Art Is Not Necessary in
Applying the Sixth Paragraph of 35 U.S.C § 112
The respondents in the case of Intel Corporation v. U. S. Inter-
national Trade Commission'87 had challenged the Commission's
finding of infringement of several patent claims containing means-
plus-fumction limitations. The respondents argued that the Com-
mission had improperly construed these means-plus-function limi-
tations in view of the prior art. The respondents asserted that a
finding of equivalency of structure under 35 U.S.C. § 112, 6, could
not be made if the prior art was considered.'
On appeal, the Federal Circuit pointed out that the respon-
dents had confused equivalent structure under 35 U.S.C. § 112, 6
with equivalence under the doctrine of equivalents.
The Federal Circuit noted that to literally meet a means-plus-
function limitation, the accused device must (1) perform the identi-
cal function claimed for the means element, and (2) perform that
function using the same structure as disclosed in the specification or
an equivalent structure. 89 In determining equivalent structure
under 35 U.S.C. § 112, 6, the sole question is whether the single
means in the accused device which performs the function stated in
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. 946 F.2d 821, 20 USPQ2D 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
188. Id. at 1179.
189. Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 934, 4 USPQ2D 1737,
1739 (1987) (en banc); Laitram Corp. v. Rexnord, Inc., 939 F.2d 1533, 19 USPQ2D 1367,
1369-70 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Durango Assocs., Inc. v. Reflange, Inc., 843 F.2d 1349, 1357, 6
USPQ2D 1290, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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the claim is the same as, or an equivalent of, the corresponding
structure described in the patent specification as performing that
function.19 The aids for determining equivalent structure under 35
U.S.C. § 112, 6 are the same as those used in interpreting any
other type of claim limitation, namely, the specification, the prose-
cution history, other claims in the patent, and expert testimony.191
It is therefore not necessary to consider the prior art in deter-
mining equivalent structure under 35 U.S.C. § 112, 16. The Fed-
eral Circuit noted that individual claim limitations, including claim
limitations written in means-plus-function terminology, are fre-
quently found in the prior art. However, the fact that the prior art
discloses an individual claim limitation does not thereby limit the
scope of the claim. 192
The Federal Circuit therefore affirmed the Commission's find-
ings of infringement.
IV. DivisioNAL APPLICATIONS - 35 U.S.C. § 121
A. 35 U.S.C § 121 Will Not Remove a Parent Patent As a
Reference if the Principle of "Consonance" Has Been
Violated
The case of Symbol Technologies, Inc. v. Opticon, Inc. 193 in-
volved several patents directed to methods and devices employing
lasers to read bar codes. 194
The patentee had filed its original application in February
1980. In the first office action, the examiner had required restric-
tion to one of seven species identified as Groups I - VII. The paten-
tee had elected to prosecute the Group I claims, directed to a light-
weight laser scanning apparatus. The original application contain-
ing the Group I apparatus claims matured into the "parent" patent.
After the examiner had required restriction, the patentee had
filed a divisional application containing method claims drawn to the
invention of the non-elected Group VI claims. This divisional ap-
plication, containing both the Group VI method claims as well as
new apparatus claims, had eventually issued as the "divisional"
patent.
190. D.M.I., Inc. v. Deere & Co., 755 F.2d 1570, 1575, 225 USPQ 236, 239 (Fed. Cir.
1985);Data Line Corp. v. Micro Technologies, Inc., 813 F.2d 1196, 1201, 1 USPQ2D 2052,
2055 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
191. Intel, 20 USPQ2D at 1179-80.
192. Id.
193. 935 F.2d 1569, 19 USPQ2D 1241 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
194. Id. at 1243.
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After issuance, the patentee had sued for infringement of both
the parent patent and the divisional patent. In response, the in-
fringer had argued that the divisional patent was invalid for obvi-
ousness-type double patenting over the parent patent. The infringer
had asserted that the parent patent was a reference against the divi-
sional patent because the patentee had violated the principle of
"consonance" by adding apparatus claims to the divisional patent
application. 195
The district court concluded that the divisional patent was not
proved invalid for obviousness-type double patenting over the par-
ent patent, and found infringement. 196 The infringer appealed the
judgment.
With regard to the issue of double patenting, the Federal Cir-
cuit observed on appeal that 35 U.S.C. § 121197 will not apply to
remove a parent patent as a reference where the principle of "conso-
nance" has been violated. The principle of "consonance" requires
that the line of demarcation between the independent and distinct
inventions that prompted a restriction requirement be maintained
throughout prosecution of a divisional application. Therefore,
although claims may be amended or added during prosecution of
the divisional application, they can not be amended or added so as
to bring them back over the line imposed in the original restriction
requirement which gave rise to the divisional application. If that
line of demarcation is crossed, then the prohibition of the third sen-
tence of § 121 does not apply, and the parent patent may be used as
a reference against the invention claimed in the divisional patent.198
The Federal Circuit read the infringer's assertion to allege that
because the Group VI invention had been described as a "method"
in the restriction requirement, the addition of apparatus claims in
the divisional application had crossed the line of demarcation.
However, the record showed that both the method claims and the
apparatus claims in the divisional patent were directed to the same
195. Id. at 1249.
196.' Symbol Technologies, Inc. v. Opticon, Inc., 17 USPQ2d 1737 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
197. Section 121 provides, in relevant part:
A patent issuing on an application with respect to which a requirement for
restriction under this section has been made, or on an application filed as a
result of such requirement, shall not be used as a reference either in the Patent
and Trademark Office or in the courts against a divisional application or
against the original application or any patent issued on either of them, if the
divisional application is filed before the issuance of the patent on the other
application.
4198. Gerber Garment Technology, Inc. v. Lectra Systems, Inc., 916 F.2d 683, 688, 16
USPQ2D 1436, 1440 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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Group VI invention. 199 The Federal Circuit found that the use of
the word "method" to describe the Group VI claims during restric-
tion did not mean that the claims were limited to a method, but
instead was merely used as a short-hand description of the invented
system. Therefore, the line of demarcation established in the re-
striction requirement had not been crossed, and the parent patent
was not available as a reference against the divisional patent under
§ 121. The Federal Circuit therefore affirmed the judgment of the
district court.2°
V. INTERFERENCE - 35 U.S.C. § 135
A. Actual Reduction to Practice May Be Shown by an
Adequate Simulation
The subject invention in the case of DSL Dynamic Sciences
Limited v. Union Switch & Signal, Inc. 201 was directed to a coupler
mount assembly used to attach equipment to a railway car coupler.
The appellant was the assignee of a U.S. patent which had issued in
June of 1985, based upon an application filed in September 1983.
The appellee was the assignee of a pending U.S. patent application
that had been filed in March 1984.202
An interference had been declared between the appellant's is-
sued patent and the appellee's pending application. During the in-
terference proceeding, the appellee argued that it had reduced the
invention to practice in the U.S. in May 1983. In support of its
reduction to practice, the appellee presented evidence of tests that
had been performed on moving trains during May 1983. These
tests involved the use of a prototype of the coupler mount assembly
on the caboose of a train.203
Because the appellant's activity relating to conception and re-
duction to practice had been performed in Canada, the appellant
was prevented by 35 U.S.C. § 104 from establishing an invention
date earlier than its U.S. filing date of September 1983. The Board
found that the appellee had established a reduction to practice of
May 1983, and was therefore entitled to priority of invention.2°
The appellant sought review of the Board's decision via an ac-
tion in federal district court under 35 U.S.C. § 146. In the district
199. Symbol, 19 USPQ2D at 1249.
200. Id. at 1250.
201. 928 F.2d 1122, 18 USPQ2D 1152 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
202. Id. at 1153.
203. Id. at 1153-54.
204. Id. at 1154.
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court, the appellant argued that the appellee's tests had not been
performed in the intended environment of the claimed invention
and that the tests were therefore insufficient to establish a reduction
to practice of the claimed invention. According to the appellant,
the purpose of the claimed invention was to obviate the need for a
caboose at the end of a train. Therefore, the claimed invention
would never be attached to a caboose, but would instead be at-
tached to the coupler of a freight car. If the device tested by the
appellee in May 1983 had been attached to a freight car, then the
device would have failed. The district court declined to admit the
appellant's evidence on this point, and affirmed the award of prior-
ity to the appellee.21 5
On appeal, the Federal Circuit found that even if the appel-
lant's evidence had been admitted by the district court, the appellee
would nevertheless still be entitled to the award of priority of
invention.20 6
The Federal Circuit noted that the appellee could meet its bur-
den of proving an actual reduction to practice by showing one of
two things: (1) that the use of a coupler mount assembly with a
caboose is an intended purpose of the claimed invention; or (2) that
if the use of a coupler mount assembly with a caboose is not an
intended purpose of the claimed invention, then the tests performed
on a caboose coupler sufficiently simulated the conditions present
on a freight car coupler to adequately show reduction to practice of
the claimed invention.20 7
The Federal Circuit found that, even if the district court had
accepted the appellant's argument that the claimed invention would
n6t be attached to a caboose, the tests performed on a caboose
coupler were sufficient to simulate the conditions present on a
freight car coupler to adequately show reduction to practice of the
claimed invention. Consequently, the appellee was entitled to the
award of priority of invention, and the decision of the district court
was affirmed.208
205. Id.
206. DSL, 18 USPQ2D at 1154.
207. Id. at 1154-55.
208. Id. at 1155.
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B. An Assistant Technician Performing Perfunctory Tasks
Under the Supervision of a Senior Scientist Is Not
Generally Necessary to Verify the Reliability of
Evidence About Scientific Methods or Data
The subject invention in the case of Holm wood v.
Sugavanam2 °9 was a chemical fungicide. Both parties had made
and marketed the chemical fungicide overseas. An interference had
been declared between Holmwood's U.S. patent application and
Sugavanam's U.S. patent application. 1
Sugavanam, the senior party, had an effective filing date of Oc-
tober 16, 1981. To defeat Sugavanam, Holmwood had attempted to
show that his invention had been reduced to practice in the U.S.
before October 16, 1981.211
The evidence showed that Holmwood's assignee, a German
corporation, had sent the claimed fungicide into the U.S. to verify
positive test results previously obtained in Germany. Dr. Walter
Zeck, a biological research manager for the U.S. affiliate of
Holmwood's assignee, had received the claimed fungicide on or
about September 16, 1980.212
, Upon receipt of the claimed fungicide, Dr. Zeck began a series
of standard tests for effectiveness. Two of Dr. Zeck's laboratory
assistants performed the tests in the U.S. and filed reports on the
results in October 1980. The test results showed that the claimed
fungicide worked for its intended purpose.213
Holmwood presented Dr. Zeck's testimony to the Board. The
Board attached negative implications to Holmwood's failure to call
Dr. Zeck's laboratory assistants to testify about their ministerial
role in the testing. The Board concluded that Dr. Zeck was not
"the most satisfactory witness concerning the testing of the sam-
ples" and refused to give any weight to Dr. Zeck's testimony in
reaching its conclusion.214
The Board held that Holmwood had failed to establish a reduc-
tion to practice before the effective filing date of Sugavanam. The
Board awarded priority to Sugavanam. Holmwood appealed from
the decision of the Board.215
209. 948 F.2d 1236, 20 USPQ2D 1712 (Fed. Cir. 1991).








On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that a junior technician
performing perfunctory tasks under the supervision of a senior sci-
entist is not generally necessary to verify the reliability of evidence
about scientific methods or data. In the absence of indicia calling
into question the trustworthiness of the senior scientist's testimony,
the Board may rely on the trained supervisor's testimony to ascer-
tain scientific methods or results.216
The Federal Circuit found that, due to Dr. Zeck's careful su-
pervision of the testing program and the indicia of reliability in the
test program itself, the Board's refusal to accord full weight to Dr.
Zeck's testimony was unreasonable. The Board had erred in deter-
mining that, without his assistants' testimony, Dr. Zeck's testimony
lacked probative weight.217
The Federal Circuit concluded that Dr. Zeck had supplied reli-
able, unrebutted evidence showing that Holmwood's invention had
worked for its intended purpose. If Dr. Zeck's testimony was given
proper weight, then a preponderance of the evidence showed that
Holmwood's invention had been reduced to practice in the U.S.
before Sugavanam's effective filing date. Accordingly, the Federal
Circuit reversed the decision of the Board.218
C. A Pending Interference Proceeding May Not Serve as
Adequate Reason for the Dismissal of a Declaratory
Judgment Action for Non-infringement
The patent owner in the case of Minnesota Mining and Manu-
facturing Co. v. Norton Company219 had filed an application di-
rected to an aluminum-based process for making abrasive material.
Several months later, the accused infringer had filed a patent appli-
cation which claimed both an aluminum-based process for making
abrasive material as well as an iron-based process for making abra-
sive material. The iron-based process was used by the accused in-
fringer in the commercial manufacture of abrasive material.220
The application directed to the aluminum-based process had
issued as a patent while the accused infringer's application was still
pending. The accused infringer then initiated an interference pro-
ceeding with respect to the aluminum-based process. The patent
owner informed the accused infringer (as well as the accused in-
216. Id. at 1714.
217. Id. at 1715.
218. Id.
219. 929 F.2d 670, 18 USPQ2D 1302 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
220. Id. at 1303.
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fringer's customers) that, under the doctrine of equivalents, the is-
sued patent covered the accused infringer's iron-based process.221
The accused infringer filed suit under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 seeking
a declaratory judgment that its iron-based process did not infringe
the issued patent.222 The patent owner moved to dismiss the declar-
atory judgment litigation, arguing that the results of the interfer-
ence proceeding might moot any declaratory judgment issued by
the district court. The district court granted the patent owner's mo-
tion and dismissed the accused infringer's complaint.223
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, the accused infringer argued
that the harm threatened to its business entitled it to the benefits of
28 U.S.C. § 2201, and that the district court erred in giving too
little consideration to the harm which a delay in deciding the in-
fringement litigation would inflict on the accused infringer.224
The Federal Circuit, agreeing with the accused infringer, noted
that the pending interference proceeding would only determine the
issue of priority of invention. The pending interference proceeding
would not determine the infringement issue underlying the declara-
tory judgment litigation.225
If the interference proceeding resulted in an award of priority
to the accused infringer, then the infringement litigation would be
moot. However, the Federal Circuit found that the mere chance of
the infringement litigation becoming moot was not reason enough
to dismiss the litigation. The accused infringer was entitled by 28
U.S.C. § 2201 to have a decision on the infringement question and
not to have to wait until the final resolution of the interference
proceeding.226
The Federal Circuit noted (without providing specific exam-
ples) that there may be situations in which a district court should
decline to exercise its discretion to assume jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 2201 when an interference proceeding is underway. How-
ever, in the case of Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., the
Federal Circuit held that it was an abuse of discretion to have dis-
221. Id. at 1304.
222. 28 U.S.C. § 2201, also referred to as the Declaratory Judgment Act, provides:
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction ... any court of the
United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the
rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declara-
tion, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.
223. Minnesota Mining, 18 USPQ2D at 1304.
224. Id. at 1305.
225. Id. at 1306.
226. Id.
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missed a declaratory judgment litigation for non-infringement based
on a pending interference proceeding, when the interference pro-
ceeding could not decide (or was not likely to moot) the infringe-
ment issues raised and when the declaratory judgment plaintiff
would likely suffer significant ongoing harm during any delay.' 7
The Federal Circuit therefore reversed the judgment of the dis-
trict court and remanded for further proceedings relating to the de-
claratory judgment litigation.22
VI. APPEAL TO THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL
CiRcurr - 35 U.S.C. § 141
A. A District Court Action Under 35 U.S.C. § 146 May Not
Preclude an Appeal to the Federal Circuit Under 35
U.S.C. § 141
The case of In re Van Geuns2 29 resulted from an interference
involving a patent application filed by Van Geuns and a patent is-
sued to Brown. During the interference proceeding, the Board had
determined that the subject matter of both Brown's patent and Van
Geuns' application was unpatentable for obviousness.230
Van Geuns appealed the Board's decision to the Federal Cir-
cuit under 35 U.S.C. § 141. Brown did not appeal to the Federal
Circuit. Instead, Brown's assignee filed suit against Van Geuns' as-
signee in district court under 35 U.S.C. § 146, alleging that the
Board had incorrectly held Brown's patent claims unpatentable.
Van Geuns asserted a counterclaim in the district court action.23 1
Van Geuns moved the Federal Circuit to enjoin Brown's dis-
trict court proceeding. Brown opposed Van Geuns' motion and
moved the Federal Circuit to either remand Van Geuns' appeal to
the PTO or to stay Van Geuns' appeal pending resolution of the
district court action.232
The Federal Circuit found that the patent statute provided
both Brown and Van Geuns with the right to seek direct review in
separate courts. Section 141 specifically permits a "party to an in-
terference dissatisfied with the decision of the Board of Patent Ap-
peals and Interferences ... [to] appeal the decision to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.. ." Section 146
227. Id.
228. Minnesota Mining, 18 USPQ2D at 1307.
229. 946 F.2d 845, 20 USPQ2D 1291 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
230. Id. at 1292.
231. Id. at 1295.
232. Id.
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specifically permits "any party to an interference dissatisfied with
the decision of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences...
[to seek] remedy by civil action .... ." Congress thereby explicitly
preserved both alternative routes for review of a Board interference
proceeding, and the Federal Circuit concluded that it could not
foreclose either route.233
The Federal Circuit noted that, to promote efficient judicial
management and conservation of scarce judicial resources, it may
enjoin parties under its jurisdiction from proceeding with a concur-
rent action involving the same or related issues.234 However, in In
re Van Geuns, the Federal Circuit found that Van Geuns' § 141
appeal did not feature the same parties or issues as Brown's § 146
district court case. 35
Van Geuns' appeal under § 141 contested only the Board's pat-
entability determinations on claims corresponding to the interfer-
ence count. Van Geuns' appeal was therefore no different than a
traditional ex parte appeal to the Federal Circuit from a Board de-
termination, and did not include any adverse entity other than the
Commissioner.236
In contrast, Brown's district court litigation under § 146 in-
cluded Brown's assignee as a party. Moreover, Brown contested the
propriety of the Board's rejection of Brown's charges of inequitable
conduct against Van Geuns. Van Geuns' § 141 appeal therefore did
not feature the same parties or the same issues as Brown's § 146
district court case, and resolution of one case would not dispose of
the other litigation.237
The Federal Circuit therefore denied Van Geuns' motion to
enjoin Brown's § 146 district court proceeding, and also denied
Brown's motion to either remand Van Geuns' § 141 appeal to the
PTO or to stay the appeal pending resolution of the district court
action.238
233. Id. at 1294.
234. Katz v. Lear Siegler, Inc., 909 F.2d 1459, 1463, 15 USPQ2D 1554, 1557 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
235. Van Geuns, 20 USPQ2D at 1295.
236. Id.
237. Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180, 96 L. Ed. 200, 72 S.
Ct. 219 (1952).
238. Van Geuns, 20 USPQ2D at 1295.
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VII. PROTECTION OF FEDERALLY OWNED INVENTIONS - 35
U.S.C. § 207
A. A Licensee Under a Patent Owned by the Federal
Government May Maintain an Infringement Action
Without Joining the Federal Government as a Party
The lawsuit underlying the appeal in Nutrition 21 v. The
United States239 was for infringement of a patent owned by the
United States.240
The patent licensee had filed suit against an accused infringer
and had named the U.S. as a party defendant pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 19(a). 241 The U.S. had moved to be dismissed from the case,
arguing that the suit could be maintained by the licensee alone,
without the need for the U.S. as a party. The U.S. based its argu-
ment on (1) the enforcement rights granted to the licensee by the
U.S. under the patent license agreement, and (2) the authorization
provided to federal agencies under 35 U.S.C. 207(a)(2) to grant pat-
ent enforcement rights to licensees.242
239. 930 F.2d 862, 18 USPQ2D 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
240. See, Nutrition 21 v. Thorne Research, Inc., 130 F.R.D. 671, 14 USPQ2D 1244
(W.D. Wash. 1990).
241. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a) provides:
Joinder of Persons Needed for Just Adjudication
(a) Persons To Be Joined If Feasible. A person who is subject to service of
process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in the
person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already par-
ties or (2) the person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and
is so situated that the disposition of the action in the person's absence may (i)
as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect that inter-
est or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties, subject to a substantial risk
of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of
the claimed interest. If the person has not been so joined, the court shall order
the person be made a party. If the person should join as a plaintiff but refuses
to do so, the person may be made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an involun-
tary plaintiff. If the joined party objects to venue and joinder of that party
would render the venue of the action improper, that party shall be dismissed
from the action.
242. Section 207 of Title 35, provides in pertinent part:
(a) Each Federal agency is authorized to -
(2) grant nonexclusive, exclusive, or partially exclusive licenses under
federally owned patent applications, patents, or other forms of protection ob-
tained, royalty-free or for royalties or other consideration, and on such terms
and conditions, including the grant to the licensee of the right of enforcement
pursuant to the provisions of chapter 29 of this title as determined appropriate
in the public interest;
(3) undertake all other suitable and necessary steps to protect and ad-
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The licensee acknowledged that it would not otherwise object
to proceeding without the U.S. as a party, but feared that if it pro-
ceeded without the U.S., then, after judgment by the district court,
the Federal Circuit might subsequently dismiss the infringement ac-
tion on appeal due to the absence of an indispensable party under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b).24 3 The licensee therefore opposed the U.S.
motion to be dismissed, and moved for realignment of the U.S. as
an involuntary plaintiff pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(a).
The district court, relying on the case of Independent Wireless
Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of America,2' concluded that the pat-
ent owner is a necessary party to a suit for patent infringement
brought by an exclusive licensee. The district court therefore issued
an order denying the U.S. motion to be dismissed as a party and
realigning the U.S. as an involuntary plaintiff.245
The question on appeal was whether the licensee could main-
tain a patent infringement action without the U.S. as a party, when
the U.S. had authorized the licensee to sue for patent infringement
in its own name and on its own behalf.2
4 6
In answering this question in the affirmative, the Federal Cir-
cuit emphasized the language of the patent license agreement,
which expressly empowered the licensee to bring infringement suits
in its own name, at its own expense, and on its own behalf, with the
U.S. retaining a continuing right to intervene in such suit.24
7
The Federal Circuit also noted that the public policy concerns
minister rights to federally owned inventions on behalf of the Federal Govern-
ment either'directly or through contract ....
243. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b) provides:
Determination by Court Whenever Joinder not Feasible
If a person as described in subdivision (a)(1)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party,
the court shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action
should proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent
person being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered by
the court include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's
absence might be prejudicial to the person or those already parties; second, the
extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of
relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third,
whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; fourth,
whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for
nonjoinder.
244. 269 U.S. 459, 70 L. Ed. 357, 46 S.Ct. 166 (1926). Independent Wireless held that
"both the owner and the exclusive licensee are generally necessary parties in the [patent in-
fringement] action in equity." 269 U.S. at 466.
245. Nutrition 21 v. Thorne Research, Inc., 130 F.R.D. at 671, 14 USPQ2d at 1244
(W.D. Wash. 1990).
246. Nutrition 21, 18 USPQ2D at 1352.
247. Id. at 1354.
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underlying passage of the legislation that included 35 U.S.C.
207(a)(2) (specifically, concerns regarding the effective private sec-
tor commercialization of inventions resulting from government-fi-
nanced research) support maintenance of the infringement suit
without the U.S. as a party. The case of Independent Wireless was
not controlling, because that case did not involve a government-
owned patent, and because the relevant law had been changed by
Congress.248
The Federal Circuit therefore held that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C.
207(a)(2) and the patent license agreement involved, the licensee
could maintain an action against the accused infringer without the
U.S. as a party. The Federal Circuit expressly declined to consider
the question of what preclusive effect the outcome of the lawsuit
might have upon the U.S. after its dismissal as a party.249
VIII. REISSUE - 35 U.S.C. § 251
A. A Patentee Can Not Be Compelled to Seek Reissue
Where the Patentee Insists That There Is No Error In
the Patent
In defense to a charge of patent infringement, the alleged in-
fringer in the case of Green v. The Rich Iron Company, Inc.250 as-
serted that the patent was invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) because
the invention had been in public use or on sale more than one year
before the application filing date.251
The alleged infringer filed a motion for summary judgment on
its § 102(b) defense. The district court denied the motion without
prejudice. However, the district court sua sponte ordered the paten-
tee to seek reissue from the PTO, stating that the PTO was the best
forum for consideration of the § 102(b) issue, given the special ex-
pertise of the PTO regarding the validity of patents and concerns of
judicial economy. The patentee appealed from the district court's
order.2 5
2
The issue on appeal was whether a district court can compel a
patentee to seek reissue, even though the patentee insists that there
is no error in the patent.
The Federal Circuit observed that 35 U.S.C. § 251 permits the
PTO to reissue a patent that "is, through error without any decep-
248. Id.
249. Id. at 1355-56.
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tive intention, deemed wholly or partly inoperative or invalid, by
reason of a defective specification or drawing, or by reason of the
patentee claiming more or less than he had a right to claim in the
patent." '253 The implementing regulation, 37 C.F.R. § 1.175(a)(1),
requires the reissue applicant to file a statement under oath or a
declaration "when the applicant verily believes the original patent
to be wholly or partly inoperative or invalid, stating such belief and
the reasons why." '254 Similarly, 37 C.F.R. § 1.175(a)(5) requires the
reissue applicant to explain how the errors arose or occurred, and
37 C.F.R. § 1.175(a)(6) requires the reissue applicant to affirm that
the errors occurred without any deceptive intention.255
The Federal Circuit noted that the case authority relied upon
by the district court involved reissue applications filed pursuant to
the "no-fault" reissue practice, under which an applicant was per-
mitted to fie for reissue merely for the purpose of obtaining a PTO
determination regarding the effect of newly discovered prior art.2" 6
Such "no-fault" reissue practice is no longer permitted, and reissue
is now available only for those patents which, through "error," are
deemed wholly or partly inoperative or invalid.257
The Federal Circuit concluded that if the patentee insists that
there is no error in the patent, then ordering the patentee to seek
reissue would compel the patentee to attest to error which the pat-
entee does not believe exists. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit re-
versed the district court order and remanded the case for further
proceedings.2 58
B. That an Error Could Have Been Discovered at the Time
of Prosecution Does Not Preclude Correction of the
Error Through Reissue
The subject patent in the case of Scripps Clinic & Research
Foundation v. Genentech, Inc.25 9 was a reissue patent entitled "UI-
trapurification of Factor VIII Using Monoclonal Antibodies." The
original patent had contained process claims and product-by-pro-
cess claims, but had not contained any product claims. The "error"
that the inventors had sought to cure via reissue was the claiming of
"less than they had a right to claim" in the original patent due to
253. Id. at 1076.
254. Id.
255. Green, 20 USPQ2D at 1076.
256. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.175(a)(4) (1981).
257. Green, 20 USPQ2D at 1077.
258. Id.
259. 927 F.2d 1565, 18 USPQ2D 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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the omission of the product claims.2"
Before the district court the accused infringer had argued that
the patentee's reason for seeking reissue was inadequate under 35
U.S.C. § 251. The district court granted the accused infringer's mo-
tion for partial summary judgment of invalidity on this ground, and
the patentee appealed. 261
On appeal, the Federal Circuit observed that the district court
had mistakenly interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 251 as requiring a showing
that the error could not have been avoided. However, the reissue
statute does not require that no competent attorney could have
avoided the error sought to be corrected by reissue. Failure of an
attorney to appreciate the full scope of the invention, or failure to
claim the invention sufficiently broadly, are among the most com-
mon sources of errors in patents. The fact that the error could have
been discovered at the time of prosecution does not, by itself, pre-
clude a patentee from correcting the error through reissue.262
The Federal Circuit found that the inventors had established
that they had claimed less than they had a right to claim, that they
had done so in error, and that there had been no deceptive intent.
The application for reissue therefore fully complied with the re-
quirements of 35 U.S.C. § 251, and the district court's grant of par-
tial summary judgment was reversed.263
C. An Objective "Intent to Claim" Is Not Dispositive of Any
Required Inquiry Under 35 U.S. C. § 251
Less than one year after issuance of the subject patent in the
case of In re Amos,214 the patentees had submitted an application
for a broadened reissue. The broadened reissue application sought
to ?dd new claims 10-12 to original claims 1_9.265
The PTO Board had found that the disclosure of the original
patent failed to set forth an "intent to claim" the subject matter
defined by new claims 10-12, and that the "objective intent" of the
patentees, as manifested in the original patent, had been to solely
claim the invention defined by claims 1-9. Because it found that the
failure to claim the subject matter defined by new claims 10-12 was
not the result of an "error" as required by 35 U.S.C. § 251, the
260. Id. at 1008.
261. Id. at 1009.
262. In re Wilder, 736 F.2d 1516, 222 USPQ 369 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1209, 84 L. Ed. 2d 323, 105 S. CL 1173 (1985).
263. Scripps, 18 USPQ2D at 1009.
264. 953 F.2d 613, 21 USPQ2D 1271 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
265. Id. at 1272.
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Board affirmed the final rejection of new claims 10-12. The paten-
tee appealed the Board's decision.266
The issue on appeal was whether the concept of "intent to
claim" had any role in a rejection of claims submitted during reissue
under 35 U.S.C. § 251.267
The Federal Circuit observed that there are four types of error
identified in 35 U.S.C. § 251 as being correctable via reissue.268
First, the patentee may correct an error in the specification.269 Sec-
ond, the patentee may correct a defective drawing. Third, the pat-
entee may correct original claims that are too broad. Fourth, the
patentee may correct original claims that are too narrow. 270 The
basis for correcting original claims that are too broad has generally
been the discovery of partially-invalidating prior art.271 In contrast,
the basis for correcting original claims that are too narrow has been
the post-issuance discovery of attorney error in understanding the
scope of the invention.272
The Federal circuit noted that the phrase "intent to claim"
does not appear in 35 U.S.C. § 251. The Federal Circuit read the
Board's phrase "intent to claim" as a decision that new claims 10-
12 were not for the "same invention" as disclosed in the original
patent, and interpreted the Board's decision as being based upon a
determination that the original patent disclosure did not support
the subject matter of new claims 10-12 as required by § 251.273
The Federal Circuit noted that the inquiry under § 251 as to
whether the new claims are for the same invention as disclosed in
the original patent is analogous to the analysis required by § 112,
11. The entirety of the original patent must be examined and a de-
cision must be made whether, through the "objective eyes" of the
hypothetical person having ordinary skill in the art, an inventor
could fairly have claimed the new claims in the original
application.274
The record showed that the original patent disclosure did cover
the subject matter defined by new claims 10-12. Consequently, the
266. Id. at 1273.
267. Id.
268. In re Clark, 522 F.2d 623, 625-26, 187 USPQ 209, 211-12 (CCPA 1975).
269. In re Salem, 553 F.2d 676, 679, 193 USPQ 513, 516 (CCPA 1977).
270. In re Handel, 312 F.2d 943, 948, 136 USPQ 460, 464 (CCPA 1963).
271. In re Harita, 847 F.2d 801, 805, 6 USPQ2d 1930, 1932 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
272. In re Wilder, 736 F.2d 1516, 1519, 222 USPQ 369, 371 (Fed, Cir. 1984), cert. de-
nied, 469 U.S. 1209 (1985); Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d
1565, 1575, 18 USPQ2d 1001, 1009 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
273. Amos, 21 USPQ2D at 1274.
274. Id. at 1275.
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Federal Circuit concluded that the Board had erred in denying the
reissue application on the basis of the lack of an "intent to claim."
The Federal Circuit therefore reversed the Board, stating that the
presence or absence of an objective "intent to claim," standing
alone, is not dispositive of any required inquiry under § 251 and
cannot, alone, form the basis for a denial of reissue claims.27
D. Involvement in a Reissue Proceeding May Excuse a
Patentee's Delay in Filing Suit for Infringement
The subject patent in the case of Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v.
Meccanica Euro Italia S.P.A.27 had issued in June, 1976. A reissue
application was ified in December, 1979, and the reissue proceeding
was completed in February, 1985. The patentee did not file suit for
infringement until August, 1988. The patentee asserted that its de-
lay in filing suit after it first learned of the infringement was excused
due to the patentee's involvement in the reissue proceeding.2 7
The district court found that the patentee had not shown evi-
dence sufficient to excuse its failure to file suit within six years of the
time the patentee knew or should have known of the infringement.
The district court therefore concluded that the patentee was barred
from maintaining an infringement action by laches. 27" The patentee
appealed the district court's conclusion.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that if a patentee estab-
lishes that it was engaged in "other litigation," then the patentee
may avoid the consequences of what would otherwise be an unrea-
sonable delay in filing suit.279 The "other litigation" excuse nor-
mally applies when a patentee delays filing suit against an alleged
infringer until the conclusion of a prior lawsuit. If the alleged in-
fringer is ultimately sued, and if the alleged infringer had received
adequate notice of the alleged infringement, then the time con-
sumed by the other litigation may be considered in determining
whether the patentee's delay in filing suit was reasonable.280
For purposes of determining the reasonableness of a patentee's
275. In re Hounsfield, 699 F.2d 1320, 216 USPQ 1045 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
276. 944 F.2d 870, 20 USPQ2D 1045 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
277. Id. at 1050.
278. Laches may be found when the patentee's delay in filing suit is shown to be unrea-
sonable and unexcused and the alleged infringer has suffered material prejudice or injury as a
result of the delay. Leinoff v. Louis Milona & Sons, 726 F.2d 734, 741, 220 USPQ 845, 850
(Fed. Cir. 1984).
279. Watkins v. Northwestern Ohio Tractor Pullers Ass'n, 630 F.2d 1155, 1162, 208
USPQ 545, 551 (6th Cir. 1980).
280. Vaupel, 20 USPQ2D at 1050.
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delay in filing suit, the Federal Circuit saw no distinction between
litigation raising the issue of patent validity and a PTO proceeding
involving patentability. The Federal Circuit therefore reasoned that
a reissue proceeding should be treated in the same way as an in-
fringement litigation for purposes determining the applicability of
the' "other litigation" excuse.281
For the "other litigation" excuse to apply, the alleged infringer
must be adequately informed of the "other litigation" and must also
be adequately informed that the patentee intends to enforce the pat-
ent against the alleged infringer after the "other litigation" is
completed. 282
In Vaupel, the alleged infringer had been actively involved in
the reissue proceeding as a protestor. In the opinion of the Federal
Circuit, the record left no doubt that the alleged infringer had been
adequately informed of the "other litigation", and had been ade-
quately informed of the patentee's intent to enforce the patent after
the "other litigation" had been completed. Under these circum-
stances, the patentee was not required to provide the alleged in-
fringer with written notification of an intent to sue after completion
of the reissue proceeding in order to avoid a holding of laches. The
district court's conclusion that the alleged infringer had not been
adequately informed of the patentee's intent to enforce the patent
due to the patentee's failure to provide such written notification to
the alleged infringer was legal error.28 3
The Federal Circuit concluded that the patentee's delay in fil-
ing suit was excused because of the patentee's involvement in the
reissue proceeding, and the patentee was not guilty of laches. The
judgment of the district court relating to laches was reversed.
IX. PATENT INFRINGEMENT - 35 U.S.C. § 271.
A. Proper Claim Interpretation Is a Question of Law
The district court in the case of Key Manufacturing Group, Inc.
v. Microdot, Inc.2 4 had found the accused infringer liable for both
literal infringement and infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents.28 5 The accused infringer appealed.
281. Id. at 1051.
282. Hottel Corp. v. Seaman Corp., 833 F.2d 1570, 1573, 4 USPQ2D 1939, 1940-41
(Fed. Cir. 1987).
283. Vaupel, 20 USPQ2D at 1051.
284. 925 F.2d 1444, 17 USPQ2D 1806 (Fed. Cir. 1991). See also Key Mfg. Group, Inc.
v. Microdot, Inc., 15 U5PQ2d 1195 (E.D. Mich. 1990).
285. Id. at 1807.
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The issue on appeal was one of proper claim interpretation,
which is a question of law freely reviewable by the Federal Cir-
cuit. 286 There were no factual disputes over the meaning of the sub-
ject claim language, and neither party asserted that the claim
language had anything other than its common, ordinary
meaning.
287
The Federal Circuit found that the district court's interpreta-
tion of the claims conflicted with the straightforward language of
the claims, as supported by the patent specification and the prosecu-
tion file history. The Federal Circuit concluded that the district
court had erred in interpreting the claims, and that the accused
product did not literally infringe the properly interpreted claims. 28
The Federal Circuit also found that the accused device did not
infringe under the doctrine of equivalents, because a hypothetical
claim which literally encompassed the accused device would have
been obvious in view of the prior art.289
The Federal Circuit therefore reversed the judgment of the dis-
trict court.
B. Product-by-Process Claims Are Not Limited to the
Product Prepared by the Process Set Forth in the
Claims
The subject patent in the case of Scripps Clinic & Research
Foundation v. Genentech, Inc.2 90 was entitled "Ultrapurification of
Factor VIII Using Monoclonal Antibodies." The patent owner had
argued that the accused infringer's recombinantly-produced Factor
VIII:C product infringed several of the patent's product-by-process
claims.2 91 The district court disagreed, concluding that the prod-
uct-by-process claims could not be infringed unless the accused in-
fringer also practiced the process defined by the claims. The district
court therefore refused to grant the patentee's motion for summary
judgment of infringement of the product-by-process claims. The
286. Durango Assocs. Inc. v. Reflange Inc., 843 F.2d 1349, 1356, 6 USPQ2D 1290, 1295
(Fed. Cir. 1988); Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1270, 229 USPQ
805, 811 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cerL denied, 479 U.S. 1030 , 93 L. Ed. 2d 829, 107 S. Ct. 875
(1987).
287. Howes v. Medical Components, Inc., 814 F.2d 638, 643, 2 USPQ2D 1271, 1273
(Fed. Cir. 1987).
288. Key Manufacturing, 17 USPQ2D at 1809.
289. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 14
USPQ2D 1942 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S.Ct. 537, 112 L.Ed.2d 547 (1990).
290. 927 F.2d 1565, 18 USPQ2D 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
291. Id. at 1015.
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patent owner appealed.292
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that the district court's
conclusion conflicted with precedent which indicated that, in deter-
mining the patentability of product-by-process claims during prose-
cution, the product is interpreted as not being limited by the process
stated in the claims.293 The Federal Circuit found that, since
claims must be construed the same way for validity and for infringe-
ment, the correct reading of product-by-process claims is that they
are not limited to the product prepared by the process set forth in
the claims. Thus, the Federal Circuit concluded that infringement
of the product-by-process claims by the accused infringer's product
was an issue which may be considered at trial.294
C. A Claim Element Can Not Be Interpreted Contrary to Its
"Plain Meaning" Based Upon an "Alternative" to the
Claim Element Described in the Specification
The subject patent in the case of Unique Concepts, Inc. v.
Brown295 was directed to an "assembly of border pieces" used to
attach a fabric wall covering to a wall. The claimed assembly was
made up of a number of "right angle corner border pieces" and
"linear border pieces" which were arranged to form a frame.296
The alleged infringer had argued that the accused product did
not infringe because the accused product did not have corner border
pieces which were preformed at a right angle, but instead employed
two linear pieces which were each mitered, i.e., cut at a 45 degree
angle, and then placed together to form a right angle.2 9 7
After trial, the district court entered judgment for the alleged
infringer, finding that the mitered linear pieces used by the alleged
infringer did not meet the claim language "right angle corner bor-
der pieces," either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents. 298
The patentee appealed.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit found that the claim language
made unambiguous reference to two distinct elements: "linear bor-
der pieces" and "right angle corner border pieces." The Federal
292. Id.
293. Eg., In re Thorpe, 777 F.2d 695, 227 USPQ 964 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Brown, 59
C.C.P.A. 1036, 459 F.2d 531, 535, 173 USPQ 685, 688 (CCPA 1972) ; In re Bridgeford, 53
C.C.P.A. 1182, 357 F.2d 679, 682 n.5, 149 USPQ 55, 58 n.5 (CCPA 1966).
294. Scripps, 18 USPQ2D at 1016.
295. 939 F.2d 1558, 19 USPQ2D 1500 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
296. Id. at 1502.
297. Id. at 1503.
298. See, Unique Concepts, Inc. v. Brown, 735 F. Supp. 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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Circuit reasoned that if linear border pieces whose ends are mitered
are the same as linear border pieces and a right angle comer piece,
then the recitation of both "right angle comer border pieces" and
"linear border pieces" in the same claim would be redundant. The
Federal Circuit further reasoned that "merging" the two types of
claim elements into one would violate the "all elements rule,"
which requires that to prove infringement, every element in the
claim must be found in the accused device either literally or
equivalently.
299
The Federal Circuit acknowledged that the patent specification
contained the following paragraph, which described the option of
using "improvised comer pieces" rather than "preformed right-an-
gle comer pieces":
Instead of using preformed right-angle comer pieces of the
type previously disclosed, one may improvise comer pieces by
miter-cutting the ends of a pair of short linear border pieces at
right angles to each other and providing a space between the cut
ends to define the necessary storage slot. For this purpose, a tem-
porary spacer may be used to provide exactly the right amount of
storage space. The advantage of such comer pieces resides in the
fact that linear pieces may be mass-produced at low cost by con-
tinuous extrusion, whereas preformed comer pieces must be
molded or otherwise fabricated by more expensive techniques.
On the other hand, a preformed comer piece is somewhat easier
for a do-it-yourselfer to work with.3°
The Federal Circuit viewed the above-quoted paragraph as dis-
closing an "alternative" to the claimed right angle comer border
piece, rather than disclosing an example of the claimed right angle
comer border piece.30 1 The Federal Circuit stated:
It would run counter to [the requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112 to
particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter of
the invention] for an applicant for patent to expressly state
throughout his specification and in his claims that his invention
includes right angle comer border pieces and then be allowed to
avoid that claim limitation in a later infringement suit by point-
ing to one paragraph in his specification stating an alternative
299. See, SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Laboratories Corp., 859 F.2d 878, 889,
8 USPQ2D 1468, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
300. Unigue Concepts, 19 USPQ2D at 1503.
301. In a dissenting opinion, Judge Rich viewed the above-quoted paragraph as demon-
strating that the specification disclosed two different species of the claimed "right angle cor-
ner border pieces": (1) preformed one-piece and (2) mitered, short, linear pieces, arranged at
right angles and properly spaced at their junction. Id. at 1506.
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that lacks that limitation, and thus interpret the claim contrary
to its plain meaning. Such a result would encourage an applicant
to escape examination of a more broadly-claimed invention by
filing narrow claims and then, after grant, asserting a broader
scope of the claims based on a statement in the specification of an
alternative never presented in the claims for examination.3°2
The Federal Circuit concluded that if the patentee had in-
tended to claim mitered linear border pieces as an alternative to
right angle corner border pieces, then the patentee was required to
persuade the examiner to issue such a claim. The patentee failed to
do so. Consequently, the mitered linear border pieces disclosed but
not claimed in the patent application were dedicated to the
public.303
The Federal Circuit concluded that the district court had cor-
rectly found that a proper construction of the claim language "right
angle corner border pieces" required a single preformed corner
piece, and that the patent did not literally cover the alleged in-
fringer's corners formed by aligning two mitered straight pieces.
The decision of the district court was therefore affirmed.
D. An Infringement Analysis Requires Comparison of the
Accused Product to the Patent Claims, Not To Another
Product
The subject design patent in the case of Lund Industries, Incor-
porated v. Go Industries, Inc.3 was directed to an automobile sun
visor. The parties had previously settled an earlier lawsuit by enter-
ing into a settlement agreement in which the accused infringer had
conceded the validity of the subject design patent and had admitted
infringement.3 °5
After settlement of the earlier lawsuit, the accused infringer
had introduced a new sun visor product. The patentee had sought a
preliminary injunction, charging that the accused infringer's new
sun visor product infringed the design patent.30 6
In weighing the likelihood of success on infringement, the dis-
trict court compared the new visor and the admittedly infringing
old visor covered by the settlement agreement. The district court
302. Id. at 1504.
303. Edward Miller & Co. v. Bridgeport Brass Co., 104 U.S. 350, 352, 26 L. Ed. 783
(1881).
304. 938 F.2d 1273, 19 USPQ2D 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
305. Id. at 1384.
306. Id. at 1385.
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found that the new visor did not colorably differ from the admit-
tedly infringing old visor. Relying on the case of KSM Fastening
Sys. v. H.A. Jones Co.,3° to justify its comparison of the new visor
with the old visor, the district court concluded that the new visor
also infringed the design patent and therefore issued a preliminary
injunction. The accused infringer appealed.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit found that the district court
had erred by relying on KSM. In KSM, the Federal Circuit had
permitted comparison of an infringing device and an accused device
as part of the inquiry into whether contempt proceedings were ap-
propriate. However, in KSM the Federal Circuit had not permitted
comparison of an infringing device and an accused device to deter-
mine whether the patent had been infringed.08
In Lund, the Federal Circuit held that a proper infringement
analysis requires comparison of the accused design to the patent
claims, not to another design.30 9 The district court's departure
from this proper infringement analysis was not justified by the ac-
cused infringer's prior admission of infringement with respect to a
different (albeit related) product. The Federal Circuit therefore va-
cated and remanded with instructions for the district court to ana-
lyze the alleged infringement of the design patent by comparing the
accused device to the patent claim.310
E. Application of the Doctrine of Equivalents Is the
Exception, Not the Rule
The subject patent in the case of Wallace London v. Carson
Pirie Scott & Co. 311 was directed to clamps used to hang clothes
securely in travel garment bags. The patentee had alleged that the
accused clamps infringed literally and under the doctrine of
equivalents. Both the patentee and the alleged infringer had moved
for summary judgment relating to infringement. The district court
granted the alleged infringer's motion. The patentee appealed only
that part of the district court's judgment relating to infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents.312
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that while designing
around patents to make new inventions is encouraged, piracy is not.
307. 776 F.2d 1522, 227 USPQ 676 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
308. KSM, 776 F.2d at 1530, 227 USPQ at 682.
309. KSM, 776 F.2d at 1530, 227 USPQ at 682; Amstar Corp. v. Envirotech Corp., 823
F.2d 1538, 1545, 3 USPQ2D 1412, 1417 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
310. Lund, 19 USPQ2D at 1386.
311. 946 F.2d 1534, 20 USPQ2D 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
312. Id. at 1458.
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Thus, where an infringer, instead of inventing around a patent by
making a substantial change, merely makes an insubstantial change,
essentially misappropriating the patented invention, infringement
may lie under the doctrine of equivalents. Nevertheless, the Federal
Circuit made clear that:
Application of the doctrine of equivalents is the exception, how-
ever, not the rule, for if the public comes to believe (or fear) that
the language of patent claims can never be relied on, and that the
doctrine of equivalents is simply the second prong of every in-
fringement charge, regularly available to extend protection be-
yond the scope of the claims, then claims will cease to serve their
intended purpose. Competitors will never know whether their ac-
tions infringe a granted patent.313
In Wallace London the Federal Circuit found that the accused
device did not work in substantially the same way as the claimed
device, and therefore did not infringe under the doctrine of
equivalents. Because the evidence showed that the accused device
did not meet the claim limitations either literally or equivalently,
the alleged infringer was properly entitled to summary judgment as
a matter of law. The ruling of the district court was therefore
affirmed.3 14
F. Infringement Under the Doctrine of Equivalents Exists
Only If the Changes Made to the Claimed Invention
By the Accused Infringer Are Not Substantial
The subject patent in the case of Slimfold Manufacturing Com-
pany, Inc. V Kinkead Industries, Inc.3 1 had issued in 1974 and was
directed to a "Pivot and Guide Rod Assembly for Bi-Fold Door."
In 1976, after becoming aware of the patentee's product, the ac-
cused infringer instructed its engineers to produce a similar product
referred to as the "Type I door." In 1978, after becoming aware of
the patent, the accused infringer abandoned the Type I door and
began making the "Type II door." The Type II door had been de-
liberately designed to avoid infringement of the patent.' 16
In a suit for patent infringement, the district court found that
the Type I door literally infringed the patent, and that the Type II
door infringed under the doctrine of equivalents. The district court
also found the infringement to be willful, and held that the patent
313. Id. at 1458-59.
314. Id. at 1460.
315. 932 F.2d 1453, 18 USPQ2D 1842 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
316. Id. at 1845.
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owner was entitled to treble damages under 35 U.S.C. § 284 and
attorneys fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285.3"7
On appeal, the accused infringer argued that the district court
had erred in finding that the Type II door infringed under the doc-
trine of equivalents and in finding its infringement to be willful.
3 18
With respect to infringement under the doctrine of equivalents,
the Federal Circuit found that the district court had been overly
concerned with the fact that the Type II door had been deliberately
designed to avoid infringement. Noting that intentional "designing
around" the claims of a patent is not, by itself, a wrong which must
be compensated by invocation of the doctrine of equivalents, the
Federal circuit stated:
Designing around patents is, in fact, one of the ways in which the
patent system works to the advantage of the public in promoting
progress in the useful arts, its constitutional purpose. Inherent in
our claim-based patent system is also the principle that the pro-
tected invention is what the claims say it is, and thus that in-
fringement can be avoided by avoiding the language of the
claims. 319 It is only when the changes are so insubstantial as to
result in "a fraud on the patent" that application of the equitable
doctrine of equivalents becomes desirable.320
Therefore, liability for infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents may be found only if the changes made to the claimed
invention by the accused infringer are not "substantial." Under the
Graver Tank tripartite test, the changes made to the claimed inven-
tion are not "substantial ' 321 only if the accused device performs
substantially the same function, in substantially the same way, to
achieve substantially the same result as the claimed invention.
Noting that the claimed invention in Slimfold was a mechani-
cal combination in a crowded field and therefore entitled to only a
narrow scope of equivalents, the Federal Circuit concluded that the
Type II door did not operate in substantially the same way as the
claimed invention. Consequently, the Type II door avoided in-
fringement under the doctrine of equivalents, and the district
court's finding to the contrary was reversed.322
317. Id. at 1847.
318. Id.
319. Slimfold, 18 USPQ2D at 1845-46, quoting Texas Instruments, Inc. v. U.S.I.T.C.,
805 F.2d 1558, 1572, 231 USPQ 833, 841-42 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
320. Slimfold, 18 USPQ2D at 1846, quoting Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod-
ucts Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608, 94 L.Ed. 1097, 70 S.Ct. 854, 85 USPQ 328, 330 (1950).
321. Slimfold, 18 USPQ2D at 1846.
322. Id.
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The Federal Circuit found sufficient evidence in the record to
support a finding of willfulness with respect to infringement by the
Type I door. However, the Federal Circuit also found that the dis-
trict court's findings regarding willfulness and the exceptional na-
ture of the case had been influenced by the district court's incorrect
assumption that the accused infringer did not avoid infringement
when it developed the Type II door. Therefore, the Federal Circuit
directed the district court, on remand, to re-determine whether the
facts of the case, in light of the holding of no infringement with
respect to the Type II door, still merited a finding of willfulness and
a finding of "exceptional case" under 35 U.S.C. § 285.323
G. A Patentee Must Prove Substantial Identity As to Each
of the Function, Way, and Result Prongs of the
Doctrine of Equivalents Test
The subject patent in the case of Malta v. Schulmerich Caril-
lons, Inc.324 was directed to improvements in the design of
handbells, of the type used by music groups in churches, schools,
and the like. The subject handbells consisted of a bell, a handle,
and a clapper pivotably mounted inside the bell.32
The patent disclosed two different embodiments for the clap-
per. The first embodiment had three opposing pairs of "striking
surfaces." The second embodiment had three "opposed pairs of
buttons" attached to the surface of the clapper. The patent specifi-
cally used the term "striking surfaces" with respect to the first em-
bodiment, and used the different term "buttons" with respect to the
second embodiment. The patent stated that the two different em-
bodiments shared the same advantages, but varied in design, flexi-
bility and simplicity.326I Claim 2 of the patent used the broad term "surface portions"
to describe the surface of the clapper. Claim 3 of the patent was
very similar to claim 2, but used the narrower term "buttons" to
describe the surface of the clapper.327
The patentee had alleged infringement of both claims 2 and 3.
The jury had been given special interrogatories asking whether the
accused handbells infringed claims 2 and 3 of the patent, either lit-
erally or under the doctrine of equivalents. In response, the jury
323. Id. at 1847.
324. 952 F.2d 1320, 21 USPQ2D 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
325. Id.
326. Id. at 1166.
327. Id.
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had found that claim 2 was not infringed, but that claim 3, while
not literally infringed, was infringed under the doctrine of
equivalents.328
The alleged infringer moved for JNOV on the grounds that the
evidence was not sufficient to support the finding of infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents. The judge agreed, and granted
judgment notwithstanding a jury verdict of non-infringement in
favor of the alleged infringer. 329 The patentee appealed from the
grant of JNOV of non-infringement.33 °
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that claim 2 of the patent
used the broad term "surface portions" to describe the surface of
the clapper, whereas claim 3 used the narrower term "buttons."
The Federal Circuit reasoned that where a broad term is used in one
claim and a narrower term is used in a second claim, and is used
with respect to only one embodiment in the specification, the impli-
cation is that infringement of the second claim can be avoided by
not meeting the narrower term.331
The Federal Circuit further noted that the patent stated that
the two different embodiments were alternatives to each other, but
varied in design, flexibility and simplicity. The Federal Circuit
viewed this as indicating that the two different embodiments did not
perform the claimed function in substantially the same "way," as
that term is used in the Graver Tank test.332
In attempting to prove infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents, the patentee had principally relied upon the testimony
of the inventor. The Federal Circuit found the inventor's testimony
to be conclusory and lacking a sufficiently particularized explana-
tion of both how the overall function, way, and result of the accused
device are substantially the same as those of the claimed device, and
how the plastic/slotted plastic/felt arrangement of the accused de-
vice is the equivalent of the claimed "buttons" limitation.33 The
evidence failed to prove that all three prongs of the Graver Tank
test had been met, or that the "buttons" limitation had been met
equivalently. 334 The Federal Circuit could find no other evidence in
the record to provide the necessary substantial evidence on the issue
328. Malta, 21 USPQ2D at 1163.
329. Malta v. Schulmerich Carillons Inc., 13 USPQ2d 1900 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
330. Malta, 21 USPQ2D at 1164.
331. Id. at 1166.
332. Id. at 1165.
333. Id. at 1166.
334. Id.
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of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. 335
The patentee had therefore failed to present evidence sufficient
to support a finding of infringement of claim 3 under the doctrine of
equivalents, and the Federal Circuit upheld the district court's
grant of JNOV on the ground of non-infringement.336
H. Prosecution History Estoppel Does Not Necessarily
Preclude Application of the Doctrine of Equivalents
The district court in the case of Dixie USA, Inc. v. Infab Corpo-
ration 337 had determined that the accused device did not infringe
literally, and that infringement under the doctrine of equivalents
was precluded by prosecution history estoppel.331 The district court
therefore granted the alleged infringer's motion for summary judg-
ment of non-infringement. The patentee appealed.
On appeal, the patentee argued that, even in the face of prose-
cution history estoppel, the patentee should still be able to obtain
some degree of equivalence, and that a total preclusion of all equiva-
lence should not apply. 339 The Federal Circuit agreed that, as a
general proposition, the patentee's argument was correct.3 4° How-
ever, the Federal Circuit found that the district court in Dixie had
not applied total preclusion.341 Instead, the district court had con-
sidered the nature of the prior art and the amendments and argu-
ments made during the prosecution of the subject patent application
and had concluded that the scope of equivalence being urged by the
patentee was precisely that which was forbidden by the prosecution
history.342
The Federal Circuit therefore found that the district court had
properly applied the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel and
affirmed the decision of the district court.343
335. Malta, 21 USPQ2D at 1166.
336. Id. at 1167.
337. 927 F.2d 584, 17 USPQ2D 1968 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
338. Id. at 1969.
339. Id. at 1970.
340. Mannesmann Demag Corp. v. Engineered Metal Prod., 793 F.2d 1279, 1284, 230
USPQ 45, 48 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
341. Dixie, 17 USPQ2D at 1970.




X. DEFENSES TO PATENT INFRINGEMENT - 35 U.S.C. § 282
A. Intent to Deceive the Patent Examiner Is an Essential
Factual Predicate to Inequitable Conduct
The appeal in the case of Tol-O-Matic, Inc. v. Proma Produkt -
Und Marketing Gesellschaft MH.34 was taken from the judg-
ment of.the district court holding the subject patent unenforceable
based on inequitable conduct.34 5
The inequitable conduct issue involved a reference to Hoffar
which the patentee had called to the examiner's attention only after
allowance of the claims, following which the examiner had re-
opened prosecution. There was evidence that the patentee's Ger-
man patent attorney had known of the Hoffar reference, and had
believed that the Hoffar reference was merely cumulative to the
prior art already before the U.S. examiner; that the German attor-
ney responded promptly to the request by the U.S. patent attorney
for all references cited in other countries; and that after receiving
these references, which included the Hoffar reference, the U.S. pat-
ent attorney promptly cited the Hoffar reference to the PTO. There
was also evidence that the PTO, investigating the charge of inequi-
table conduct, had found that the Hoffar reference was merely cu-
mulative to other references already of record.3'
The jury found that the patentee had made material misrepre-
sentations during patent prosecution, and that the patentee had ac-
ted with gross negligence, but that the patentee had not intended to
deceive the patent examiner.34 7 Based on these findings, the district
court held the patent invalid for inequitable conduct.348
On appeal, the patentee argued that the district court's ruling
was contrary to law, in light of the jury's finding that intent to
deceive had not been proven.34 9
The alleged infringer argued that the jury had simply found
that intent to deceive had not been proven by clear and convincing
evidence, but that the jury's finding of gross negligence did establish
a sufficient threshold level of intent, which the district court then
correctly balanced against the jury's finding of materiality to sup-
344. 945 F.2d 1546, 20 USPQ2D 1332 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
345. Id. at 1333.
346. Id. at 1334.
347. Id. at 1335.
348. Id. at 1336.
349. Tol-O-Matic, 20 USPQ2D at 1336.
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port a finding of inequitable conduct.35 °
The Federal Circuit noted that inequitable conduct carries the
consequence of permanent unenforceability of the patent.35' Forfei-
ture is not favored as a remedy for actions not shown to be culpable.
Consequently, clear and convincing evidence of conduct sufficient
to support an inference of culpable intent is required for a holding
of inequitable conduct.352 Gross negligence alone, absent culpable
intent, does not provide a sufficient basis for a holding of inequitable
conduct.
353
The Federal Circuit noted that the jury's specific finding that
intent to deceive had not been established, although gross negli-
gence had been established, was not a trivial distinction.35 4 Since
intent to deceive the patent examiner is an essential factual predi-
cate to inequitable conduct, the finding that intent had not been
proven bars a ruling of inequitable conduct.355 The Federal Circuit
therefore reversed the judgment of inequitable conduct.
B. The Materiality of a Withheld Reference Requires
Consideration of Both Similarities and Differences
Between the Prior Art and the Claimed Invention
The district court in the case of Halliburton Company v.
Schlumberger Technology Corporation 356 determined that the pat-
entee had engaged in inequitable conduct by withholding an impor-
tant prior art reference from the PTO during prosecution.35 7 The
patentee admitted that it had been aware of the withheld reference,
but had not considered the reference to be material. 35 8 The district
court refused to enforce the patent and awarded the accused in-
fringer attorney fees and expenses.3 9  The patentee appealed.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit initially noted that a two-step
350. J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc. v. Lex Tex Ltd., Inc., 747 F.2d 1553, 223 USPQ 1089 (Fed.
Cir. 1984).
351. Tol-O-Matie, 20 USPQ2D at 1337.
352. Northern Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp., 908 F.2d 931, 939, 15 USPQ2D 1321,
1327 (Fed. Cir.)"), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 296, 112 L. Ed. 2d 250 (1990).
353. Kingsdown Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876, 9
USPQ2D 1384, 1392 (Fed.Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1067, 104 L. Ed. 2d
633, 109 S. Ct. 2068 (1989).
354. Tol-O-Matic, 20 USPQ2D at 1340.
355. Id.
356. 925 F.2d 1435, 17 USPQ2D 1834 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
357. Id. at 1836.
358. Id. at 1841.
359. Halliburton Co. v. Schlumberger Technology Corp., 722 F. Supp. 324, 12 USPQ2D
1765 (S.D. Tex. 1989).
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analysis is required to properly find inequitable conduct.3" First,
the trial court must determine whether the withheld reference satis-
fies a threshold level of materiality and whether the applicant's con-
duct satisfies a threshold showing of intent to mislead.36 x Second,
the trial court must balance materiality and intent.362 The more
material the reference, the less culpable the intent required, and vice
versa.
363
Regarding materiality, the Federal Circuit noted that a refer-
ence is "material" if there is "substantial likelihood that a reason-
able examiner would consider it important in deciding whether to
allow the application to issue as a patent."' 36" However, a patent
applicant is not obligated to disclose a material reference if the ma-
terial reference is merely cumulative, or if the reference is less mate-
rial than those references already before the examiner.365
In determining whether a withheld reference is merely cumula-
tive, or less material than those references already cited, the Federal
Circuit observed that consideration must be given to both similari-
ties and differences between the prior art and the claimed invention,
including portions of the withheld reference that teach away from
the claimed invention.366
In Halliburton, the Federal Circuit concluded that the district
court had misunderstood the claimed invention, and had therefore
failed to appreciate the significance of the differences between the
claimed invention and the withheld reference. These differences
distinguished the withheld reference from the claimed invention,
and also made the withheld reference less material than the cited
references.367
Because the withheld reference was less material than the cited
references, the patentee was under no obligation to disclose the
360. Halliburton, 17 USPQ2D at 1841.
361. FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc Co., 835 F.2d 1411, 1415, 5 USPQ2D 1112, 1115 (Fed.
Cir. 1987); J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex, Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1559-60, 223 USPQ 1089,
1092 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert denied, 474 U.S. 822, 88 L. Ed. 2d 60, 106 S. Ct. 73 (1985).
362. Under Sea Indus., Inc. v. Dacor Corp., 833 F.2d 1551, 1559,4 USPQ2D 1772, 1777
(Fed. Cir. 1987).
363. N.V. Akzo v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours, 810 F.2d 1148, 1153, 1 USFQ2d 1704,
1708 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
364. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1989).
365. Specialty Composites v. Cabot Corp., 845 F.2d 981, 992, 6 USPQ2D 1601, 1609
(Fed. Cir. 1988).
366. Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Barnes-Hind/Hydrocurve, Inc., 796 F.2d 443,448-49, 230
USPQ 416, 420 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert denied, 484 U.S. 823 , 98 L. Ed. 2d 47, 108 S. Ct. 85
(1987).
367. Halliburton, 17 USPQ2D at 1842.
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withheld reference to the PTO.168 Consequently, when the patentee
decided to withhold the reference from the PTO, the patentee could
not have acted with culpable intent to mislead.369
The Federal Circuit therefore concluded that both the district
court's materiality and intent findings were clearly erroneous, and
that the patentee had not engaged in inequitable conduct. The
judgment of the district court was therefore reversed.370
C. A Reference That Is Material Only to Withdrawn Claims
Can Not Be the Basis of a Holding of Inequitable
Conduct
The subject patent in the case of Scripps Clinic & Research
Foundation v. Genentech, Inc.371 was entitled "Ultrapurification of
Factor VIII Using Monoclonal Antibodies. 372 The accused in-
fringer appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment
that the patent owner had not engaged in inequitable conduct dur-
ing prosecution of the subject patent application.373
The prosecution history of the patent contained numerous ref-
erences, including a single paragraph abstract written by a Dr.
Meyer, as well as a 27 page paper also written by Dr. Meyer. The
Meyer paper, which cited the Meyer abstract, contained a much
more detailed disclosure than the Meyer abstract. The Meyer paper
had been submitted to the PTO by the patent applicant as part of an
information disclosure statement. The Meyer abstract had not been
submitted to the PTO by the patent applicant, but had been inde-
pendently discovered by the Examiner.374
On appeal, the accused infringer charged the patent owner
with inequitable conduct resulting from the patent owner's failure
to bring the Meyer abstract to the examiner's specific attention.375
The Federal Circuit observed, however, that the Meyer ab-
stract merely summarized the Meyer paper, and was therefore
merely cumulative to the Meyer paper. A reference that is merely
cumulative to other references does not meet the threshold of mate-
368. Specialty Composites, 845 F.2d at 992, 6 USPQ2d at 1609; J.P. Stevens, 747 F.2d at
1559-60, 223 USPQ at 1092.
369. Halliburton, 17 USPQ2D at 1842.
370. Id.
371. 927 F.2d 1565, 18 USPQ2D 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
372. Id. at 1003.
373. Id. at 1004.




riality that is a predicate to a holding of inequitable conduct. 37 6
The Federal Circuit further stated that when a reference is
before the examiner, whether through the examiner's search or the
applicant's disclosure, it can not be deemed to have been withheld
from the examiner. Thus, what is controlling is whether the Meyer
abstract had been considered by the examiner, not how the Meyer
abstract came to the examiner's attention.377
The accused infringer also charged the patent owner with ineq-
uitable conduct because the patent owner had originally sought
claims to certain monoclonal antibodies, and had subsequently can-
celed those claims after the examiner had required the patent owner
to provide comparative data with the monoclonal antibodies de-
scribed in the Meyer abstract.378
The Federal Circuit noted, however, that an applicant has the
absolute right to decline to do work suggested by the PTO, and to
withdraw claims that had been presented for examination, without
incurring liability for inequitable conduct. The Federal Circuit held
that a reference that is material only to withdrawn claims can not
be the basis of a holding of inequitable conduct.3 79
The Federal Circuit concluded that, drawing all factual infer-
ences in its favor, the accused infringer had failed to offer evidence
or legal argument showing that inequitable conduct could be proven
at trial, as to either materiality of the Meyer abstract, or the paten-
tee's intent to deceive or mislead.380 The Federal Circuit therefore
affirmed the district court's grant of partial summary judgment of
no inequitable conduct based on the Meyer abstract.381
D. Disputed Fact Questions Regarding Inequitable Conduct
Are Not Appropriately Resolved by Summary
Judgment
The subject patent in the case of Scripps Clinic & Research
Foundation v. Genentech, Inc.3 82 was a reissue patent entitled "Ul-
trapurification of Factor VIII Using Monoclonal Antibodies. 383
376. Haliburton Co. v. Schlumberger Technology Corp., 925 F.2d 1435, 1440, 17 USPQ
2d 1834 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 15, 1991).
377. Scripps, 18 USPQ2D at 1015.
378. Id.
379. Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson Co., 745 F.2d 1437, 1457, 223 USPQ
603, 616-17 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
380. Scripps, 18 USPQ2D at 1015.
381. Id. at 1016.
382. 927 F.2d 1565, 18 USPQ2D 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
383. Id. at 1003.
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During the prosecution of the reissue application, the examiner
had raised various questions under 35 U.S.C. § 112 relating to the
purity of the Factor VIII that was the subject of the proposed prod-
uct claims. In response, the inventors had made several statements
in the record regarding the purity of the claimed Factor VIII. 84
The district court had found that the inventors' statements
about the purity of the product were unsupported by the evidence.
The district court therefore granted partial summary judgment of
unenforceability of the claims due to inequitable conduct.38 5
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that there are two essen-
tial factual predicates to a determination of inequitable conduct:
the materiality of the representation, and whether the representa-
tion was made with intent to deceive or mislead. 86
In Scripps the Federal Circuit found that there was a factual
dispute regarding whether the inventors' statements concerning pu-
rity were in error. Moreover, there was a factual dispute regarding
the inventor's intent to mislead or deceive the examiner, an issue
about which the district court had failed to make any finding.38 7 It
was not appropriate to resolve either of these factually disputed is-
sues on summary judgment. The Federal Circuit therefore reversed
the grant of partial summary judgment of unenforceability of the
claims for inequitable conduct.
E. Determination of Privity Under the Doctrine of Assignor
Estoppel Requires Consideration of Both Direct and
Indirect Contacts With the Patentee
Assignor estoppel is an equitable doctrine that prevents a pat-
entee who has assigned the rights to a patent from later contending
that what was assigned is a nullity. 88 The doctrine also bars a simi-
lar challenge by any party in privity with the assignor. Privity de-
pends upon the closeness of the relationship based upon a balancing
of the equities.3 89
The complainant in the case of Intel Corporation v. U. S. Inter-
384. Id. at 1011.
385. Id. at 1012.
386. Modine Mfg. Co. v. Allen Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 538, 541, 16 USPQ2D 1622, 1624
(Fed. Cir. 1990).
387. Scripps, 18 USPQ2D at 1006.
388. Diamond Scientific Co. v. Ambico, Inc., 848 F.2d 1220, 1224, 6 USPQ2D 2028,
2030 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
389. 'Shamrock Technologies, Inc. v. Medical Sterilization, Inc., 903 F.2d 789, 14
USPQ2D 1728 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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national Trade Commission3 9° had argued that assignor estoppel
prevented a first respondent from challenging the validity of the
subject patent because the inventor, a major shareholder and chief
executive officer of the first respondent, had assigned the patent to
the complainant.391 The complainant further argued that assignor
estoppel similarly prevented a second respondent from challenging
the validity of the subject patent because of the close relationship
that the inventor and the first respondent had with the second
respondent.392
The Commission determined that the first respondent was in
privity with the inventor, and was therefore prevented by assignor
estoppel from challenging the patent's validity. However, the Com-
mission determined that the second respondent did not have suffi-
cient contacts with the inventor to be in privity, and that the second
respondent was therefore not estopped from challenging the pat-
ent's validity. 93 The complainant appealed the Commission's deci-
sion that the second respondent was not in privity with the
inventor.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit found that the Commission had
improperly limited its analysis to whether the relationship between
the inventor and the second respondent was enough to find that the
two were in privity.394 In determining whether the second respon-
dent was in privity with the inventor, the Commission should have
considered all contacts between the second respondent and the in-
ventor, direct and indirect, including the contacts between the first
respondent and the second respondent. The Commission had not
adequately considered the part the inventor had played in creating
the joint venture between the second respondent and the first re-
spondent, under which both respondents sought to mutually de-
velop the allegedly infringing product.395  The Federal Circuit
concluded that the balance of the equities required a finding of priv-
ity between the second respondent and the inventor.396
Because of its privity with the inventor and the first respon-
dent, the Federal Circuit concluded that the second respondent
should not have been allowed to challenge the validity of the patent.
Because the second respondent had been improperly permitted to
390. 946 F.2d 821, 20 USPQ2D 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
391. Id. at 1175.
392. Id.
393. Id. at 1176.
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contest the validity of the patent, the Federal Circuit vacated the
Commission's holding that claim 1 of the patent was invalid.3 9 7
XI. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF - 35 U.S.C. § 283
A. The Patentee Has the Burden of Showing Likelihood of
Success With Respect to Validity and Infringement At
the Preliminary Injunction Stage
The trial court in the case of Nutrition 21 v. The United
States398 had granted a preliminary injunction pursuant to 35
U.S.C. § 283, which enjoined the alleged infringer from selling or
offering for sale a product encompassed within the patent claims.399
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, the alleged infringer sought relief
from the injunction on grounds that the district court had erred by
failing to set forth adequate findings of fact to support the prelimi-
nary injunction. 40°
The Federal Circuit initially noted that the issuance of a pre-
liminary injunction turns upon four factors: 1) the probability that
the party seeking the injunction will succeed on the merits; 2) the
threat of irreparable harm to the party seeking the injunction
should a preliminary injunction be denied; 3) the balance between
this harm and the harm that granting the injunction will cause to
the other parties; and 4) the public interest." 1
Regarding the first factor (the probability that the party seek-
ing the injunction will succeed on tile merits), the Federal Circuit
observed that while a patent is presumed valid, that presumption of
validity is a procedural device that places the burden of going for-
ward and the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial on the party
attacking the validity of a patent.402 Prior to trial, at the prelimi-
nary injunction stage, the burden of showing likelihood of success
on the merits with respect to the patent's validity, enforceability,
and infringement is placed upon the patentee.4° A patentee must
therefore "clearly show" that the patent is valid and infringed
397. Id. at 1181.
398. 930 F.2d 867, 18 USPQ2D 1347 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
399. Nutrition 21 v. Thorne Research Inc., 130 F.R.D. 671, 14 USPQ2D 1244 (1990).
400. Id. at 1245.
401. Pretty Punch Shoppettes v. Hauk, 844 F.2d 782, 783, 6 USPQ2D 1563, 1564 (Fed.
Cir. 1988).
402. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1988); Roger Corp. v. Litton Systems, Inc., 757 F.2d 1266,
1270, 225 USPQ 345, 347 (Fed. Cir. 1985).




before a court may preliminarily enjoin an alleged infringer.' In
the case of Nutrition 21, the Federal Circuit found that the required
"clear showing" of validity and infringement was absent.4"
Regarding the second factor (the threat of irreparable harm to
the party seeking the injunction), the Federal Circuit noted that
without a clear showing of validity and infringement, a presumption
of irreparable harm does not arise in a preliminary injunction pro-
ceeding." 6 There is no presumption that money damages will be
inadequate. Nor is irreparable harm proven by evidence of the diffi-
culty of calculating losses in market share or speculation that such
losses might occur.
The Federal Circuit therefore vacated the preliminary injunc-
tion due to the district court's failure to set forth adequate findings
of fact to support the preliminary injunction." 7
B. Preliminary Injunctive Relief Against Infringement Under
The Doctrine of Equivalents Requires a Finding That
the Function/Way/Result Test Has Been Met
The patentee in the case of The Conair Group, Inc. v. Automa-
tik Apparate-Maschinenbau Gmbh"° had filed suit against the al-
leged infringer and had moved for a preliminary injunction. The
district court concluded that both literal infringement and infringe-
ment under the doctrine of equivalents were reasonably likely to be
found, and granted the motion.4° 9 The alleged infringer appealed
the preliminary injunction order.
The issue on appeal was whether the District Court had abused
its discretion, committed an error of law, or seriously misjudged the
evidence by granting the patentee's motion for a preliminary
injunction.410
With regard to literal infringement, the Federal Circuit noted
that the record contained uncontradicted evidence indicating that at
least one limitation of the patent claim was not met by the accused
404. Roper, 757 F.2d at 1271-72, 225 USPQ at 348-49; Smith Int'l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool
Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1580-81, 219 USPQ 686, 692 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
405. Nutrition 21, 18 USPQ2D at 1347.
406. Datascope Corp. v. Kontron, Inc., 786 F.2d 398, 400, 229 USPQ 41, 42-43 (Fed.
Cir. 1986); Roper, 757 F.2d at 1271, 225 USPQ at 349.
407. Roper, 225 USPQ at 349.
408. 944 F.2d 862, 20 USPQ2D 1067 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
409. See Conair Group, Inc. v. Automatik Apparate-Maschinenbau, 19 USPQ2D 1535
(W.D. Pa. 1990).
410. Conair Group, 20 USPQ2D at 1069.
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device.4 1' The Federal Circuit therefore concluded that the district
court had seriously misjudged the evidence, and that the district
court's determination of a likelihood of success on grounds of literal
infringement was erroneous.4 12
With regard to infringement under the doctrine of equivalents,
the Federal Circuit noted that Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure requires a district court to make findings of fact to
support the granting of a preliminary injunction. Failure to provide
adequate findings of fact is an error of law.413
The Federal Circuit noted that-the district court had failed to
make any findings that the accused device performed substantially
the same function as the claimed invention, that the accused device
did so in substantially the same way, or that the accused device
obtained the same result.41 4 The district court had further failed to
make any findings that the range of equivalents sought by the paten-
tee did not "ensnare the prior art. ' 415 Lastly, the district court had
failed to make any findings regarding whether the doctrine of prose-
cution history estoppel applied to limit the range of equivalents.416
Since the district court had made none of the required findings
with regard to infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, the
Federal Circuit found no basis for concluding that there was a like-
lihood of success on that ground. Consequently, the injunction was
vacated. 17
411. Id. at 1070.
412. Id. at 1071.
413. Nutrition 21 v. United States, 930 F.2d 867, 869, 18 USPQ2D 1347, 1349 (Fed. Cir.
1991). Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) provides, in pertinent part, that:
In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the
court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law
thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58; and in granting or
refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings
of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its action ....
414. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 94 L. Ed. 1097, 70
S. Ct. 854, 85 USPQ 328 (1950).
415. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 685, 14
USPQ2D 1942, 1949 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 537, 112 L. Ed. 2d 547, 59 U.S.L.W.
3392 (1990).




C. Preliminarily Injunctive Relief Against Infringement
Under the Doctrine of Equivalents Requires
Consideration of Whether the Teachings of the Prior
Art Would Have Made Obvious the Range of
Equivalents Being Asserted
The patent owner in the case of We Care, Inc. v. Ultra-Mark
International Corp.418 had filed suit against the alleged infringer and
had sought a preliminary injunction pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 283 to
prevent the manufacture and sale of the accused device while the
suit was pending.419 The district court determined that the patent
owner would probably not be able to prove literal infringement, but
granted the injunction based on the finding that the patent owner
was likely to prove infringement at trial under the doctrine of
equivalents.420 The alleged infringer appealed the district court's
grant of a preliminary injunction.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit observed that the doctrine of
equivalents may not be used to extend a patent owner's right to
exclude beyond what could lawfully have been obtained in the origi-
nal patent application. Therefore, in determining infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents, the prior art must be examined to
assure that the range of equivalents being asserted does not en-
croach upon subject matter in the prior art.421 This examination
necessarily involves consideration of not only what the prior art
would have anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102, but also what the
prior art would have made obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103, at the
time the patent application was filed.
With respect to the requisite prior art analysis, the district
court in the case of We Care had observed that the none of the
relevant prior art references "identically disclosed" every element of
the patent claims, as "extended" by the doctrine of equivalents. The
Federal Circuit found that the district court's prior art analysis did
not go far enough, since the district court failed to consider whether
the teachings of the prior art would have made obvious the range of
equivalents being asserted for the patent claims.422 The Federal
Circuit concluded that the district court had erred by not consider-
ing, in an obviousness context, whether a range of equivalents broad
418. 930 F.2d 1567, 18 USPQ2D 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
419. Id. at 1563.
420. We Care, Inc. v. Ultra-Mark Int'l Corp., et al., 741 F. Supp. 743, 14 USPQ2D 1804
(D. Minn. 1989).
421. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 685, 14
USPQ2D 1942, 1949 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
422. We-Care, Inc., 18 USPQ2D at 1565.
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enough to find infringement was permissible. 23
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit vacated the preliminary in-
junction and remanded the case to the district court to determine
whether the range of equivalents sought by the patent owner en-
croached upon the prior art. 24
D. Preliminary Injunctive Relief Against Design Patent
Infingement Requires a Finding That the Novelty in
the Patented Design Has Been Appropriated and
That the Ordinary Observer Would Be Deceived
In the case of Oakley, Inc. v. International Tropic-Cal, Inc."5
the District Court had granted a preliminary injunction enjoining
the alleged infringer from infringing a design patent. The alleged
infringer appealed the injunction.426
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that under Rule 52(a) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a preliminary injunction must
be supported by findings of facts.427 The test of the adequacy of the
findings is whether they are sufficiently comprehensive and perti-
nent to the issue to form a basis for the decision. 428
In the case of a design patent, proof of infringement requires a
showing that an ordinary observer would be deceived in a manner
that would induce the observer to purchase the accused device sup-
posing it to be the patented design.429 In addition to overall similar-
ity of design, the accused device must also appropriate the novelty
in the patented design which distinguishes it from the prior art.430
In Oakley, the Federal Circuit found that the district court had
failed to make any explicit findings regarding these facts.431 The
district court had made no express or implied finding that the pat-
ent owner was likely to be able to prove at trial that the alleged
infringer's products infringed the patent.432 Because the district
court's findings of fact were insufficient for proper review of the
423. Id.
424. Id.
425. 923 F.2d 167, 17 USPQ2D 1401 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
426. Id. at 1402.
427. Id. at 1403.
428. Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 873, 228 USPQ 90, 98 (Fed. Cir.
1985).
429. Gorham Mfg. Co. v. White, 81 U.S.(14 Wal.) 511,, 20 L. Ed. 731 (1872).
430. Avia Group Int'l, Inc. v. L.A. Gear Cal., 853 F.2d 1557, 1565, 7 USPQ2D 1548,
1554 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Shelcore, Inc. v. Durham Indus., Inc., 745 F.2d 621, 628, 223 USPQ
584, 590 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
431. Oakley, 17 USPQ2D at 1403.
432. Id.
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issues, the Federal Circuit vacated the District Court's preliminary
injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings."'
E. Likelihood of Success On the Merits Includes a Showing
That the Plaintiff Holds Title to the Patent
The inventor of the patented subject matter in the case of
Filmtec Corporation v. Allied-Signal Inc.4" 4 had been one of the
founders of the plaintiff corporation.43 Prior to founding the plain-
tiff corporation, the inventor had been employed at a non-profit re-
search organization.436
. The inventor's work at the non-profit research organization
had been carried out under a contract with the U.S. Government.
The contract required the non-profit research organization to grant
to the U.S. Government the entire right in any invention made
under the contract or any subcontract thereunder. The contract
further required the non-profit research organization to warrant
that it would obligate its employees to assign their rights in any
invention made under the contract to the non-profit research
organization.437
The inventor had left the non-profit research organization in
January of 1978. The subject patent application had been filed by
the inventor in February of 1979. The inventor assigned his rights
in the patent application to the plaintiff corporation. After the sub-
ject patent issued, the plaintiff corporation sued the alleged infringer
for infringement.438
The alleged infringer asserted that the invention claimed in the
patent had been made by the inventor while employed by the non-
profit research organization. The alleged infringer asserted that,
under the contract between the non-profit research organization
and the Government, the Government held legal title to the inven-
tion and therefore the inventor had no rights to assign to the plain-
tiff. Since the plaintiff lacked legal title to the patent, the plaintiff
had no standing to bring an infringement action under the
patent.439
The district court concluded that, as a matter of law, even if
the invention had been made while the inventor had been employed
433. Id. at 1404.
434. 939 F.2d 1568, 19 USPQ2D 1508 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
435. Id. at 1509.
436. Id.
437. Id.
438. Id. at 1510.
439. Filmtec, 19 USPQ2D at 1510.
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at the non-profit research organization, the Government could have
no more than equitable title to the patent, which equitable title
could not be asserted as a defense by the alleged infringer.' 0 The
district court issued a preliminary injunction against the alleged in-
fringer, and the alleged infringer appealed.
The Federal Circuit viewed the issue on appeal as not who
should ultimately be held to have title to the patent, but instead
whether the plaintiff had made a sufficient showing to establish rea-
sonable likelihood of success on the merits, which included a show-
ing that title to the patent was held by the plaintiff.41
The Federal Circuit agreed with the alleged infringer that if the
subject matter of the patent had been invented by the inventor dur-
ing his employment with the non-profit research organization, and
if the inventor had granted the non-profit research organization
rights in the invention made during his employment, then the in-
ventor had nothing to give to the plaintiff and the purported assign-
ment to the plaintiff was a nullity." 2 Consequently, the plaintiff
would lack both title to the patent and standing to bring the present
action.443
However, the record did not indicate whether the employment
agreement between the inventor and the non-profit research organi-
zation either granted or required the inventor to grant to the non-
profit research organization the rights to the patented invention. 4'
The Federal Circuit was therefore unable to determine who held
legal title to the patent and was unable to determine if the plaintiff
could make a sufficient legal showing to establish the likelihood of
success necessary to support a preliminary injunction." 5
Because the record left serious doubts as to who had title to the
patent, the Federal Circuit concluded that the plaintiff had failed to
established a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits on the
title issue. Consequently, the Federal Circuit vacated the grant of
the preliminary injunction and remanded to the district court for
further proceedings." 6
440. Id. at 1511.
441. Id.
442. Id.
443. Id. at 1512.
444. Filmtec, 19 USPQ2D at 1512.
445. Id.
446. Id. at 1513.
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XII. DAMAGES - 35 U.S.C. § 284
A. A Party Seeking to Recover Money Damages for Patent
Infringement Must Have Held Legal Title to the
Patent During the Time of the Infingement
The assignee of the subject patent in the case of Arachnid, Inc.
v. Merit Industries, Inc.' 7 had entered into a consulting agreement
in 1980. The consulting agreement provided that any inventions
conceived by the consultant's employees in the course of the project
covered by the agreement would be the property of the patent as-
signee, and all rights to the invention "will be assigned" by the con-
sultant to the patent assignee.44
In November, 1982, several months after the consulting agree-
ment was terminated, the consultant's employees filed an applica-
tion for the subject patent. However, instead of assigning the patent
application to the patent assignee, the consultant's employees as-
signed the patent application to the consultant. 9
In April, 1983, the patent assignee sued the consultant for
breach of the 1980 consulting agreement, seeking an assignment of
all right, title, and interest in the patent application (from which the
subject patent had subsequently issued) that had been filed by the
consultant's employees.450
In April, 1987, the district court declared the patent assignee
to have been and to be the lawful owner of all right, title, and inter-
est in and to the patented invention since the conception of the in-
vention.451 The district court ordered the consultant to assign all its
right, title, and interest in the patent to the patent assignee.452
In October, 1987, in accordance with the district court order,
the consultant executed an assignment of all of its right, title, and
interest in and to the patent to the patent assignee.453 The assign-
ment did not include any assignment of the right to recover for past
infringement.454
Meanwhile, in May, 1985, the consultant had granted a nonex-
clusive license to practice the patented invention to the alleged in-
447. 939 F.2d 1574, 19 USPQ2D 1513 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
448. Id. at 1515.
449. Id.
450. Id.
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fringer.455 Beginning in December, 1985, and ending in June, 1986,
the alleged infringer had manufactured and sold a device which ad-
mittedly fell within the scope of the patent claims. 456
In June, 1989, the patent assignee sued the alleged infringer in
district court, seeking to recover money damages based upon the
alleged infringer's sales of the accused device in the 1985-86 pe-
riod.4 57 The patent assignee moved for a directed verdict on the
issue of infringement. The district court granted the patent as-
signee's motion, directing a verdict of infringement and assessing
money damages.458 The alleged infringer appealed from the district
court's final judgment.
On appeal, the issue was whether the patent assignee had
standing to sue for money damages for infringement that occurred
in 1985-86.4
The alleged infringer argued that the patent assignee did not
have standing to sue for an infringement that had occurred in 1985-
86.' s The alleged infringer asserted that until October 1987 (when
the consultant assigned the patent to the patent assignee), the patent
assignee had only "equitable title" to the patent, not "legal title,"
and that such equitable title alone was not sufficient to confer stand-
ing to sue for money damages for infringement.461
The patent assignee argued that it had acquired all legal and
equitable rights to the patented invention when the consultant
signed the consulting agreement in 1980.462 The patent assignee
had therefore always been the legal and equitable owner of the pat-
ented invention, and on that basis the patent assignee had standing
to sue the alleged infringer for the infringement occurring in 1985-
86.463
The Federal Circuit noted initially that an action to recover
money damages for patent infringement is an action "at law,"
rather than an action "in equity."' 464 The general rule is that one
seeking to recover money damages for patent infringement must
have held the legal title to the patent during the time of the
455. Arachnid, 19 USPQ2D at 1515.
456. Id.
457. Id.
458. Id. at 1516.
459. Id.









The Federal Circuit found that the 1980 consulting agreement
was merely an agreement to assign, rather than an assignment."6
The statement in the agreement that all rights to inventions devel-
oped during the consulting period "will be assigned" to the patent
assignee was not a present assignment of an existing invention and
was not effective to transfer all legal rights to the patent assignee.
The patent assignee therefore did not obtain legal title to the patent
until October 1987, when the consultant executed an assignment of
all of its right, title, and interest in and to the patent to the patent
467assignee.
The Federal Circuit further found that the 1987 district court
order decreeing the patent assignee to have been the owner of the
invention since the invention's conception may have validated the
patent assignee's right to seek equitable relief against the consultant.
However, the 1987 district court order did not retroactively divest
the consultant of legal title to the patent during the 1985-86
timeframe and revest that legal title in the patent assignee for stand-
4681ing purposes.
Therefore, the Federal Circuit concluded that the district court
had erred in directing a verdict of infringement in favor of the pat-
ent assignee, and reversed the judgment of the district court.4 69
B. A Reasonable Royalty Under 35 U.S.C. § 284 Is Not
Restricted to a Specific Figure Put Forth By One of the
Parties
The accused product in the case of SmithKline Diagnostics,
Inc. v. Helena Laboratories Corporation470 had been held to infringe
465. Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Mach. Works, 261 U.S. 24, 67 L. Ed. 516,43
S. Ct. 254 (1923). An exception to the general rule is recognized where the assignment of a
patent is coupled with an assignment of a right of action for past infringement. Another
exception to the general rule has been recognized which confers standing upon non-patent
owners to join in infringement suits as co-plaififfs with the patentee; see, eg., Kalman v.
Berlyn Corp., 914 F.2d 1473, 16 USPQ2D 1093 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (sole licensee with clearly
defined nexus to patentee); Weinar v. Rollform Inc., 744 F.2d 797, 223 USPQ 369 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (exclusive vendor of patented product), cerL denied, 470 U.S. 1084, 105 S. Ct. 1844, 85
L. Ed. 2d 143 (1985).
466. Arachnid, 19 USPQ2D at 1518.
467. Id. at 1519.
468. Id.
469. Id. at 1519.
470. 926 F.2d 1161, 17 USPQ2D 1922 (Fed. Cir. 1991). See also SmithKline Diagnos-
tics, Inc. v. Helena Laboratories Corp., 859 F.2d 878, 891, 8 USPQ2D 1468, 1479 (Fed. Cir.
1988).
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the patent.471 The district court had concluded that the patentee
had failed to establish the requirements for a damage award based
upon lost profits.472
The district court turned to the alternative damage remedy
available under 35 U.S.C. § 284, namely, the calculation of damages
based upon a "reasonable royalty".473 The district court entered a
"reasonable royalty" damage award based upon a 25% royalty for
the infringer's sales of infringing goods.474
The patentee appealed the judgment of the district court, urg-
ing that the district court had wrongly denied the patentee a greater
amount calculated on the basis of the patentee's lost profits. The
infringer cross-appealed, asserting that the district court's award
based on the 25% royalty figure could not be upheld because this
figure was not specifically advocated by either party.475 The in-
fringer asserted that the district court should have entered a "rea-
sonable royalty" damage award based on only a 3% royalty figure,
since this was the royalty figure at which the infringer had licensed
other, similar products. 76
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that the amount of a pre-
vailing party's damages is a finding of fact.477 Consequently, if the
amount of a prevailing party's damages is fixed by the district court,
then the damage award is reviewed in accordance with the "clearly
erroneous" standard of Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a).478
The Federal Circuit then affirmed the district court's finding
that the patentee had failed to prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence, its entitlement to recover its lost profits as actual
damages.479
With respect to the district court's determination of a reason-
able royalty, the Federal Circuit ruled that a district court is not
restricted in finding a reasonable royalty to a specific figure put
forth by one of the parties.480 The district court may reject the
figures proffered by the parties and may substitute an intermediate
figure as a matter of the district court's judgment based upon all of
471. SmithKline, 17 USPQ2D at 1923.
472. Id. at 1924.
473. Id.
474. SmithKline Diagnostics Inc. v. Helena Laboratories Corp., 12 USPQ2D 1375 (E.D.
Tex. 1989).
475. SmithKline, 17 USPQ2D at 1924.
476. Id.
477. Id.
478. Id. at 1925.
479. Id.




In SmithKline, the record showed that the infringer had en-
tered licenses for products similar to the infringing product at roy-
alty rates as low as 3% and 5%.482 However, the record also
showed that the infringer had competed with lower priced competi-
tors than the patentee. Furthermore, the evidence showed that the
patented product had achieved immediate commercial success, that
the patented product had satisfied a long felt need, that the patentee
had never licensed the patented technology, and that the patentee
had intended to maintain its exclusivity of the patented technology
by refusing to grant licenses under the patent.483
The Federal Circuit concluded that the finding of 25% as a
reasonable royalty had been based on all of the evidence and was
not clearly erroneous. Consequently, the Federal Circuit affirmed
the 25% royalty as reasonable.484
C. Lost Profit Damages Must Be Based on Infringing Sales
The subject patent in the case of Standard Havens Products,
Inc. v. Gencor Industries, Inc.485 was directed to a "counterflow"
method of producing asphalt compositions.48 6 The patentee had
charged the alleged infringer with contributing to or inducing in-
fringement of the patent via the sale of the alleged infringer's
asphalt-producing "Ultraplant," which plant allegedly performed
the claimed "counterflow" method.48 7
The district court found that the alleged infringer had contrib-
uted to and induced infringement of the patent, and that the paten-
tee had suffered lost profit damages.488 The district court based the
amount of lost profit damages upon the alleged infringer's sale of
ten asphalt plants. 8 9 Judgment was entered against the alleged in-
fringer, and the alleged infringer appealed.
On appeal, the alleged infringer argued that the damage award
should be vacated because the patentee had never bid on two of the
ten asphalt plant sales used to calculate the damage award.4 90
481. SmithKline, 17 USPQ2D at 1926.
482. Id. at 1928.
483. Id.
484. Id. at 1928.
485. 953 F.2d 1360, 21 USPQ2D 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
486. Id. at 1323.
487. Id. at 1324.
488. Id. at 1325.
489. Id.
490. Standard Havens, 21 USPQ2D at 1325.
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However, the Federal Circuit found that there were no acceptable
noninfringing substitutes for asphalt plants that used the patented
"counterflow" process.491 Consequently, it was not of controlling
significance that the patent owner did not bid on every one of the
infringing sales, since this fact did not show that the patentee could
not or would not have made those sales if the infringer had not
infringed.492 Thus, the Federal Circuit did not view the fact that
the patentee had not bid on two of the ten asphalt plant sales in-
cluded in the damage award as a basis for overturning the award.493
The alleged infringer further argued that four of the ten asphalt
plant sales were improperly included in the damage award, since
three of the sales were of noninfringing asphalt plants, and one sale
had been made to a foreign customer located in England.494
Regarding the three noninfringing asphalt plant sales, the pat-
entee argued that the alleged infringer's bids for those sales had in-
cluded the infringing "counterflow" asphalt plant, and it was only
after the bid had been accepted that the alleged infringer substituted
a noninfringing "parallel flow" asphalt plant.495 Because of that
substitution, the patentee contended that it had lost sales of its
"counterflow" asphalt plant.496 However, because an infringing
"counterflow" asphalt plant had never actually been sold, the Fed-
eral Circuit concluded that there had been no direct infringement
and, therefore, no contributory infringement.497
Regarding the sale to the foreign customer, the patentee as-
serted that the sale had been made in the U.S. However, the Fed-
eral Circuit observed that the patent claimed a method for
producing asphalt, not an apparatus for implementing that process.
Consequently, the sale in the U.S. of the unpatented apparatus
alone did not make the alleged infringer a contributory infringer of
the patented method.4 98
Moreover, there was no evidence that the foreign customer had
used the asphalt plant in the U.S., or that the foreign customer had
shipped products back to the U.S. made abroad by the patented
491. Id.
492. Gyromat Corp. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 735 F.2d 549, 222 USPQ 4 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
493. Standard Havens, 21 USPQ2D at 1326.
494. Id. at 1328.
495. Id.
496. Id. at 1329.
497. Porter v. Farmers Supply Serv., Inc., 790 F.2d 882, 884, 229 USPQ 814, 815 (Fed.
Cir. 1986).
498. Standard Havens, 21 USPQ2D at 1330.
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process. 99 Consequently, infringement by the foreign customer
had not been shown and, in the absence of direct infringement,
there can be no inducement of infringement or contributory
infringement.5°°
The Federal Circuit therefore vacated the patent damage
award and remanded the case for redetermination of the proper
award for lost profits based on the six infringing asphalt plant
sales.50
1
D. A Patent Owner Establishing All Four Panduit
Requirements Has Sustained the Burden of Proving
Entitlement to Lost Profits for All Infringing Sales
Under 35 U.S.C. § 284, a district court is required to award
damages adequate to compensate the patent owner for infringe-
ment, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty. Generally, in
determining whether a patent owner is entitled to obtain damages
for lost profits caused by the infringement, the district court must
conclude (1) that the patent owner would have made the sales of the
patented product but for the occurrence of the infringement, and (2)
that proper evidence supporting the computation of lost profits was
presented at trial. ° 2
The only specific test approved by the Federal Circuit in deter-
mining whether a patent owner is entitled to obtain damages for lost
profits caused by the infringement was introduced in the case of
Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Brothers Fibre Works, Inc..o The Panduit
test has four requirements. To obtain damages for lost profits, the
patent owner must prove (1) a demand for the patented product, (2)
the marketing and manufacturing capability to exploit the demand,
(3) an absence of acceptable noninfringing substitutes for the pat-
ented product, and (4) the amount of profit which the patent owner
would have made."°
During the accounting phase of litigation in the case of Kauf-
man Company, Inc. v. Lantech, Inc."' the district court, applying
499. Id.
500. Id. at 1331.
501. Id. at 1332.
502. King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 863, 226 USPQ 402,409 (Fed.
Cir. 1985), cerL denied, 475 U.S. 1016, 89 L.Ed. 2d 312, 106 S.Ct. 1197 (1986).
503. 575 F.2d 1152, 197 USPQ 726 (6th Cir. 1978).
504. Id. at 730.
505. 926 F.2d 1136, 17 USPQ2D 1828 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The Federal Circuit had previ-
ously affirmed a judgment of willful infringement. Kaufman Co. v. Lantech, Inc., 807 F.2d
970, 1 USPQ2D 1202 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
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the Panduit test, had concluded that the patent owner was entitled
to lost profit damages for only 8 of 44 infringing sales.506 The dis-
trict court had concluded that lost profit damages should not be
awarded for 36 of the infringing sales because the third Panduit ele-
ment had not been satisfied for these sales (i.e., the patent owner
had failed to show an absence of acceptable noninfringing substi-
tutes for these 36 infringing sales).5" 7 This finding was based on the
fact that the patent owner had presented specific evidence of the
absence of acceptable noninfringing substitutes for 8 of the infring-
ing sales, but had failed to present specific evidence of the absence
of acceptable noninfringing substitutes for the remaining 36 infring-
ing sales.50 Because the district court found that acceptable nonin-
fringing substitutes for the patented product did exist, the court
denied lost .profit damages for 36 of the 44 infringing sales.509
On appeal, a threshold issue was whether the district court had
applied the correct rule of law in finding that there existed accepta-
ble noninfringing substitutes for the patented product.510
The Federal Circuit noted that to be deemed acceptable, a non-
infringing substitute must not have a disparately higher price than,
or possess characteristics significantly different from, the patented
product.5 1 In Kaufman, the allegedly noninfringing substitutes did
not possess all of the beneficial characteristics of the patented prod-
uct, nor were they priced as low as the patented product.5 12 The
district court therefore erred when it concluded that the allegedly
noninfringing substitutes were "acceptable" noninfringing substi-
tutes.5 3 The district court should have found that there were no
acceptable noninfringing substitutes, and therefore should have
found that all four factors of the Panduit test had been satisfied.5 14
The Federal Circuit further ruled that because the patent
owner had established all four Panduit requirements, the patent
owner had sustained the burden of proving entitlement to lost prof-
its for all infringing sales.51 5 In other words, because all four
506. Kaufman, 17 USPQ2D at 1829.
507. Id.
508. Id.
509. Id. at 1830.
510. Id.
511. Gyromat Corp. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 735 F.2d 549, 553, 222 USPQ 4, 7
(Fed.Cir. 1984).
512. Kaufman, 17 USPQ2D at 1830.
513. Id.
514. Id. at 1832.
515. See, eg., Bio-Rad Laboratories, Inc. v. Nicolet Instrument Corp., 739 F.2d 604,
616,222 USPQ 654, 663 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1038, 83 L. Ed. 2d 405, 105 S. Ct.
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Panduit requirements were satisfied, it was reasonable to infer that
the patent owner probably would have made all 44 of the infringing
sales but for the occurrence of the infringement.516 The burden
should then be placed upon the infringer to show that it is unrea-
sonable to infer that some or all of the infringing sales probably
caused the patent owner to suffer lost profits. Any doubts regarding
the calculatory precision of the damage amount are resolved against
the infringer.5 17
According to the Federal Circuit, the reasonableness of the in-
ference that the patent owner probably would have made all 44 of
the infringing sales was not negated by evidence showing a cus-
tomer preference for the infringer's services over those of the patent
owner. 18 Nor was the reasonableness of the inference negated by
the patent owner's admission that it would not have competed with
the infringer for every one of the 44 infringing sales. 19
The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded this case for the
district court to calculate and award to the patent owner those prof-
its lost on all 44 infringing sales. 20
E. Damages May Not Be Increased Under the Second
Paragraph of 35 U.S. C. § 284 to Rectify a Perceived
Inadequacy in an Actual Damage Award
The infringer in the case of Beatrice Foods Co. v. New England
Printing and Lithographing Co.52 had intentionally destroyed evi-
dence, thereby hindering the patentee in proving infringement and
making it more difficult to accurately determine the actual damages.
The district court decided to triple the damage award, explaining
that the damage award was tripled not as a penalty, but to provide
the patentee with adequate compensation for the infringement.522
516 (1984). The patent owner is only required to show that there was a "reasonable
probability" that it would have made the infringing sales but for the occurrence of the in-
fringement. The patent owner is not required to negate every possibility that a purchaser
might not have bought another product other than the patented product absent the infringe-
ment. Gyromat Corp. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 735 F.2d 549, 554, 222 USPQ 4, 8 (Fed.
Cir. 1984).
516. The inference that the patent owner probably would have made all of the 44 infring-
ing sales but for the occurrence of the infringement was also compelled by the fact that the
patent owner and the infringer were the only two suppliers competing in the market. Lam,
Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 718 F.2d 1056, 1065, 219 USPQ 670, 675 (Fed.Cir. 1983).
517. Id.
518. Kaufman, 17 USPQ2D at 1832.
519. Id.
520. Id.
521. 923 F.2d 1576, 17 USPQ2D 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
522. Id.
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The principal issue on appeal was whether the district court
had improperly tripled the damages on the theory that the increased
award was necessary to adequately compensate the patentee for the
infringement. 523
The Federal Circuit noted that the provision of the patent laws
governing the award of damages for infringement is 35 U.S.C.
§ 284.524 The first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 284 requires the dis-
trict court to award damages "adequate to compensate for the in-
fringement." The second paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 284 authorizes
the district court to increase the damages up to threefold. The stat-
ute does not state the basis upon which a district court may increase
damages. However, case authority states that increased damages
may be awarded only as a penalty for an infringer's willful infringe-
ment or bad faith. 525
The Federal Circuit held that the adequacy of the damage
award must be measured by actual damages pursuant to the first
paragraph of § 284, rather than by increased damages pursuant to
the second paragraph of § 284.26 If, as in Beatrice, the infringer's
own conduct makes it difficult or impossible for the patentee to ac-
curately determine the actual damages, then a district court may
resolve all doubts against the infringer and determine the actual
damages based upon the best available evidence. 527 However, a dis-
trict court may not increase the actual damage award under 35
U.S.C. § 284, second paragraph, in order to rectify what the district
court views as an inadequacy in the actual damage award.5 2  A
district court may increase the actual damage award under 35
U.S.C. § 284, second paragraph, only as a penalty for an infringer's
willful infringement or bad faith.529
The Federal Circuit in Beatrice therefore affirmed the judg-
ment of the district court insofar as it awarded actual damages, but
523. The case was before the district court on remand from the Federal Circuit for the
purpose of determining the patentee's damages. See Beatrice Foods Co. v. New England
Printing and Lithographing Co., 899 F.2d 1171, 1176, 14 USPQ2D 1020, 1024 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
524. Beatrice, 17 USPQ2D at 1554.
525. Yarway Corp. v. Eur-Control USA, Inc., 775 F.2d 268, 277, 227 USPQ 352, 358
(Fed. Cir. 1985); Lam, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 668 F.2d 462, 474-75, 213 USPQ 1061,
1070-71 (10th Cir.), cer. denied, 456 U.S. 1007, 73 L.Ed. 2d 1302, 102 S. Ct. 2298 (1982).
526. Beatrice, 17 USPQ2D at 1556.
527. Lam, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 718 F.2d 1056, 1065, 219 USPQ 670, 675 (Fed.
Cir. 1983):




vacated the judgment insofar as it awarded increased damages.53 °
F. A Reduction of Lost Profit Damages Can Not Be Based
Solely on Market Share
The district court in the case of Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin- Wiley
Corp. 531 had found the infringer liable for patent infringement. In
assessing damages, the district court had found that no acceptable
non-infringing substitutes for the patented product existed in the
relevant market.532 The district court had further found that, in the
absence of the infringing sales, the patentee would have possessed
an 80% market share.533 The district court therefore awarded the
patentee damages for lost profits on only 80% of the infringing
sales.534 The patentee appealed the judgment on the grounds that
the district court had erred as a matter of law in reducing the dam-
age award by 20%.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit agreed that the district court
had erred. The Federal Circuit stated that the mere existence of a
competing product in the market does not necessarily make that
product an "acceptable substitute." For example, a competing
product which lacks the advantages of the patented product is not
an acceptable substitute to a customer seeking those advantages.536
Consequently, merely because a share of the market is held by com-
petitors, it does not necessarily follow that acceptable non-infring-
ing substitutes exist in the market. 537
The Federal Circuit further stated that in determining whether
a reduced damage award for lost profits is justified, the controlling
issue is not whether there are other competitors in the market, but
instead whether such competitors sell an acceptable non-infringing
substitute.538 The district court had found that there were no com-
petitors selling an acceptable non-infringing substitute, and this
finding was not clearly erroneous.5 39 Thus, the patentee should
530. Id. at 1557.
531. 939 F.2d 1540, 19 USPQ2D 1432 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
532. Id. at 1434.
533. Id.
534. See Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wley'Corp., 721 F. Supp. 28, 13 USPQ2D 1192
(Conn. June 26, 1989, Aug. 21, 1989).
535. Id. at 1435.
536. Id. at 1436.
537. TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 901, 229 USPQ 525, 529 (Fed. Cir.),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 852, 93 L. Ed. 2d 117, 107 S. Ct. 183 (1986); Radio Steel & Mfg. Co. v.
MTD Prods., Inc., 788 F.2d 1554, 1556, 229 USPQ 431, 432-33 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
538. Uniroyal, 19 USPQ2D at 1437.
539. Id.
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have been awarded a profit on all of the infringing sales."4 The
district court's reduction of lost profits based solely on market share
was inconsistent with the finding of an absence of acceptable non-
infringing substitutes. 41
The Federal Circuit therefore vacated and remanded for the
entry of a judgment for damages reflecting the patentee's lost profits
on all of the infringing sales.5 42
G. A District Court Determination Denying Enhanced
Damages May Not Be Overturned Absent A Clear
Showing of Abuse of Discretion
After finding infringement, the district court in the case of
State Industries, Inc. v. Mor-Flo Industries, Inc. 141 had awarded the
patentee lost profits on some infringing sales and a royalty on the
remaining sales." 4 The district court had also found that the in-
fringement had not been willful and had denied enhanced damages
under 35 U.S.C. § 284. as
The Federal Circuit had affirmed the district court's judgment
insofar as it had awarded lost profits and a royalty.5 46 The Federal
Circuit had vacated the district court's judgment insofar as it had
denied increased damages, and remanded to the district court to
reconsider whether a finding of willful infringement and enhanced
damages was justified.547
On remand, the district court concluded that a finding of will-
ful infringement and enhanced damages was not justified, and en-
tered an order denying them.5 48 Because the district court's order
left its damage award unchanged, the patentee appealed.
The patentee argued on appeal that the district court's failure
to find willfulness was clearly erroneous, and that the district court
had erred in not awarding enhanced damages.5 9
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that a district court's
analysis of whether to increase damages is a two-step process. First,
the district court must determine whether willful infringement has
540. Id.
541. Id. at 1438.
542. Id. at 1439.
543. 948 F.2d 1573, 20 USPQ2D 1738 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
544. Id. at 1739.
545. Id.
546. Id.
547. Id. at 1740.




been proven. Second, if the district court finds that willful infringe-
ment has been proven, then it must still determine whether or not,
under the totality of the circumstances, increased damages are war-
ranted. 50 This determination is committed to the sound discretion
of the district court.55 ' A finding of willfulness, though a sufficient
basis for an award of enhanced damages, does not compel such an
award. 5 2 The district court's determination may not be overturned
absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion. 3
The Federal Circuit found that the patentee in State Industries
was unable to point to any basis on which clear error in the district
court's willfulness finding could be shown.554 Moreover, even if the
finding of no willfulness was overturned, that would not mandate
reversal of the district court's discretionary decision to deny en-
hanced damages.5 5
Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in deny-
ing enhanced damages, the Federal Circuit affirmed. And because
the Federal Circuit found the patentee's appeal to be frivolous as
filed and as argued, the Federal Circuit imposed sanctions pursuant
to Fed.R.App.P. 38.56
XIII. A'1TORNEY FEES - 35 U.S.C. § 285
A. Restitution of Fee Award Under 35 U.S.C. § 285 May Be
Inferred From Appellate Opinion
The district court in the case of Sun-Tek Industries, Inc. v.
Kennedy Sky Lites, Inc. 557 had originally held that no "exceptional
case" under 35 U.S.C. § 285 had been established, and had entered
final judgment.5 58 Seven months later, the District Court reversed
its determination and entered an amended final judgment which
awarded the plaintiff attorney fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285.15 ' The
defendant appealed to the Federal Circuit and challenged the dis-
trict court's authority to reverse its original final judgment and
550. Id.
551. Id.
552. Modine Mfg. Co. v. Allen Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 538, 542-43, 16 USPQ2d 1622,
1625-26 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2017, 114 L. Ed. 2d 103 (1991).
553. State Industries, 20 USPQ2D at 1740.
554. Id. at 1742.
555. Id.
556. Id.
557. 929 F.2d 676, 18 USPQ2D 1332 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
558. Id. at 1333.
559. Id.
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enter an amended final judgment awarding attorney fees." 6
While that appeal had been pending, the defendant had been
unable to maintain the bond required by the district court in order
to stay execution of the amended final judgment.5 61 As a result, the
plaintiff had satisfied the amended final judgment against the de-
fendant through execution on the proceeds of a sale of the defend-
ant's assets.562
Thereafter, the Federal Circuit ruled that the district court had
been without jurisdiction and authority to reverse its original final
judgment . 63 The Federal Circuit vacated that portion of the dis-
trict court's amended final judgment which had awarded attorney
fees to the plaintiff. 5"
The district court then determined that the mandate of the
Federal Circuit did not include any stated requirement to order the
plaintiff to make restitution of the attorneys' fees awarded in the
amended final judgment.565 The district court therefore ruled that
(1) the plaintiff did not have to repay the attorney fees it had re-
ceived pursuant to the amended final judgment, and (2) the pro-
ceedings in the district court following the amended final judgment
supported a new finding of an "exceptional case" under 35 U.S.C.
§ 285 entitling the plaintiff to additional attorney fees.5 66 The de-
fendant appealed both rulings of the district court.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit acknowledged that the district
court may have been technically correct in stating that the Federal
Circuit's mandate did not include an explicit requirement to order
restitution. 67 However, the Federal Circuit's prior opinion had
held that the district court did not have authority to amend its orig-
inal final judgment, and that the district court's reversal of the origi-
nal final judgment had been improper. 568 Consequently, the award
of attorney fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285 after the original final judg-
ment had been entered had been a nullity.569 The Federal Circuit
concluded that, under these circumstances, the district court had
560. Id.
561. Id.
562. Sun-Tek, 18 USPQ2D at 1333.
563. Id. at 1333-34.
564. See Sun-Tek Indus., Inc. v. Kennedy Sky Lites, Inc. et al., 848 F.2d 179, 6
USPQ2D 2017 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1009, 102 L. Ed. 2d 784, 109 S. Ct.
793 (1989).
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been given more than sufficient guidance to be able to infer the Fed-
eral Circuit's intention to order restitution. 70 Thus, under the Fed-
eral Circuit's previous holding that attorney fees were improperly
awarded, the Federal Circuit required the plaintiff to repay all it
had collected in the grant of attorney fees, plus interest to the date
of repayment.571  With respect to the district court's award of ad-
ditional attorney fees for the defendant's post-judgment conduct,
the Federal Circuit observed that a district court may properly
award attorney fees under § 285 to prevent "gross injustice" when a
party has litigated vexatiously 572
The district court had based its award of additional attorney
fees on the defendant's post-judgment litigation tactics, including
the defendant's violation of the bond reduction order and attempts
to defeat the plaintiff's execution on the amended final judgment.5 73
The district court had evaluated the defendant's post-judgment con-
duct in light of the defendant's previous litigation tactics.5 74
The Federal Circuit found that it was proper for the district
court to take into consideration the pattern established by the de-
fendant during the trial in determining whether the defendant's
post-judgment conduct had been vexatious.57 5 The Federal Circuit
could not say that the district court's conclusion that the defend-
ant's post-judgment actions were vexatious had been improper.576
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit found that the district court's
award of additional attorney fees for post-judgment vexatious con-
duct had not been an abuse of discretion. 77
XIV. TIME LIMITATION ON DAMAGES - 35 U.S.C. § 286
A. A Patentee's Delay In Bringing Suit Does Not Alone
Create a Presumption of Prejudice
The patentee in the case of A. C. Aukerman Company v. R.L.
Chaides Construction Co. 578 had advised the accused infringer of the
570. Sun-Tek, 18 USPQ2D at 1334.
571. Id.
572. See Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. LKB Produkter AB, 892 F.2d 1547, 1552, 13
USPQ2D 1301, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Machinery Corp. of America v. Gullfiber AB, 774
F.2d 467,227 USPQ 368 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal Chem. Co., 736 F.2d
688, 222 USPQ 97 (Fed. Cir. 1984).





578. 18 USPQ2D 1618 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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alleged infringement in 1979.17' Essentially no further contact had
occurred between the parties for approximately eight and one-half
years."8 In 1988 the patentee filed suit for infringement.
The accused infringer responded by raising the defenses of
laches and estoppel. The accused infringer asserted that the paten-
tee's delay in filing suit had created a presumption that the delay
was unreasonable and prejudicial, and the burden of proving the
reasonableness of the delay or lack of prejudice was thereby shifted
to the patentee.5 8
1
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
accused infringer, holding that the doctrines of laches and estoppel
blocked the patentee's recovery of any damages.5" 2
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that 35 U.S.C. § 286 per-
mits a patentee to sue for damages even though the first act of in-
fringement had occurred more than six years prior to filing suit.58 3
However, in such a case, any damage award is limited to acts of
infringement which occurred within the preceding six years.5 84 The
Federal Circuit further observed that the issue of what presump-
tions arise from a patentee's delay exceeding the six year period of
§ 286 is a matter about which there is some confusion. 8
In the case of Cornetta v. United States5 86 (a non-patent case),
the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, emphasized that delay alone
does not constitute laches.58 7 The Federal Circuit rejected the idea
that a defendant asserting a laches defense can rely on a presump-
tion of prejudice, or shift the burden to the plaintiff to show lack of
prejudice, merely because the delay is long.588
However, in the case of Leinoff v. Louis Milona & Sons, Inc.,"9
the Federal Circuit stated that a delay of more than six years in
bringing an infringement action after the infringement is "noticed"
is a presumptively unreasonable delay, and a patentee who waits for
579. Id. at 1625.
580. Id.
581. See, for example, Jamesbury Corp. v. Litton Indus. Prods., 839 F.2d 1544, 5
USPQ2d 1779 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 828 (1988).
582. A.C. Aukerman, 18 USPQ2D at 1625.
583. Id. at 1622.
584. "Except as otherwise provided by law, no recovery shall be had for any infringe-
ment committed more than six years prior to the filing of the complaint or counterclaim for
infringement in the action." 35 U.S.C. § 286.
585. A.C. Aukerman, 18 USPQ2D at 1622.
586. 851 F.2d 1372, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
587. Id.
588. Id.
589. 726 F.2d 734, 220 USPQ 845 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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more than six years before filing suit must explain the delay.590 If
the patentee fails to explain the delay, then a district court may find
that the period of time alone to be sufficient evidence of undue de-
lay.5 91 Moreover, a delay of six years raises a presumption of mate-
rial injury, and places on the patentee the additional burden of
proving a lack of injury to the infringer caused by the delay.5 92
In Aukerman, the Federal Circuit adopted the rule in Cornetta
and specifically rejected the notion that a presumption of prejudice
arises due to the mere fact that the patentee delayed bringing
suit.5 93 The Federal Circuit ruled that prejudice requires a showing
that the patentee's delay was both unreasonable and inexcusable.5 94
Furthermore, the burden of proof in establishing the defenses of
laches and estoppel remains with the accused infringer who alleges
the defenses.5 95
The Federal Circuit therefore concluded that the district court
had erred in placing the burden on the patentee to rebut the pre-
sumption of prejudice, and had erred in concluding that the paten-
tee was barred by the defenses of laches or estoppel.5 96 Accord-
ingly, the Federal Circuit vacated the grant of summary judgment
and remanded.
(Subsequent to rendering the above decision in the case of A. C.
Aukerman Company v. R.L. Chaides Construction Co., the Federal
Circuit vacated the decision and granted a rehearing.)5 97
XV. REQUEST FOR REEXAMINATION - 35 U.S.C. § 302
A. Extrinsic Evidence May Be Considered In a
Reexamination to Explain the Meaning of a Reference
The subject patent in the case of In re Baxter Travenol Labs5 98
was directed to a system for collecting, processing and storing com-
ponents of blood. The claimed invention included a blood bag con-
taining DEHP, a plasticizer.5 99
The patentee had filed a request for reexamination based upon
a prior art article, written by an employee of the patentee, which
590. Id.
591. Id.
592. Id. at 850.
593. A.C. Aukerman, 18 USPQ2D at 1623-24.
594. Id. at 1624.
595. Id.
596. Id. at 1625.
597. Id.
598. 952 F.2d 388, 21 USPQ2D 1281 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
599. Id. at 1283.
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described a blood bag system similar to the commercial blood bag
system produced by the patentee.6w At the time the prior art arti-
cle had been published, the commercial blood bag system produced
by the patentee contained a blood bag plasticized with DEHP. The
prior art article did not, however, contain any express mention of
DEHP.601
The patentee had discovered the prior art article during prepa-
ration for an interference proceeding. Testimony taken during the
interference proceeding was also submitted as part of the
reexamination. 2
The PTO Board concluded that, since the prior art article de-
scribed the patentee's commercial system, and the patentee's com-
mercial system utilized a DEHP plasticized blood bag, the skilled
artisan would understand the prior art article as describing a blood
bag plasticized with DEHP. Consequently, the Board found that
the prior art article anticipated the claimed invention under 35
U.S.C. § 102(b).603
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, the dispositive question re-
garding anticipation was whether a skilled artisan would reasonably
understand or infer from the prior art article that the blood bag
described therein was plasticized with DEHP.04
The patentee argued that the testimony taken during the inter-
ference proceeding, upon which the Board had relied in affirming
the § 102(b) rejection, was extrinsic evidence which should not have
been considered in determining the anticipatory teachings of the
prior art article. 6°5 The Federal Circuit rejected this argument,
holding that extrinsic evidence may be considered when it is used to
explain, rather than to expand, the meaning of a reference. 1 6 In
the case of In re Baxter Travenol, the testimony taken during the
interference was used to identify the material employed in the pat-
entee's commercial blood bags, thereby explaining what the lan-
guage in the prior art article would have meant to the skilled
artisan.6°7 The testimony showed that the skilled artisan, reading




603. Baxter, 21 USPQ2D at 1284.
604. Id.
605. Id.
606. Scripps Clinic & Research Foundation v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1576-77,
18 USPQ2d 1001, 1010 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
607. Baxter, 21 USPQ2D at 1284.
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describing a blood bag plasticized with DEHP °8
The patentee further argued that the skilled artisan would not
necessarily have thought that the blood bag disclosed in the prior
art article was plasticized with DE-IP, since there were other, non-
DEB? plasticizers available at the time the article had been pub-
lished.60 9 The Federal Circuit found this argument unpersuasive,
since the prior art article specifically described the patentee's com-
mercial blood bag, and the patentee's commercial blood bag was
known to be plasticized with DEHP.61 0 Consequently, the Federal
Circuit concluded that the prior art article disclosed all of the ele-
ments of the claimed invention, and this disclosure was unaffected
by the availability of other, alternative elements.61'
The Board's finding that the claims were anticipated by the
prior art article was therefore affirmed by the Federal Circuit.61 2
B. Claims Are Not Deemed Substantively Changed As a
Matter of Law When Amended During Reexamination
Following a Rejection Based on Prior Art
During reexamination of the subject patent in the case of Lai-
tram Corporation v. NEC Corporation,61 3 the examiner had rejected
the patent claims under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) and § 103 in view of
certain newly cited references. 14 In response to the rejection, the
patent owner had amended the claims and had pointed out how the
teachings of the references differed from the amended claims.615
The examiner allowed the claims, as amended.616
In a subsequent suit for patent infringement, the alleged in-
fringer asserted that because the amendment to the claims during
reexamination had been made to overcome a rejection based on
prior art, the amendment had been substantive as a matter of
law.617 Consequently, the patent owner could not recover damages
for the alleged infringement during the period between the date of
issuance of the original patent and the date of issuance of the reex-





612. Baxter, 21 USPQ2D at 1284.
613. 952 F.2d 1357, 21 USPQ2D 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
614. Id. at 1277.
615. Id.
616. Id. at 1278.
617. Id.
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"identical" in scope, as required by 35 U.S.C. § 252.618
The patent owner responded by asserting that the amendment
to the claims during reexamination had been done to more particu-
larly define the invention, and that the words added by amendment
stated inherent details and did not change the scope of the
claims.
6 19
The district court did not decide the question of whether the
changes to the claims were in fact substantive, or discuss the scope
of the claims before and after amendment.620 The district court
ruled summarily that any amendment to overcome a rejection on
prior art is substantive as a matter of law.621 The district court's
grant of partial summary judgment in favor of the alleged infringer
was certified for immediate appeal.
On appeal, the issue was whether amendments made to patent
claims during reexamination of the patent are substantive as a mat-
ter of law, when the amendments are made following a rejection
based on prior art.6 22
The Federal Circuit initially noted that the word "identical" in
§ 252 does not mean verbatim.623 Instead, the word "identical" in
§ 252 means, at most, without substantive change. 624
The Federal Circuit noted further that the cases relied upon by
the alleged infringer were cases in which prosecution history estop-
pel limited application of the doctrine of equivalents.625 The Fed-
eral Circuit observed that each of these cases had been decided on
its particular facts, taking into account relevant evidence of the
specification, prosecution history, prior art, and other pertinent cir-
cumstances.62 6 Consequently, none of these cases supported theper
se rule urged by the alleged infringer.627
Thus, with respect to the issue of infringement under the doc-
trine of equivalents, Federal Circuit precedent had rejected the
proposition that any amendment to a claim acts as a per se estop-
618. Laitram, 21 USPQ2D at 1279.
619. Id. at 1281.
620. Id. at 1280.
621. Id.
622. Id. at 1278.
623. Laitram, 21 USPQ2D at 1279.
624. Seattle Box C. v. Industrial Crating & Packing, Inc., 731 F.2d 818, 827-28, 221
USPQ 568, 575 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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pel. 6 28 By analogy, in the case of Laitram, where the issue was sub-
stantive change on reexamination, the Federal Circuit similarly
declined to adopt a rule of per se estoppel.
The Federal Circuit held that when claims are amended during
reexamination following a rejection based on prior art, the claims
are not deemed substantively changed as a matter of law. Instead,
to determine whether a claim change is substantive, it is always nec-
essary to analyze the claims of the original and the reexamined pat-
ents in light of the particular facts, including the prior art, the
prosecution history, other claims, and any other pertinent
information.
The Federal Circuit therefore reversed the grant of summary
judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.629
XVI. DISTRICT COURT JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE
A. The Proper Focus in Determining Subject Matter
Jurisdiction Is Whether the Plaintiff Has Pleaded the
Elements Required for a Patent Infringement Claim
The Official Gazette of the PTO had listed the subject patent in
the case of Exxon Chemical Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corporation 63
0
as being issued on September 19, 1989. On that same date the pat-
entee had filed suit against the alleged infringer in district court.631
However, for a substantial period of time after September 19,
1989 the patent document had not been printed, the patent grant
had not been signed by or on behalf of the Commissioner, the offi-
cial seal had not been affixed, a copy of the specification and claims
had not been available to the public, and access to the prosecution
history had been denied.632
Based upon these facts, the alleged infringer argued that the
subject patent had not in fact issued on September 19, 1989 and that
as of that date there had been no valid patent on which to sue. The
alleged infringer therefore moved to dismiss the infringement suit
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.633
The district court denied the alleged infringer's motion to dis-
miss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the alleged infringer
628. Hi-Life Products, Inc. v. American National Water-Mattress Corp., 842 F.2d 323,
325, 6 USPQ2d 1132, 1134 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
629. Laitram, 21 USPQ2D at 1281.
630. 935 F.2d 1263, 19 USPQ2D 1061 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
631. Id. at 1061-62.
632. Id. at 1062.
633. Id.
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appealed.634
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that jurisdiction of the
district court is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), which grants the
district court original jurisdiction of any civil action "arising under
any Act of Congress relating to patents." Jurisdiction under
§ 1338(a) exists when a well-pleaded complaint establishes that fed-
eral patent law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff's
right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial
question of federal patent law.635 Therefore, under the "wel-
pleaded complaint" rule, the proper focus in determining subject
matter jurisdiction is on whether the plaintiff actually pleaded the
elements required by the patent laws for a patent infringement
claim.
6 3 6
In Exxon, the Federal Circuit found that the patentee's com-
plaint had pleaded a valid patent infringement claim. This "well-
pleaded" complaint thereby established proper jurisdiction as a
matter of law. The alleged infringer's challenge to jurisdiction was,
in fact, directed only to the merits of a question of patent validity
(including the date of patent validity). This question of patent va-
lidity remained to be resolved at trial. The Federal Circuit therefore
held that the district court had correctly assumed jurisdiction under
§ 1338(a) on the basis of the well-pleaded complaint.637
B. A Post-filing Covenant Not to Sue May Be Considered In
Evaluating Whether an Actual Controversy Exists
The patentee in the case of Spectronics Corporation v. H.B.
Fuller Company, Inc.631 had sent a letter to various competitors,
including the alleged infringer, announcing the issuance of the sub-
ject patent. After receiving the letter, the alleged infringer had filed
suit against the patentee under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2201, seeking a declaratory judgment that the patent was
invalid or not infringed by the alleged infringer.639
After suit had been fled, the patentee entered into a covenant
634. Id. at 1062-63.
635. Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 808-09, 7 USPQ2d
109, 1113 (1988).
636. Kunkel v. Topmaster International, Inc., 906 F.2d 693, 695, 15 USPQ2d 1367,
1369 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
637. Exxon, 19 USPQ2D at 1063.
638. 940 F.2d 631, 19 USPQ2D 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
639. The Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a), provides in pertinent part: "In
a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction .... any court of the United States, upon
the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any
interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought."
[Vol. 9
PATENT LAWDEVELOPMENTS
not to sue the alleged infringer for infringement of the patent
claims. The patentee also submitted the patent to the PTO for reis-
sue. The patentee then filed a motion to dismiss the alleged in-
fringer's complaint for lack of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2201
due to the absence of an "actual controversy." The district court
granted the patentee's motion to dismiss, and the alleged infringer
appealed.'
On appeal, the Federal Circuit initially observed that the exist-
ence of an "actual controversy" is an absolute requirement for
proper jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2201. 1 In cases in which an
alleged infringer seeks a declaratory judgment of patent invalidity
or non-infringement, the courts apply a two-pronged test for deter-
mining whether an "actual controversy" exists. First, the accused
infringer must have actually produced or prepared to produce an
allegedly infringing product.' 2 Second, the patentee's conduct
must create an objectively reasonable apprehension on the part of
the accused infringer that the patentee will initiate suit if the alleg-
edly infringing activity continues."43
In the case of Spectronics, the alleged infringer argued that the
required apprehension that the patentee will initiate suit should be
determined at the time the complaint is filed, and that later events
(such as a patentee's covenant not to sue) can not influence the ju-
risdiction of the district court under 28 U.S.C. § 2201.6'
The Federal Circuit agreed that a party seeking a declaratory
judgment must plead facts sufficient to establish the existence of an
actual controversy at the time the complaint is filed, and that later
events may not create jurisdiction where none existed at the time
the complaint is filed. However, the Federal Circuit ruled that an
actual controversy must be present at all stages of review, not
merely at the time the complaint is filed, and that the burden is
upon the alleged infringer to establish that an actual controversy
existed at, and has continued since, the time the complaint was
640. Id. at 1547.
641. Grain Processing Corp. v. American Maize-Products Co., 840 F.2d 902, 905, 5
USPQ2d 1788, 1791 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
642. Jervis B. Webb Co. v. Southern Sys., Inc., 742 F.2d 1388, 1398-99, 222 USPQ 943,
949 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
643. Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 736, 6 USPQ2d
1685, 1689 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Releasomers, Inc., 824 F.2d
953, 955, 3 USPQ2d 1310, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Indium Corp. v. Semi-Alloys, Inc., 781
F.2d 879, 228 USPQ 845 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 820, 93 L. Ed. 2d 37, 107 S.
Ct. 84 (1986).
644. Spectronics, 19 USPQ2D at 1548.
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filed.r65
In the case of Spectronics, the covenant not to sue, forever pre-
vented the patentee from asserting the patent claims against the al-
leged infringer, and the alleged infringer had thereby effectively
"won" the non-infringement case pleaded in its complaint. The
Federal Circuit concluded that the post-filing covenant not to sue
was properly considered by the district court in evaluating whether
an actual controversy existed. 46
The alleged infringer further argued that, irrespective of the
covenant not to sue, the potential grant of a reissue patent placed
the alleged infringer at risk of further litigation on the subject mat-
ter contained in the patent.' 47
However, the Federal Circuit found no guarantee that the reis-
sue patent would eventually issue. Moreover, even if the alleged
infringer could establish an objectively reasonable apprehension
that the patentee would initiate suit based upon the reissue patent,
the alleged infringer could not demonstrate that its present activity
was potentially infringing of any reissue patent claims, since no reis-
sue patent claims yet existed by which infringement could be
measured. 648
The Federal Circuit therefore affirmed the judgment of the dis-
trict court granting the patentee's motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction.' 49
C. A Grantee of All Substantial Patent Rights May Sue for
Infringement In Its Own Name Without Joining the
Patent Owner As a Party
The district court in the case of Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v.
Meccanica Euro Italia S.P.A.65 o found that the subject patent had
been infringed. The infringer appealed, alleging that the suit should
have been dismissed because the plaintiff was a mere patent licensee
and could not maintain an infringement action without joining the
patent owner as a party.651
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that a patent license gives
645. Amstar Corp. v. Envirotech Corp., 823 F.2d 1538, 1549, 3 USPQ2d 1412, 1420
(Fed. Cir. 1987); International Medical Prosthetics Research Assocs. v. Gore Enter. Hold-
ings, Inc., 787 F.2d 572, 575, 229 USPQ 278, 281 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
646. Spectronics, 19 USPQ2D at 1551.
647. Id. at 1549.
648. Id.
649. Id. at 1551.
650. 944 F.2d 870, 20 USPQ2D 1045 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
651. Id. at 1046.
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the licensee no title in the patent and no right to bring suit in its
own name for infringement. 65 2 If a licensee brings suit for infringe-
ment, then the licensee must join the patent owner as a party, so
that the possibility of two separate suits on the same patent against
a single infringer is eliminated. 653
Whether a particular transfer of patent rights constitutes an
assignment or a license is determined by the substance of the trans-
action, rather than by the name given to the transaction by the par-
ties.6 4 If it appears from the agreement and the surrounding
circumstances that the parties intended that the patent owner sur-
render all substantial rights to the invention, then the transfer will
be considered an assignment.6 55
In the case of Vaupel, the patent owner had transferred to the
plaintiff all but four rights to the invention.6 56 The Federal Circuit
concluded that none of these four rights reserved by the patent
owner was so substantial as to reduce the transfer to a mere license
or indicate an intent not to transfer all substantial rights. 65 7
One of the rights transferred by the patent owner to the plain-
tiff was the right to sue for infringement. Consequently, the Federal
Circuit found that the suit provided complete relief between the
plaintiff and the infringer, and there was no substantial risk that the
infringer would incur double obligations to both the patent owner
and the plaintiff. Therefore, the suit did not undermine the policy
of eliminating the possibility of two suits on the same patent against
a single inffinger.658
The Federal Circuit therefore concluded that the agreement
between the plaintiff and the patent owner, although not constitut-
ing a formal assignment, was a grant of all substantial rights and
permitted the plaintiff to sue without joining the patent owner. The
district court's ruling that the plaintiff had standing to sue for in-
fringement without joining the patent owner as a party was there-
652. Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 255, 34 L. Ed. 923, 11 S. Ct. 334 (1891).
653. Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Mach. Works, 261 U.S. 24, 38, 67 L. Ed. 516,
43 S. Ct. 254 (1923).
654. Waterman, 138 U.S. at 256.
655. Bell Intercontinental Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d 1004, 1011, 152 USPQ 182,
184 (1967).
656. The patent owner retained: 1) a veto right on sublicensing by the plaintiff; 2) the
right to obtain patents on the invention in other countries; 3) a reversionary right to the
patent in the event of bankruptcy or termination of production by the plaintiff; and 4) a right
to receive infringement damages.
657. Vaupel, 20 USPQ2D at 1049.
658. Id.
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fore affirmed.65 9
D. A Member of the Public Who Perceives They Will Be
Harmed By an Issued Patent Which They Believe to
Be Invalid Does Not Necessarily Have Standing to
Sue
In the case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty,"0 the U.S. Supreme
Court held that non-naturally occurring man-made living microor-
ganisms fall within the definition of patentable subject matter under
35 U.S.C. § 101.661 In the case of ExParteAllen,6 2 the PTO Board
applied Chakrabarty to hold that § 101 was not a bar to patentabil-
ity for a specific non-naturally occurring genetically altered strain of
polyploid oysters.663
Shortly after the Board's decision in Allen, the PTO had issued
a Rule which stated, in part, that the PTO "now considers non-
naturally occurring, non-human multicellular organisms, including
animals, to be patentable subject matter within the scope of 35
U.S.C. § 101. ' '664
In the case of Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg,65 various
plaintiffs (including nonprofit organizations whose goal is the pro-
tection of animals) had filed suit in district court challenging the
Rule on procedural and substantive grounds. The goal of these
plaintiffs was to stop issuance of patents for animals.
The PTO Commissioner filed a motion to dismiss the com-
plaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.
The motion was granted by the district court, and the plaintiffs
appealed.666
In a first cause of action the plaintiffs had alleged that the Rule
declaring animals to be patentability subject matter exceeded the
659. Id.
660. 447 U.S. 303, 65 L. Ed. 2d 144, 100 S. Ct. 2204 (1980).
661. § 101 Inventions patentable
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, man-
ufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and require-
ments of this title.
35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
662. 2 USPQ2D 1425 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1987), aff'd, 846 F.2d 77 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
See also Ex Parte Hibberd, 227 USPQ 443 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1985).
663. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 305.
664. See 1077 Official Gazette 24 (April 21, 1987).
665. 932 F.2d 920, 18 USPQ2D 1677 (Fed. Cir. 1991).




authority delegated to the Commissioner under the patent statute.
As relief for this alleged violation, the plaintiffs sought a declaration
that animals are not patentable subject matter under § 101 and an
injunction against the issuance of any patents directed to animals.667
The plaintiffs had asserted essentially two types of personal in-
juries from the Commissioner's allegedly erroneous interpretation
of § 101: (1) having to pay increased costs in the form of royalties
on patented animals, and (2) suffering decreased profits because of
competition from more productive non-naturally occurring
animals.668
The Federal Circuit found that these alleged economic injuries
were highly speculative and not "fairly traceable" to the Commis-
sioner's allegedly erroneous interpretation of the statute. 669 The
Federal Circuit further found that the "zone of interests" of the
patent laws is not so broad as to encompass any member of the
public who perceives they will be harmed by an issued patent which
they believe to be invalid. The Federal Circuit therefore concluded
that the plaintiffs had failed to allege facts sufficient to give them
standing to sue on the first cause of action.67
In a second cause of action the plaintiffs had asserted that the
PTO Commissioner had violated the Administrative Procedure Act
by failing to publish a notice of the proposed Rule in the Federal
Register, by failing to allow interested persons an opportunity to
submit public comment, and by failing to state the basis and pur-
pose of the Rule following consideration of public comment. 671 The
plaintiffs sought to enjoin the PTO from approving or issuing any
patents on multicellular living organisms, including animals, or tak-
ing any action to effectuate the Rule, until the PTO complied with
these procedural requirements. 672
667. Id.
668. Id.
669. Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 48 L. Ed. 2d 450, 96
S. Ct. 1917 (1976).
670. To establish standing to sue, a party must show (1) "that he personally has suffered
some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct" (personal in-
jury), (2) that "the injury 'fairly can be traced to the challenged action'" (causation), and (3)
that the injury "is likely too be redressed by a favorable decision" (effective relief). Valley
Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454
U.S. 464, 472, 70 L. Ed. 2d 700, 102 S. Ct. 752 (1982). In addition to these requirements for
standing, the Supreme Court has further limited standing to those parties within the "zone of
interests" a particular statute addresses. Air Courier Conference of America v. American
Postal Workers Union, 112 L. Ed. 2d 1125, 111 S. Ct. 913, 59 U.S.L.W. 4140, 4142 (Feb. 26,
1991).
671. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) and (c).
672. Animal Legal Defense Fund, 18 USPQ2D at 1687.
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On appeal, the Federal Circuit observed that prior public no-
tice and comment regarding certain agency actions is required
under § 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act.67 However, no-
tice and public comment is not required for interpretative rules,
general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, proce-
dure, or practice.674
The Federal Circuit noted that the subject Rule clearly corre-
sponded with the interpretation of § 101 set out in Allen and
Chakrabarty. Thus, the Federal Circuit viewed the Rule as being
merely interpretative of previous valid administrative actions and
not representing a change in the law by the Commissioner. The
Federal Circuit therefore concluded that the Commissioner's Rule
fell within the "interpretative" exception to the § 553 public notice
and comment requirement, and that the plaintiffs consequently had
no standing to assert the second cause of action.
The Federal Circuit therefore affirmed the district court's rul-
ing on the ground that the plaintiffs had lacked standing to sue.
E. Intervention Under Fed.R. Civ.P. 24(A)(2) Is Appropriate
Only Where Disposition of the Action May Impair the
Intervenor's Ability to Protect Its Interest
The subject patent in the case of Chapman v. Manbeck 675 had
lapsed because the patentee had failed to pay maintenance fees re-
quired under 35 U.S.C. § 41(b). The Commissioner had denied the
patentee's petition to reinstate the lapsed patent pursuant to 35
U.S.C. § 41(c)(1). The patentee then filed an action under 5 U.S.C.
§ 701-06 in federal district court in Virginia to compel the Commis-
sioner to reinstate the patent. The Virginia district court ordered
the Commissioner to reinstate the patent.676
Previously, the patentee had filed suit against an accused in-
fringer in federal district court in New Jersey. Immediately after
the Virginia district court ordered the Commissioner to reinstate
the patent, the patentee amended the complaint in the New Jersey
suit to charge the accused infringer with infringement of the rein-
673. (b) General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal Regis-
ter, unless persons subject thereto are named and either personally served or otherwise have
actual notice thereof in accordance with law ....
(c) After notice required by this section, the agency shall give interested persons an
opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written data, views, or
arguments .... 5 U.S.C. § .553(b), (c).
674. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A).
675. 931 F.2d 46, 18 USPQ2D 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
676. Id. at 1566.
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stated patent. The New Jersey district court thereafter issued an
order preventing the accused infringer from raising a lapsed patent
defense against the new infringement claim.677
The accused infringer then moved to intervene as a third party
in the patentee's suit for reinstatement against the Commissioner in
the Virginia district court. The Virginia district court denied the
accused infringer's motion to intervene, and the accused infringer
appealed that denial to the Federal Circuit.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that intervention by third
parties is governed by Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. Under subsection (a), Rule 24 permits intervention of right:
"When the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or
transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so
situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter
impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest, un-
less the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing
parties.1678
The Federal Circuit found that the decision of the Virginia dis-
trict court ordering reinstatement of the patent was not binding
upon the New Jersey district court. If the New Jersey district court
prevented the accused infringer from raising a lapsed patent de-
fense, then the decision of the New Jersey district court could be
challenged by the accused infringer via an appeal to the Federal
Circuit. The Virginia district court action therefore did not impair
the accused infringer's ability to fully litigate its rights. Conse-
quently, the Virginia district court's denial of intervention did not
"impair or impede" the accused infringer's interest "as a practical
matter." 679
The Federal Circuit therefore affimed the Virginia district
court's denial of the accused infringer's motion to intervene.
F. Lear v. Adkins Does Not Override the Res Judicata Effect
of a Consent Judgment Declaring a Patent Valid
The subject patents in the case of Foster v. Hallco Manufactur-
ing Co., Inc. 680 had come into dispute between the same parties in
an prior infringement litigation. The parties had entered a settle-
ment agreement of that prior litigation, under which the alleged in-
677. Id.
678. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2), [emphasis added].
679. The Federal Circuit additionally found that the Virginia district court had not
abused its discretion in denying permissive intervention. Chapman, 18 USPQ2D at 1565.
680. 947 F.2d 469, 20 USPQ2D 1241 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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fringer had obtained a nonexclusive royalty bearing license under
the patents. The parties had terminated the prior litigation by the
entry of a consent judgment in which the alleged infringer had ac-
knowledged the validity and infringement of the patents. 681
About four years after entry of the consent judgment, the al-
leged infringer began producing and marketing new models of the
accused products. The alleged infringer took the position that the
new accused products did not infringe the patents in the license
agreement, and therefore the alleged infringer had no obligation to
pay royalties to the patentee on sales of the new accused products.
The patentee disagreed, taking the position that the new accused
products were covered by the license agreement, and demanded
royalty payments on the new accused products.682
The alleged infringer then filed suit, seeking a declaration that
the patents were invalid and unenforceable. The patentee moved
for partial summary judgment, on the ground that the alleged in-
fringer was precluded from raising the issues of validity and en-
forceability by reason of the consent judgement entered in the prior
litigation between the parties, which stated that the patents were
valid and enforceable. The alleged infringer responded by asserting
that the consent judgment was itself unenforceable because the con-
sent judgment was equivalent to an agreement not to challenge the
validity of a patent. The alleged infringer based its position on the
case of Lear v. Adkins, 6 s in which the Supreme Court held that
patent licensees are not precluded from challenging the validity of
licensed patents because of the federal policy favoring full and free
use of ideas in the public domain.
The district court held that the provision in the consent judg-
ment with respect to the validity and enforceability of the patents
contravened the federal patent policies recognized by the Supreme
Court in Lear v. Adkins and, thus, the consent judgment did not
preclude the alleged infringer from raising the issues of validity and
enforceability. 68 4
On appeal, the issue was whether the patent policy expressed in
Lear v. Adkins overrides the res judicata 685 effect which would
681. Id. at 1242.
682. Id.
683. 395 U.S. 653, 23 L. Ed. 2d 610, 89 S. Ct. 1902 (1969), 162 USPQ 1. Foster, 20
USPQ2D at 1244.
684. Foster, 20 USPQ2D at 1244.
685. Res judicata precludes the relitigation of a cause of action, or any possible defense
to the cause of action, which is ended by a judgment of the court. Res judicata applies
whether the judgment of the court is rendered after a trial and imposed by the court, or the
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otherwise result from a consent judgment which declared a patent
valid and enforceable.
The Federal Circuit observed that the issue considered by the
Supreme Court in Lear involved the right of a patent licensee to
challenge the validity of a licensed patent in a suit for royalties
under a contract. The issue therefore involved a conflict between
federal patent policy and state contract law. The Supreme Court in
Lear concluded that federal patent policy should prevail, and there-
fore ruled in favor of precluding restrictions on attacks on patent
validity.6 86
However, the Supreme Court in Lear did not deal with the
specific fact situation presented in Foster, in which prior litigation
had been terminated by a consent judgment that expressly acknowl-
edged a patent's validity. In such a situation, the Federal Circuit
found that other strong competing policy considerations came into
play, namely, preserving the finality of judgments as well as the
strong public policy of encouraging settlements. Moreover, unlike
Lear, where there was a conflict between federal patent policy and
state contract law, in Foster these strong competing policies did not
involve questions of the primacy of federal law over state law.6 87
The Federal Circuit concluded that the patent policy expressed
in Lear v. Adkins did not override the res judicata effect which
would otherwise result from a consent judgment that declared a
patent valid and enforceable.68 8 The Federal Circuit therefore re-
versed the district court's ruling based on Lear and held that a con-
sent judgment respecting validity and enforceability may bar future
litigation of those issues. However, because there were genuine is-
sues of fact and law respecting the application of principles of res
judicata, the Federal Circuit remanded to the district court for re-
689consideration of those issues.
G. Fed. R. Evid. 705 Is Applicable to Opinion Testimony on
Infringement of Means-Plus-Function Claims
The case of Symbol Technologies, Inc. v. Opticon, Inc. 90 in-
volved several patents directed to methods and devices employing






690. 935 F.2d 1569, 19 USPQ2D 1241 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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lasers to read bar codes.69 1
At trial, the patentee had offered the testimony of an expert
witness, accompanied by charts and drawings, to demonstrate in-
fringement of the asserted claim--, each of which contained "means
plus function" limitations as permitted under 35 U.S.C. § 112, 6.
The patentee's expert stated that, in his opinion, each claim limita-
tion was met by a corresponding structure in the accused device.692
At trial, the patentee had suggested that, under Fed. R. Evid.
705,693 the district court receive the exhibits representing the ex-
pert's testimony without foundation, thereby avoiding the need to
go through lengthy testimony explaining with each infringing de-
vice how the expert found that each element was infringed. The
infringer raised no objection, and failed to cross-examine the paten-
tee's expert on the issue.
The district court found infringement,694 and the infringer ap-
pealed the judgment. On appeal, the infringer argued that the pat-
entee had failed to present sufficient evidence during its case-in-
chief to establish a prima facie showing of infringement. The in-
fringer contended that a party asserting infringement of claims con-
taining "means plus function" limitations must demonstrate how
each structure in the accused device, asserted to meet a functional
claim limitation, is the same as or equivalent to a corresponding
structure disclosed in the specification. 695 The infringer argued that
the patentee's expert had testified on the ultimate issue of infringe-
ment, but had failed to discuss in detail the equivalency between the
structure of the accused device and the structure disclosed in the
patent specification.696
The Federal Circuit observed, however, that the purpose of
691. Id. at 1242.
692. Id.
693. Rule 705 provides:
Disclosure of Facts or Data Underlying Expert Opinion
The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give reasons there-
for without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the court
requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose the
underlying facts or data on cross-examination.
Symbol Technologies, 19 USPQ at 1241.
694. Symbol Technologies, Inc. v. Opticon, Inc., 17 USPQ2d 1737 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
695. See Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 934, 4 USPQ2D 1737,
1739 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961, 108 S. Ct. 1226 (1988). In Pennwalt the
Federal Circuit stated: "Where the issue is raised, it is part of the ultimate burden of proof of
the patent owner to establish, with respect to a claim limitation in means-plus-function form,
that the structure in the accused device which performs that function is the same as or an
equivalent of the structure disclosed in the specification." Id.
696. Symbol Technologies, 19 USPQ2D at 1241.
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Rule 705 is to abbreviate trials by permitting expert witnesses to
state opinions without first specifying the data upon which the opin-
ion is based. The Federal Circuit confirmed that Rule 705 is fully
applicable to patent trials and to opinion testimony on infringement
of claims under 35 U.S.C. § 112, 6.
The patentee was therefore permitted, under Rule 705, to rest
its prima facie case on the expert's testimony that the patents were
infringed. The Rule provided the infringer with the opportunity to
demonstrate by cross examination that the expert's opinion testi-
mony was factually incorrect. However, the infringer chose not to
cross examine the patentee's expert on this issue. The Federal Cir-
cuit concluded that under Fed. R. Evid. 705 the patentee had made
a prima facie showing of infringement and affirmed the judgment of
the district court.6 97
H. The Purpose of Requiring a Respondent to Post a Bond
With the ITC Is to Protect the Complainant As Well
As the Public Interest
The complainant in the case of Biocraft Laboratories, Inc. v.
U.S. International Trade Commission 6 98 alleged that the respondent
had violated § 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930699 by importing and
selling crystalline cefadroxil monohydrate (cefadroxil), an antibiotic
covered by the complainant's U.S. patent.7°°
The Commission had issued a temporary cease and desist order
against the respondent. The temporary relief order had required
the respondent to post a bond with the Commission to allow the
respondent to sell cefadroxil which the respondent had imported
prior to the temporary relief order. The temporary relief order
stated that specific conduct otherwise prohibited by the order would
be permissible if such specific conduct was authorized by the com-
plainant in writing. Pursuant to the temporary relief order, the re-
spondent posted a bond with the Commission.
The Commission subsequently concluded its § 337 investiga-
tion and issued a permanent cease and desist order against the re-
spondent.7 °1 Shortly after the Commission issued the permanent
relief order, the complainant and the respondent settled a separate
district court litigation concerning the subject patent. The district
697. Id.
698. 947 F.2d 483, 20 USPQ2D 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
699. 19 U.S.C. § 1337.
700. Biocraft, 20 USPQ2D at 1447.
701. Id.
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court settlement agreement provided that the complainant would, if
requested by the respondent, join in any petition by the respondent
to obtain a return of the bond posted by the respondent with the
ITC.702
The respondent then requested that the Commission return the
bond. Pursuant to the district court settlement agreement, the com-
plainant submitted a letter joining the respondent's petition. The
Commission denied the respondent's request to return the bond,
and the respondent appealed.70 3
On appeal, the respondent argued that the district court settle-
ment agreement constituted the written authorization required by
the temporary relief order, and thereby made the bonding require-
ment inapplicable. The respondent also pointed out that the pur-
pose of the respondent's bond was to protect the complainant, and
the complainant here had agreed to the Commission's return of the
bond.7o
The Commission, on the other hand, argued that the district
court settlement between the respondent and the complainant had
occurred after the respondent had made the sales covered by the
bond, and that the temporary relief order required the complainant
to provide written authorization prior to such sales being made.70 5
The Federal Circuit, agreeing with the respondent, found that
once the sales in question had been authorized, the sales became
exempt from the bond and were no longer a justification for the
Commission to attempt to enforce the bond. The Federal Circuit
observed that settlement of conflicts is in the public interest and
should be encouraged. Where the complainant, whose competitive
position was being protected by the bond, agreed to its return as
part of a district court settlement agreement, return of the bond was
consistent with the intent of the parties, thereby encouraging settle-
ment. An opposite result would tend to discourage settlement.70 6
The Federal Circuit therefore held that where a complainant
agrees as part of a settlement agreement to the return of a bond, the
bond itself states that it does not apply to sales authorized by the
complainant, and the purpose of the bond is to protect the com-
plainant as well as the public interest, it is an abuse of discretion for
the Commission to decline to return the bond merely because of
702. Id. at 1448.
703. Id.
704. Id. at 1449.
705. Biocraft, 20 USPQ2D at 1448.
706. Id. at 1449.
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sales by a respondent of goods known to the complainant at the
time of the settlement agreement. The Federal Circuit therefore re-
versed the Commission's denial of the respondent's request for re-
turn of the bond posted pursuant to the temporary relief order. 7
XVII. APPELLATE COURT JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE
A. The Path of Appeal to the Federal Circuit Is Determined
By the Basis of Jurisdiction in the District Court
The case of Abbott Laboratories v. Brennan70 8 arose from an
interference proceeding in the PTO involving a patent application
of Brennan and a patent owned by Abbott. The Board had awarded
priority of invention to Brennan.7° 9
Abbott had then brought a civil action in district court pursu-
ant to 35 U.S.C. § 146, seeking to set aside the award of priority to
Brennan. Brennan had brought a counterclaim in the district court
action for fraudulent misrepresentation, abuse of process, tortious
interference with economic relations, antitrust violations, violation
of the RICO Act, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.710
The district court had awarded priority of invention to Bren-
nan. The district court had also denied Brennan's motion for sanc-
tions under Rule 11 and had denied Brennan's motion for a new
trial on his counterclaim of tortious interference with economic re-
lations. The district-court had further denied Abbott's motion for
JNOV or a new trial on the issue of abuse of process, and had par-
tially denied Abbott's alternative motion for remittitur.711
Brennan and Abbott sought review by the Federal Circuit of
various aspects of the judgment of the district court. However, Ab-
bott did not seek review of the district court decision awarding pri-
ority of invention to Brennan.
The Federal Circuit observed that, in view of Abbott's omis-
sion of appeal on the issue of priority of invention, no issues arising
under the patent law remained on appeal, and none had been re-
ferred to in the notice of appeal. The remaining issues on appeal
were either matters of state law based on pendent jurisdiction, or
issues of federal law that were not within the exclusive assignment
of the Federal Circuit, but that had been properly included at
707. Id. at 1450.
708. 952 F.2d 1346, 21 USPQ2D 1192 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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trial.712
The threshold question was therefore whether the Federal Cir-
cuit had jurisdiction over the appeal.7 13
The Federal Circuit noted that the path of appeal is deter-
mined by the basis of jurisdiction in the district court, and is not
controlled by the district court's decision or the substance of the
issues that are appealed. 714 Thus, the direction of appeal to the
Federal Circuit does not change during or after trial, even when the
only issues remaining are not within the exclusive assignment of the
Federal Circuit.715
Abbott's civil action had been properly brought under 35
U.S.C. § 146. The district court's jurisdiction had therefore arisen,
in part, under the patent statute, Title 35, and thus satisfied the
requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a).7 16 All appeals in such circum-
stances are assigned exclusively to the Federal Circuit under 28
U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1). 717
The path of the appeal in Abbott had been established with the
filing of the civil action to obtain a patent in accordance with 35
U.S.C. § 146. Although the § 146 issue was not appealed, the Fed-
eral Circuit concluded that the appeal of the other issues had been
correctly taken to the Federal Circuit.718
B. To Be Considered "Final" an Order Must Be Effectively
Unreviewable on Appeal From a Final Judgment
During the pre-trial stages in the case of Quantum Corporation
v. Tandon Corporation71 9 the patentee had moved to compel the
alleged infringer to produce documents relating to opinion letters of
counsel. The alleged infringer had countermoved for a separate
trial on the issue of willfulness after the conclusion of a trial on
liability and damages, and for deferral of discovery of the attorney
712. Id.
713. Abbott, 21 USPQ2D at 1192.
714. Id.
715. See, eg., Technicon Instruments Corp. v. Alpkem Corp., 866 F.2d 417, 419-20, 9
USPQ2d 1540, 1541-42 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Atari, Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 747 F.2d 1422,
1427, 223 USPQ 1074, 1077 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (en banc).
716. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) provides that "The district courts shall have original jurisdic-
tion of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents...".
717. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) provides that "The United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction - (1) of an appeal from a final decision of a
district court of the United States... if the jurisdiction of that court was based, in whole or in
part, on section 1338 of this title ... ".
718. Abbott, 21 USPQ2d at 1192.
719. 940 F.2d 642 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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opinion letters until after the trial on liability and damages.7 2
The district court had granted the patentee's motion to compel
production of the attorney opinion letters, and had denied the al-
leged infringer's motion to defer the trial on willfulness. The al-
leged infringer then sought to appeal the orders of the district court
compelling production of the attorney opinion letters and deferring
the trial on willfulness. The patentee moved to dismiss the appeal,
arguing that the orders appealed from were not final and therefore
were not appealable.721
The Federal Circuit noted that before a district court order
may be considered final, the order must (1) conclusively determine
the disputed question, (2) resolve an important issue completely
separate from the merits of the action, and (3) be effectively unre-
viewable on appeal from a final judgment.7 22
The Federal Circuit found that the two orders appealed from
in Quantum did not satisfy the third requirement, because the two
orders were effectively reviewable on appeal from a final judgment.
Consequently, the Federal Circuit concluded that the two orders
were not presently appealable, and granted the patentee's motion to
dismiss.723
C. The Sufficiency of the Evidence Underlying Presumed
Jury Findings Cannot Be Challenged on Appeal Where
a Motion for a Directed Verdict Was Not Made at
the Close of the Evidence
The case of Jurgens v. McKasy724 involved an appeal from a
district court judgment in a jury case involving patent infringement.
The judgment awarded damages and injunctive relief to the patent
owner for infringement of a patent directed to a windsock device.725
In Jurgens, the infringer had failed to bring a motion for a di-
rected verdict at the close of the evidence. Where a motion for a
directed verdict is not made at the close of the evidence, the suffi-
ciency of the evidence underlying presumed jury findings cannot be
720. Id. at 643.
721. Id.
722. Id. See also, Gulfstreamn Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 276,
99 L. Ed. 2d 296, 108 S. Ct. 1133 (1988); Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S.
541, 546, 93 L. Ed. 1528, 69 S. Ct. 1221 (1949).
723. Quantum, 940 F.2d at 642.
724. 927 F.2d 1552, 18 USPQ2D 1031 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
725. Id.
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challenged on appeal.726 Accordingly, when the infringer failed to
move for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence, the infringer
waived its right to challenge the presumed jury findings as unsup-
ported by substantial evidence. That failure dramatically changed
the standard of review on appeal with respect to fact issues decided
by the jury.727
For example, on appeal the infringer challenged the district
court's finding of patent validity under 35 U.S.C. § 103 in view of
two prior art references. Before the district court the patent owner
had argued that the first of these two prior art references was not
analogous art, and that the second of these two prior art references
did not show a windsock. 28
The question of what constitutes analogous art, as well as the
question of what a reference teaches, are questions of fact for the
jury to decide. On appeal, it is presumed that the jury decided these
fact questions in favor of the patent owner, concluding that the first
reference was not analogous art and that the second reference did
not show a windsock.729
Because the infringer had failed to move for a directed verdict,
the infringer could not challenge these presumptions on appeal.
Consequently, the Federal Circuit was required to presume that the
first reference was not analogous art and that the second reference
did not disclose a windsock. In accordance with these presump-
tions, the Federal Circuit concluded that the first reference could
have no bearing on the validity of the patent under 35 U.S.C. § 103,
and that the second reference would not have rendered the patent
invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 103.730
On appeal, the infringer also challenged the district court's
finding of patent infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.
The infringer asserted that if infringement was present under the
doctrine of equivalents, then the patent would encompass the prior
art. 3 More specifically, to cover the infringing windsocks literally,
the hypothetical claim would define a windsock which would have
been obvious in view of the second reference.
However, for the reasons stated above, the Federal Circuit was
726. Smith v. Ferrel, 852 F.2d 1074, 1075 (8th Cir. 1988); Hubbard v. White, 755 F.2d
692, 695-96 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 834, 88 L. Ed. 2d 87 , 106 S. Ct. 107 (1985).




731. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assoc., 904 F.2d 677, 683, 14
USPQ2D 1942, 1947-48 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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required to presume that the second reference did not disclose a
windsock. In accordance with this presumption, the Federal Cir-
cuit concluded that the hypothetical claim, viewed as a whole,
would not have been obvious in view of the second reference and
that the second reference therefore did not bar infringement by
equivalents. The judgment of the district court was therefore
affirmed.
D. A Post-verdict Motion Is a Prerequisite to Appellate
Review of the Sufficiency of the Evidence Underlying a
Jury Verdict
At the conclusion of testimony in the case of Biodex Corpora-
tion v. Loredan Biomedical, Inc.,7 32 the patentee had orally moved
for a directed verdict. The patentee had not made a specific asser-
tion that the alleged infringer's evidence in support of invalidity or
non-infringement had been insufficient, although judgment had
been requested on both issues as a matter of law. The district court
never ruled upon the patentee's motion.7 3
Both parties had requested and submitted various jury instruc-
tions. The district court, however, drafted its own instructions, to
which the patentee had objected.
The district court submitted the case to the jury with multiple
special verdict forms. In the special verdicts, the jury found that
one patent had been proven invalid and that the other patent had
not been infringed. The district court entered judgment on the jury
verdicts. The patentee made no post-verdict motions, either by re-
newing its motion for a directed verdict, moving for a new trial, or
by moving for judgment non obstante veredicto ("JNOV"). The
patentee appealed the judgment of the district Court.7 34
On appeal, the patentee argued that neither special verdict had
been supported by substantial evidence.
The Federal Circuit viewed the issue on appeal as being
whether a post-verdict motion is a prerequisite to appellate review
of the sufficiency of the evidence underlying a jury verdict. In Bi-
odex, the patentee had made an oral motion for a directed verdict at
the conclusion of the evidence. However, the patentee had not re-
submitted or renewed the motion in any form after the verdict.
The Federal Circuit reasoned that a requirement for an express
post-verdict motion by the potential appellant assists appellate re-
732. 946 F.2d 850, 20 USPQ2D 1252 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
733. Id. at 1253.
734. Id.
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view. A rule that requires explicit formulation and specification of
the preserved issues after the verdict requires the prospective appel-
lant to present the preserved issues to the district court in a well-
known and defined format after the verdict.735
The Federal Circuit therefore concluded that it could not re-
view the sufficiency of the evidence after a jury verdict absent some
post-verdict motion. The patentee's failure to present the district
court with a post-verdict motion precluded appellate review of the
sufficiency of the evidence, and was thereby dispositive of that por-
tion of the appeal directed to whether there was substantial evi-
dence to support the special verdicts.736
On appeal, the patentee also contended that the district court's
failure to give the patentee's requested jury instructions was prejudi-
cial error. 37 The Federal Circuit noted that jury instructions must
be both legally correct and sufficiently comprehensive to address
factual issues for which there is disputed evidence of record. To
succeed on appeal, the patentee must (1) prove that the jury instruc-
tions, read in their entirety, were incorrect or incomplete as given,
and (2) demonstrate that the jury instructions suggested by the pat-
entee could have cured the error. The Federal Circuit concluded
that the patentee had failed in both tasks.73
Since the Federal Circuit concluded that it may not review for
sufficiency of the evidence, and since there was no prejudicial legal
error, the Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district
court.
E. Prejudicial Legal Error Must Be Shown to Vacate a
Judgment Where No Motion for JNOV or a New Trial
Was Made After a Jury Verdict
Before the district court, the appellants in the case of Acousti-
cal Design, Inc. v. Control Electronics Company, Inc. "I had failed to
move for a directed verdict after the close of testimony, had failed
to move for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), and had
failed to move for a new trial. The district court entered final judg-
ment holding the appellants liable for patent infringement and en-
joining them from further infringement.
On appeal, the issue was whether the Federal Circuit should
735. Id.
736. Id.
737. Biodex, 20 USPQ2D at 1252.
738. Id.
739. 932 F.2d 939, 18 USPQ2D 1707 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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vacate and remand for a new trial a judgment rendered on a jury
verdict when no motions for directed verdict, JNOV, or new trial
were made before the district court.
Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a
motion for JNOV only when a party has previously moved for a
directed verdict. If no motions for JNOV or new trial are made in
the district court after a jury verdict, then the appellant is required
to show that prejudicial legal error occurred in the conduct of the
trial in order for the Federal Circuit to vacate the judgment of the
district court and remand for a new trial.7'
The Federal Circuit concluded that the appellants had not
demonstrated that prejudicial legal error occurred in the conduct of
the trial. Consequently, the Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment
of the district court.
F. Sanctions May Be Appropriate Where an Appeal Is
"Frivolous as Filed" or "Frivolous as Argued"
The appeal in the case of Finch v. Hughes Aircraft Company"4
resulted from a history of over twelve years of litigation by the ap-
pellant against the appellee.
The appellant and the appellee had originally been co-defend-
ants in a federal district court action in which the appellant had
ified a cross-claim against the appellee. After filing the cross-claim,
the appellant filed a separate complaint, in the same district court,
asserting claims identical to those in the cross-claim. All of the
counts alleged in both the complaint and the cross-claim were dis-
posed of by summary judgment for the appellee.
The appellant then fied a separate complaint against the appel-
lee in the same district court, substantially identical to the cross-
claim. The appellee moved for a dismissal of the complaint, and the
appellant did not oppose the motion. The district court granted the
appellee's unopposed motion to dismiss the new complaint, holding
that the complaint was duplicative of the proffered cross-claim and
that each count of the new complaint was barred by res judicata.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's or-
der dismissing the complaint because the appellant had failed to op-
pose the motion to dismiss, because the complaint was duplicative,
and because each claim in the complaint was barred by res judicata.
740. Railroad Dynamics, Inc. v. A. Stucki Co., 727 F.2d 1506, 1511, 220 USPQ 929, 934
(Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 871, 105 S. Ct. 220, 83 L. Ed. 2d 150, 224 USPQ 520
(1984).
741. 926 F.2d 1574, 17 USPQ2D 1914 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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Having determined that the district court's judgment must be af-
firmed, the Federal Circuit then addressed the appellee's request for
sanctions.
The Federal Circuit noted that there are two distinct bases on
which an appeal may be deemed frivolous, either one of which alone
is sufficient to support sanctions. First, an appeal may be deemed
"frivolous as filed" if the judgment of the district court is so plainly
correct and the legal authority contrary to the appellant's position
is so clear that there is no appealable issue. 42 Second, an appeal
may be deemed "frivolous as argued" where genuinely appealable
issues may exist, but the appellant's contentions in prosecuting the
appeal are frivolous.743
In the case of Finch, the Federal Circuit found the appellant's
appeal to be both frivolous as filed and frivolous as argued. Because
the appellant had no arguable basis in fact or in law for filing the
appeal and had made numerous arguments in support of the appeal
that were without any basis, the Federal Circuit granted the appel-
lee's request for sanctions under Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure and required the appellant to pay the appellee
double its costs.
742. See, e.g., In re Perry, 918 F.2d 931, 935 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Octocom Systems, Inc. v.
Houston Computer Servs., Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 943, 16 USPQ2D 1783 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Synan
v. Merit Systems Protection Bd., 765 F.2d 1099, 1102 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
743. Refac Int'l, Ltd. v. Hitachi, Ltd., 921 F.2d 1247, 1256, 16 USPQ2D 1347, 1354
Fed. Cir. 1990); Laitram Corp. v. Cambridge Wire Cloth Co., 919 F.2d 1579, 1583, 16
USPQ2D 1929, 1933 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Devices for Medicine, Inc. v. Boehl, 822 F.2d 1062,
1068-69, 3 USPQ2D 1288, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
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